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Abstract 
Over the few years that led to the creation of the constitutional law of the Islamic 
republic of Iran, I (the author) noticed a series of ambiguous and often 
contradictory points in its contents. Discovering the roots and the causes of such 
contradictions became my priority. After the Iranian Revolution (1979) 
intellectuals were confronted with very new experiences. For example, Shi'ah has 
always been a minority in the history of Islam. Therefore, Shi 'ah Fuqaha never 
experienced direct rule over people. Direct pressures from this new experience 
brought about the desire and the need for a shift in certain interpretations of the 
Shi'ah tradition. It became evident that religious laws did not have in them the 
power and the wisdom to provide answers to the issues and dilemmas of the 
modern times, hence the need for a fresh approach. 
One such issue was the discussion of legitimacy of power. 18 years on, the heated 
debate is still ongoing. Traditional Shi'ah theorists believed that all rulers are 
illegitimate except the one that represents the 12th Imam who has been absent for 
the last 1000 years. According to Shi'ah, this representation can only be made by 
elite clergy who have the ability to understand, fully, the history of Islam and 
Shi'ah. They also claim that Shari 'ah laws must be implemented in their entirety 
and according to the teachings of Qur'an and the 12 Infallible Imam. They further 
argue that the people as a whole have no role in determining the legitimacy of the 
ruler, as He has been appointed to implement divine laws and people must obey. 
With time, though, such attitudes were modified. Especially after the Islamic 
revolution in Iran (1979), new interpretations began to surface. Discussion of 
three fundamental elements relating to the shift of the Islamic viewpoints during 
the last 100 years and in particular after the Iranian revolution (1979) forms the 
main body of this thesis. These are: 
" Divine law 
" Divine Ruler 
" Role of the People 
The hypothesis of the thesis is that fundamental philosophical positions on all of 
the above three issues have been the subject of change and modification, to some 
extent and according to "time" and "place". This change does not reflect the 
abandoning of the Islamic faith by Muslims, but rather indicates the ability of this 
dynamic religion to modify itself with time'. These changes have also been 
associated with varying degrees of ambiguity and contradiction, which will be the 
subject of detailed discussions in this work. Viewpoints of other outstanding 
scholars who tried to address these issues will also be presented. 
Two theories have been expressed in relation to the shift in the Shi'ah political 
thinking; 
" Islam's ability to adapt with "time" and "place" and new issues 
" "Change", in itself, defies the very existence of religion 
Both theories have been the subject of extensive debates. Traditional Muslims and 
Non-Muslims criticise Islam for supporting the latter view, whereas revivalists 
sympathise with the former. It must be mentioned also that reference throughout 
1 Iqbal. Enayat. Lambton 
II 
this work is only made to those scholars who have used Islamic sources for their 
reasoning, i. e., not to many others who have engaged in these discussions as 
independent figures. Also discussed- will be the traditional Islam represented by 
the majority of the Assembly of the Islamic Experts (Majles-i Khobregan) which in 
effect was the main creator of the Iranian Constitution. 
Outline Of the Thesis 
Chapter 1.0 is the introduction to the work. 
Chapter 2 deals with the ideas of Shaykh Nuri as the representative of conservative 
or traditional Islam. He sees legitimacy of power only through implementation of 
all the existing Islamic laws, and that a qualified clergy can represent the hidden 
Imam, solely. 
Chapter 3 discusses constitutionalist thoughts represented by Na'ni's idea. He 
believes that Islam consists of two sets of laws: (i) timeless (divine) and (ii) 
changeable laws and argues that not all Islamic laws are divine, contrary to 
common beliefs. He continues that the representative of the hidden Imam is the 
elected parliament not a person. 
Chapter 4 discusses Khomeini's beliefs before the 1979 revolution as a new 
traditionalist. His views of legitimacy include rejection of tyranny, poverty and 
colonialism. 
Chapter 5 discusses on the Mulahhari's view on the subject of this study. 
Muiahhari believed that there is no contradiction between Islamic and Republic. 
Chapter 6 deals with the Ayatollah Muntazari 's views about the legitimacy of 
power and role of the people. Muntazari published 4 Volumes about the Welayat- 
I Faqih. His books are the most academic and theoretical debate on the issue. 
Chapter 7 outlines the Iranian Constitution and the role of the Assembly of Islamic 
Experts in the making of it. 
Chapter 8 examines the reformed views of Imam Khomeini, on legitimacy of 
power after the 1979 revolution, and also discusses the ambiguities and 
contradictions in the ICL (1980-1989). 
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relating to the religious law, or the competence and 
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The "well guided", he who will restore justice and truth 
to the world. Thus, for Shi'ites, the Twelfth Imam 
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Literally "Sources of emulation". Every Shi'ah believer 
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marja' dies, another must immediately be chosen 
The general welfare of Muslim community 
Permissible law 
Islamicized Constitution 
vi 
Mujiahid 
Ma'sumun 
Musta, d'afun 
Nay an al-Munkar 
Sunnt 
Shar' 
Shari 'ah 
Sheikh 
quddisa sirrah 
al. -sharif 
Tanbih al- Umma va 
Tanzih alMella 
(Na'ini's Book) 
Taghut 
Taghuti 
ulu-l-anzr 
Ummah 
Usul 
Ulama, U'lim 
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Vaqf 
Wali al-'Asr 
Welayat 
WelayatF'aqih 
Zakat 
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one who may act according to his own judgement in 
matters relating to religious law; who practises ijtehad. 
A clergy man who is authorised to deal with the affairs 
of the Muslims. Theologian who had received a good 
number of ejaza from another mojtahid, and is 
competent to issue legal opinion (fatva) and to practice 
ijtehad 
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Those who are oppressed 
Forbidding indecency (evil) 
the exemplary practice of the prophet; and, for Ithna 
ashari shi 'ia, that of the Imam. 
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Islamic law 
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in time of danger 
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Warning to the Community of Believers and Purification 
of the Nation (Admonition and Refinement of the 
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Demonic 
those in authority 
The Islamic Community 
The principles or sources of the religious law. 
(Plural of the U'lim), one learned in the religious law and 
its sources 
customary law 
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Fundamental doctrines of the faith 
(agent) in 940, and still continuing. 
An inalienable endowment, established for religious or 
charitable purpose, or to ensure security of tenure within 
a family 
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The loyalty and devotion of the Shiva faithful to the 
Hidden Imam. 
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The discretionary authority of the Jurist 
Islamic poor tax, obligatory alms 
Free non-Muslim subjects living in Muslim country 
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"He(Prophet) removes from them their burdens and the fetters(shackles) that were 
upon them". Qur'an. 7.157 
+++++++++++++++++++ 
"The essence of Touhid ( Monotheism) as a working idea is equality, solidarity, 
and freedom. Tine state, from the Islamic standpoint, is an endeavour to transform 
these ideal principles into space-time forces, an aspiration to realise them in a 
definite human organisation. It is in this sense alone that the state in Islam is 
theocracy, not in the sense that it is headed by a representative of God on earth 
who can always screen hid despotic will behind his supposed infallibility. 
The state according to Islam is only an effort to realise the spiritual in a human 
organisation. But in this sense all state, not based on more domination and aiming 
at the realisation of ideal principle, is theocratic. 
Mohammad Iqbal' 
+++++++++++++++++++ 
Any political system is shielded by an ideology, since this is bound to produce after 
a while self-appointed guardians of its " truth", ready to hurl accusation of heresy 
at all potential or actual rivals. Hamid Enayat2 
1 "The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam" 
z "Modern Islamic Political Thought" 
XI III 
The declaration of Shi`ism as the state religion of Iran in 1501. The caption reads: "On Friday, the 
exalted king went to the congregational mosque of 
Tabriz and ordered its preacher, who was one of 
the Shiite dignitaries, to mount the pulpit. 
The king himself proceeded to the front of the pulpit, 
unsheathed the sword of the Lord of 
Time, may peace be upon him, and stood there like the shin- 
ing sun. " 
From the History of Shah /sma`i/, British Library MS. Or 3248 (Ross Anonymous), fol. 74a. Pho- 
tograph courtesy of the British Library. 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
The Islamic Revolution of Iran is one of the most important world events in the 
second half of the twentieth century. The Shi'ah establishment mobilised its vast 
array of resources and powerful network, including more than 80,000 religious 
centres, 200,000 clerics, an appearing ideology, a charismatic leadership and a 
strong financial base to bring about the revolution. ' 
One of the most interesting aspects of the Revolution is its ideology. It is clear 
that ideology plays a crucial role in the way we understand and shape the political 
world, but no one has yet satisfactorily explained the nature of ideologies 
themselves. According to Freeden2, 
"By paying special attention to the complexity, conceptual 
inter-relationship and historic and contemporary context of 
ideologies we can both better understand them and 
reinvigorate the study of political theory". 
The ideological debate on the legitimacy of the state and participation is a 
question for all Muslims around the world. In the Muslim countries, politics and 
state are completely related to Islam. 
It is important and necessary to acknowledge that although we are discussing 
Shi'ah thought, this does not mean that thought from other sources can or cannot 
Mossavar R. Introduction, 1987 
2 Freeden, M. Introduction, 1996. 
I 
play a crucial role in the historical transformation, but the limitation of this work 
is to Shi'ah thought on the Legitimacy of power and the participation of the 
nation. The establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran can be seen as an 
attempt to legitimise political power by people with a shared religious ideology, to 
form or maintain a close alliance between mosque and state, between cult and 
power. 
It is clear that contemporary Islamic political thought can not be properly 
appreciated without a knowledge of what Islamic scholars have said in the past 
owing to the influence of their opinions upon the present. In first chapter we will 
deal with the opposition to Constitutionalism, and we will consider briefly the 
reasons why certain representatives of the Ulama were opposed by exponents of 
constitutionalism. 
The amount of political writing and pamphleteering on the above issues, within a 
strictly Islamic framework, is staggering, so there has been no option but to take 
certain prominent writers as representatives of entire schools of thought. 
Over the centuries, Shi'ah Muslims have accepted that what the Ulama have been 
saying or writing in their Epistles is Islam, and the Ulama have made decisions on 
economic, political, family and even personal issues. Traditionally Iranian 
Muslims had referred their religious questions and problems on Islamic duties to 
the Ulama; for instance, on the rights of the wife andher husband, or on the 
Islamic taxes, or penal law. 
2 
But now according to Article 15 of Iranian Constitutional Laws (ICL. 1980) the 
Islamic Consultative Assembly had the right in all questions to propose any 
measure... and submit such a measure. 
Thus, here was a question for Muslims: Was this law Islamic or not? If it was, 
then Islamic Fuqaha had been written on the Islamic laws before, and if it was not 
Islamic, they had no duty to obey such un-Islamic laws. Thus the people's 
support or lack of it was very important to both sides, and each tried to express 
and explain their reasons simply and clearly for the benefit of the people. For 
instance, Constitutionalists stated that proceedings of the parliament should be 
clear enough for the people to follow, so that they could be reassured that the 
legislation derived from Islam and not from Western non-Muslim countries. 
For the Constitutionalists, it was very difficult to ignore this important issue. 
Meanwhile, the Islamic Constitutionalists' emphasis on the traditional faith of the 
people, and their arguments, were more readily acceptable to the Muslim 
population. Thus the Constitutionalists were in greater need of the support of the 
supreme Ulama (marja'I taqlid) than were the Islamic Constitutionalists. Some 
Islamic Constitutionalists claimed that they did not accept any kind of government 
which, damaged their Islam, even 
in the case of the abolition of oppression in 
society. 
After the revolution, certain people insulted some of the traditional Muslim beliefs 
and faiths. Thus, some Muslims were worried about their 
beliefs, and thought 
that constitutionalism was a way to 
lose their faith. 
3 
Ayatolah Taleqani wrote in this regard3: "Some stupid people and some who were 
alienated by the European culture, explicitly and inexplicably insulted the Ulama. 
Some newspapers published their words. They were talking about the freedom of 
women, and interpreted equality and freedom according to what were their desires, 
not Islam". 
Whatever were the causes of members of the Ulama's opposition to 
constitutionalism, they always cited Islamic sources as the justification for their 
opinions. There were more than one hundred books and epistles for and against 
constitutionalism. 4 The content and number of these publications indicates the 
crucial role played by the theoretical debate. Islamic Constitutionalists claimed 
that the only reason for their opposition to constitutionalism was their faith in 
Islam. 
The non Islamic intellectuals, who are in general, a school opposed to the Islamic 
Constitutionalists, share a common opinion with them in that they too believe that 
Islam and constitutionalism are incompatible. Both schools of thought have 
referred to the orthodox interpretation of Islamic tradition in their argumentation. 
3 Talegni, M. 1981, P 11 
4 Zargarnezhad, G. 1995, P 39 
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1.1 The main hypothesis of this work and its illustration 
The main hypothesis of this work is that there are contradictions in the ICL 1980 
regarding legitimacy of power and political participation. The following extracts 
from the ICL 1980 provide an illustration: 
Article 6 of the ICL: 
"In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the affairs of the country must be 
administered on the basis of public opinion expressed by means of elections, 
including the election of the president, the representatives of the Islamic 
Consultative Assembly, and members of councils, or by referenda in matters 
specified in other articles of this constitution". 
This may be seen to suggest that the source of the legitimacy of power resides in 
the opinions of the majority of the people (nation). However, Article 2 of the ICL 
1980 states: 
"The Islamic Republic is a system based on belief in: 
1. God (as defined in the statement "There is no God except Allah"), His 
exclusive sovereignty and right to legislate, and the necessity of submission to His 
commands; 
2. Divine revelation and its fundamental role in setting forth laws. 
Thus according to Article 2, The Islamic Republic or Iran (IRI) is a system 
based on belief in God and the execution of God's rules. If, then, God and His 
law is the source of legitimacy of power in Iran, as stated here, how can "people 
power" as described in Article 6 co-exist with Article 2? 
Additionally the authority to recognise and reconcile the laws, as in Article 2, is 
the Islam Guardian Council mentioned in Article 2. The Guardian Council 
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members are selected by the leader of The Islamic Republic of Iran; in fact, they 
are representatives of the leader and not of the people as such. 
Furthermore, in Article 4 we read that, "All civil, penal, economic, administrative, 
cultural, military, political and other laws and regulations must be based on 
Islamic criteria. This principle applies absolutely and generally to all articles of 
the Constitution as well as to all other laws and regulations, and the Fuqaha of the 
Guardian Council are judges in this matter". 
Again in Article 4 above, we find that Islam (Submission to the will and laws of 
God) is the criterion for legitimacy of power. Article 12, which is quoted below, 
despite allowing for some leeway regarding interpretation still maintains that 
God's established law is the legitimate power: 
Article 12: 
"The official religion of Iran is Islam and the twelver Jafari school [in usul al-din 
and Figh], and this principle will remain eternally immutable. Other Islamic 
schools, including the Hanafi, Shafii, Maliki, Hanbali and Zaydi, are to be 
accorded full respect, and their followers are free to act in accordance with their 
own jurisprudence in performing their religious rites. These schools enjoy 
official status in matters pertaining to religious education, affairs of personal 
status (marriage, divorce, inheritance and wills) and related litigation in courts of 
law. In regions of the country where Muslims following any one of these schools 
of Fiqh constitute the majority, local regulations, within the bounds of the 
jurisdiction of local councils, are to be in accordance with the respective school of 
Fiqh, without infringing on the rights of the followers of other schools". 
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1.2 Historical background to the Persian constitutional revolution 1906 
As Enayat states: "The Persian Constitutional Revolution of 1906 had its origins 
in sets of circumstances developing both inside and outside Iran. From the 
international perspective the Persian Revolution may be seen as a further 
development of the wave of constitutional movements spreading across the globe 
from 1848 onwards. Most relevant may be constitutional changes or revolutions 
in Great Britain, 1867,1884; Italy, 1859 - 70; Denmark, 1864; Austria and 
Hungary, 1869; Germany, 1871; France, 1875; those in Turkey in 1876 and 1908; 
in Egypt and India, several times during the second half of the nineteenth century; 
in Japan 1889; Russia 1905; and China from 1905 to 1911. Both directly and 
indirectly the Persians were influenced by these events". 5 
There were circumstances within Iran itself, which were sufficient to precipitate 
revolution, notably arbitrary rule and corruption on the part of the government in 
Tehran and in the provinces. The Qajar rulers were deeply unpopular with the 
majority of the people and this included two most influential groups, the Ulama 
and the merchants. 
European influence within the country itself, was also causing dissatisfaction and 
destabilisation. 
Keddie states: " The economic and political dislocations brought about by the 
western impact included the undermining of most Iranian handicrafts, the 
transformation of carpet weavers into labourers working for a pittance, the fall in 
prices of Iranian exports as compared to European imports, and a disastrous drop 
in the international price of silver, the basis of Iran's currency. These 
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developments, along with the difficulty of setting up protected factories, led to 
growing economic discontent and resentment against European rivals. Even 
though some rural and urban groups benefited from trade with the West, they 
often had other grievances. Western political control of Iran was resented and the 
numerous Iranian merchants and workers who traveled to India, Russian 
Transcaucasia and Turkey could witness reforms and hear liberal ideas suggesting 
ways that governments could change and could undertake self strengthening 
policies of a kind that might better Iran's condition and free it from foreign 
control". 6 
Inside Iran, the government had allowed foreign concessions which not only 
threatened the interests of the middle class, especially the merchants but also, the 
Ulama. The traditional role of the Ulama and the religious institutions was also 
perceived to be under threat by the growth of foreign intervention and the 
consequent general influence of Westernisation. A number of intellectual Persian 
Westernisers also began to make their influence felt. These wrote against the 
tyrannical rule of their own government and campaigned at home and abroad. 
Notable among this group were Akhund-Zadah, Majd al-Mulk, Sipahsalar, 
Mustashar al-Dawlah, Malkam Khan and Talibov. Without the support of the 
Ulama, however, they could not achieve popular support in Iran, as the Ulama 
were the only organ for the expression of general public opinion. In order for 
talks of reform to facilitate revolution, an alliance was necessary between these 
intellectuals and the Ulama, all of whom, though for a variety of reasons, were 
intent upon the downfall of the then Iranian regime. The architect of this alliance 
s Ha'iri, A. 1977, P1 
6 Keddie. N. R. 1981 
8 
emerged. He was Sayyid Jamal al-Din Asadabadi, Afghani. As a result of his 
influence upon the thinking of both groups, when constitutionalism was addressed 
in contemporary writing, it was eventually presented as an idea which did not 
conflict with the traditional beliefs of the Shi'ah. 
Table 1 
Class Composition of the first Majlis (paramount) 1906 
Member's Fathers (%) 
Landowners (including landowning clergy)21 18 
Bazaari merchants and guildsmen 37 29 
Government employees 16 19 
Clergy (non-land-owning) 17 25 
Employees of internal enterprises 43 
Self-employees professionals 56 
Lower classes 00 
Source: Zahra Shajii, Namayandigan-i Majlis-i Shoray-i Melli Dar Bistoyek 
Dowrey-i Ganungozari [Representative of the National Assembly in Twenty-one 
Legislative Assemblies] (Tehran Institute of Social Research, University of 
Tehran, 1965), PP 176,250. 
Open demands were made for reforms in the administration of justice by Nuri, 
Bihbahani and Tabatabai, who were leaders among the mujtahids. They soon 
acquired a considerable following from a range of groups which included clerical 
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students. Ultimately, this movement resulted in the declaration of the Persian 
Constitution of 1906. 
The Ulama now believing that constitutionalism was in conformity with Islam, 
strongly advocated in their speeches and writing a constitutional form of 
government. They considered the tyranny and arbitrary rule of the Qajar Dynasty 
to be un-Islamic and attempted to reconcile democratic constitutionalism with the 
Islamic Shi 'ah system, in order to overthrow it. The nation as a whole 
traditionally supported the Ulama and so the Ulama's participation in the 
revolution ensured its success. 
1.3 The Ulama and Constitutionalism 
In this study the clerical attitudes towards the Iranian Constitutional Revolution 
(1906) is discussed, and in so doing the Ulama's interpretation of legitimacy and 
participation. Muslim thinkers had already discussed the harmony between Islam 
and constitutionalism, but they did not represent the Shi'ah belief and tradition, 
which has a different theory of government. 
The Ulama who began to explore the possibilities of a new regime were on the 
side of the bourgeois nationalist, i. e. the liberal merchant, tradesmen, artisans, etc. 
The Absolutist Ulama, on the other hand, mainly represented the royal court, 
many of the land-owners, conservative high middle class, unskilled labourers tied 
to the royal court, awqaf beneficiaries and retainers, those on low- income and the 
very poor. The religious public, influenced by anti-constitutional propaganda of 
the Absolutist Ulama, considered constitutionalism at variance with Islam. 
The ideological conflict about constitutional government, was a major cause of 
contention amongst the Ulama. Some Mama attempted to find an Islamic 
Reza Ghods. 1989. 
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solution for the question of the democratic constitutionalism and construct a 
constitution compatible with Islam. 
Most reformers expressed their ideas in the language of Islamic sciences using 
stereotyped legal phrases, citing Qur'anic verses and prophetic sayings, with only 
occasional quotations from foreign sources. But as time went on, Westernised 
intellectuals began to replace traditional leaders at most levels of the educational 
system. There resulted the increasing tendency of the literate classes to hold all 
that was old responsible for Muslim backwardness. The cultural unity of the elite 
was shattered. While the majority of the literate and the learned remained loyal to 
Islamic ideals and values, a small but increasingly influential group had come to 
admire and advocate Western culture and civilisation as being superior to all other 
known civilisations. They did this in a phraseology unfamiliar to most Muslims 
whether educated or not. The breakdown of the cultural integration of traditional 
society was thus reflected in a linguistic rift, which has been one of the chief 
obstacles to a coherent, sustained and fruitful debate among Muslims of all classes 
and ages over their social and political problems. This obstacle remains today. 
1.4 Changes in attitude since the Second World War 
One of the remarkable changes in the over-all Muslim mentality since the Second 
World War has been a growing trend in the opposite direction, namely, an 
awareness that no political idea, however valid and vital for the freedom and 
prosperity of Muslims, can mobilise them in a successful movement to cure their 
ills, unless it is shown to conform in both form and substances to the dictates of 
their religious consciousness. 
1.5 Ulama and legitimacy leading up to 1906. 
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For the Ulama, constitutional revolution was a matter of expediency, because they 
believe the true and right government is the one run by the hidden Imam or his 
deputies. [see glossary and following outline of Shi'ah beliefs]. In the absence of 
the ideal rule of the Imam, the constitutional revolution was seen as the best 
alternative. 
The reforming Ulama's works on constitutionalism which they treated in their own 
style, were transmitted through the writings of the modernists of the Muslim 
world. 
In their arguments, the Ulama looked upon Islam and did their best to reconcile 
constitutional government with the Qur'an and the Hadith, in particular, the 
speeches given by Ali Ibn Abi Talib in Nahj al-Balagha, their first Imam. 
1.6 Shi'ah and Sunni 
Since the majority of Iranians are Shi'ah Muslims, and Shi'ah is the official 
religion of Iran, it is necessary to provide a brief introduction to Shi'ah. 
There is a general consensus among all Muslims as to how the two main strands 
of Islam, namely Shi'ah and Sunni, originated. In order to fully recognise the 
significance of the Shi'ah perspective we need to be familiar with the Sunni 
approach too, as their histories are inextricably linked. 
The following accounts by Enayat efficiently and succinctly summarise the 
essential features of both the Shi'ah and Sunni origins and perspective. 
"Immediately after the Prophet's death dispute broke out at the Sagifah assembly 
in Medina, over the choice of his successor. 
One group of Muslims, which proved to be a minority, believed that the Prophet 
had in fact designated his successor, and that was his son-in-law and cousin, Ali. 
According to them, the designation had taken place during the Prophet's journey 
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from his last pilgrimage to Mecca, on the eighteenth day of the month of Dhul- 
hyjah, in the eleventh year of his Hijrah(emigration) (632), at a place called the 
Ghadir (pool) of khumm, 8 where he made a fateful proclamation which has been 
reported in different versions, the most popular being: He for whom I was the 
master, should hence have All as his master. This group came to be known as the 
Shi'ah (literally, followers) of Ali. Another party close to them held that the 
succession should go to the prophet's uncle, Abbas, on the grounds that if being a 
relative of the prophet was to count as the decisive qualification, Abbas, being 
senior to Ali, had a greater right by virtue of the Qur'anic verse which requires 
that among "those who are akin some must be prior to others. " (Qur'an. 8 : 75). The 
Shi'ah case, however, went far beyond the personal qualities of Ali. It asserted 
that it was inconceivable that given God's justice and benevolence (lutf) towards 
human beings he should have left the issue of the leadership (imamah, Imamate) 
undecided. The same rational consideration which necessitated the sending of his 
emissaries and prophets also required that in their absence faultless leaders should 
be appointed for the custodianship (wilayah) of their followers. Furthermore, the 
logical corollary to the acceptance of the Prophet Muhammad's teaching was the 
commitment to their implementation. Only a sound and thorough knowledge 
(ilm) of the true meaning of the Qur'an and the Prophetic Tradition could help the 
young Muslim community in this direction. That knowledge was available to 
those who were near and dear to the prophet especially All, and, through him, to 
his eleven male descendants: this at least was the position of the Shi'ahism of the 
Twelver school (ithna ashari). 
$ The name of a place in Saudi Arabia 
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1.7 Ejtehad 
Enayat explains the Shi'ah belief on Ejtehad in the following manner ; 
"Shi'ah vitality can be explained primarily by some of its potentialities for 
adaptation to social and political change. The most essential of these are the 
principle of Utihad, or independent judgement, as a device supplementing the 
source of jurisprudence, and a potentially revolutionary posture in the face of 
temporal power. A belief-system which thus sanctions the exercise of free 
opinion, even if in matters of secondary importance, has manifestly a greater 
ability for accommodation with circumstances unforeseen in the source than one 
which prohibits or severely restricts all forms of doctrinal flexibility, whether on 
fundamental or secondary matters". 9 
1.8 Sunni: 
Here is a quotation about the Sunni. 
"Another group which formed the majority of Muslims, took the view that the 
Prophet had deliberately left the question of his succession open, leaving it to the 
community to decide who would be the most competent person to assume its 
leadership. These Muslims came to be known as the Sunnis, or the followers of 
Sunnah (tradition), an appellation which may be taken to symbolise their 
adherence to principles rather than personalities. Certainly, they must have been 
helped in their conviction by the fact that the Prophet had left no son. Many of 
them do not deny the authenticity of the Ghadir story, but contest the construction 
that the Shi'ah is put on it, particularly their understanding of the term master 
(mawla) in the Prophet's proclamation. The Sunnis instead stand for the right of 
the Muslim community to choose the Prophet's successor in political leadership 
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rather than the pre-emptive title of any particular individual to it. Typical of this 
stand is the stress laid on a saying attributed to the Prophet to the effect that his 
followers are more knowledgeable or better informed (a'lam) in their worldly 
affairs than him presumably after his death. "10 
Whatever the true intentions of the Prophet, it was the Sunni view that prevailed at 
the Sagifah assembly. Its proceedings, as reported by Tabary (d. 311/923) and 
other early Muslim historians, raise some doubts about the spontaneity of its 
decision. But the fact of the matter is that an animated, and at times stormy, 
debate did take place, and that the assembly finally did elect a successor. Abu 
Bakr, the man chosen and given the title of Khalifah (Caliph, successor) of God's 
messenger was also a distinguished member of the community and a close 
companion of the Prophet. He was older than other contenders for the Caliphate, 
had been chosen by the Prophet to accompany him on his migration from Mecca 
to Medina, an event of such importance as to deserve a mention in the Qur'an (9: 
40), gave the Prophet his daughter A'ishah in marriage and acted as his chief 
adviser. All this means that in justifying the Sagifah affairs, and the continuation 
of the basic feature of its procedure, that is, the consensus (ijma) of the elite, or the 
people who loose and bind (ahl al-hall wal-aqd) in the election of abu Bakr, as 
well as his three immediate successors (Umar, Uthnian and All, who, together 
with Abu Bakr, are known as the Rightly-Guided Caliphs (Khulafa rashidun), the 
Sunnis also have to introduce a good deal of personalised politics into the 
controversy. Besides Uma, the election of the Caliphs consisted also of bayah, 
literally clasping of hands, but meaning the taking of the oath of allegiance to the 
Enayat, M. 1991. P. 160 
1° Enayat, N. 1991. PP. 4-6. 
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Caliph by his electors, and ahd, the covenant whereby the Caliph undertook, in 
the face of the Muslim community, to rule in accordance with the provisions of 
the Shari'ah, and the community promised to obey him. So whereas the key 
political terms for the Shi'ah were imamah, wilayah and ismah, those for Sunnis 
were Khalifah, ijma and bayah. Overlapping terms were, of course, inevitable: 
the Sunnis used the title Imam for the Califah, especially whenever they referred 
to his spiritual functions; and the Shi'ah is accepted the validity of ýma, provided 
that it included the opinion of the infallible one (ma sum). ' 1 
1.9 Some important issues in Shi'ah belief related to this study 
1.9.1 Religion and state 
Muslims believe that Prophet Mohammad was not only a prophet, but a ruler. 
The mosque was not only a place for praying and worship but also a Muslim's 
centre of government and culture. For them " The mosque is and has been the 
origin of great Islamic movements and works in the course of history. The 
mosque is the bastion of religion, wisdom, intellectualism and national resistance 
besides being the origin of great moves and immortal blessings" 12. 
Bernard Lewis states that 13: 
"In Islam, there is from the beginning an interpenetration, almost an identification, 
of cult and power, or religion and the state: Mohammad was not only a prophet, 
but a ruler. In this respect, Islam resembles Old Testament Judaism and looks 
quite different from Christianity. Christianity began and endured for centuries 
under official persecution. Even after it became the state religion of Rome under 
" Enayat. H. 1991. P. 6 
12 Ayatollah Khomeini. The leader of the Iranian Islamic Revolution. Ettela'at, International 
(Newspaper), Iran in the Twentieth Century, Jan. 10.1997 
13 Bernard Lewis. Journal of Democracy, April 1996. p 61 
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the Emperor Constantine in the fourth century, a distinction was maintained 
between spiritual and temporal powers. Ever since then, all Christian states 
without exception have distinguished between throne and altar, church and state. 
The two powers might be closely associated, as under the caesaropapism of the 
Byzantine Empire, or they might be separated; they might work in harmony or 
they might come into conflict; one might dominate for a time and the other might 
displace it; but the duality remains, corresponding to the distinction in Christian 
Rome between Imperium (imperial power) and sacerdotium (priestly power)". 
1.9.2 Imam, God's Representative on Earth 
It is the Shi'ah belief that since Islam is a community ruled and governed by God, 
it is necessary to have an executive authority to represent Him on earth. Prophet 
Mohammad was the last of God's representatives, and in order to continue the 
government of God on Earth, the successor to Mohammad should have his two 
qualifying attributes; 
A. Mohammad was appointed by God to rule His community 
B. Mohammad was infallible 
Since the Imamate is a universal authority, the Imam should possess Mohammad s 
two attributes: he must be appointed by God, and he should be infallible. 14 
Islamic Constitutionalists argue that, according to the Shi'ah belief on the 
Imamate, since the Imam is the Infallible representative of God, there is no place 
for the majority vote of the ordinary people regarding the members of parliament. 
14 Ibn al-Mutahbar Hilli(1250-1326) 
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They believe that the ultimate source of legitimacy is the Imam. Because of the 
role of the Ulama who had much influence on the people, even non clergy 
Constitutionalists, in spite of their opposition to Islams, referred to the above 
Shi 'ah argument, to oppose or limit the Shah's absolute power. 
1.9.3 Great occultation 
According to the Hairi16: 
"According to Shi'ah belief, the period of infallible rulers came to an end upon the 
death of the Eleventh Imam, Hasan al-Askari, in 837 (Lunar). The twelfth Imam, 
Mahdi, remained alive but hidden: alive because the universe could not survive 
without him as proof (hijjah); hidden, in order to secure his life from any 
unfavourable events. To continue the task of rulership therefore, four consecutive 
Specified Agents were appointed by the Hidden Imam. Since the beginning of 
the Minor Occultation (Ghaybat-i Sughra) in 873 (Lunar), of the Twelfth Imam, 
Mohammad Mahdi, four men become known as the Specified Agents (Nuv-vab-i 
Khas) of the Imam. According to the last dispatch handed to the last one, no one 
after him was to become the Imam's Specified Agent; thus the period of the Minor 
Occultation (873-940 Lunar) was over and the Greater Occultation began. From 
then on, the task of providing leadership of the people in temporal and religious 
affairs was left to the qualified Ulama and the greater amongst them gradually 
came to be called by the titles Marja'i taqlids(the authority chosen to be followed) 
or Mughalad ( those who are followed) and their followers were called mughalids. 
The idea of rulership gradually came to hold an important place among 
13 Zargarnezhad. p56 
16 Hairi. A P. 59 
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jurisprudential circles, and from that time on, it has occupied a place in all Shi'ah 
sources on the Hadith, Fiqh and Kalam (Theology). 
In their argumentation designed to establish the right of rulership for themselves, 
the Ulama referred most often to Hadiths, some of which are; 
1-The jurists are the authorised representatives of the Messengers on the 
stipulation that they do not follow secular rulers, the sultans. 
2- The Hidden Imam, in answer to the questions which, had been handed 
to him through his second Specified Agent, Mohammad An Uthman al- 
Amri, wrote the following: 
"As for handling new problems, you should refer to those who deal with 
our Hadith; they are my proof (hujjah), and I am God's proof for them". 
3- The Ulama are the heirs of the prophets; the prophets bequeath only 
knowledge not money. '7 
Thus, according to Shi'ah, all the actual rulers, from the first Caliph, Abu Bakr 
(d. 634 CE) onward, were but illegitimate rulers and usurpers. Co-operation with 
them has been legitimised by some of the Ulama simply because of their not being 
powerful enough to take over the government. 
1.9.4 Why Infallible Imam? 
According to the Hairi: 
"On the basis of the concept of God's rulership the Twelver Shi'ah (i. e., lthna 
Asharis, or the Imamiyyah) formed their view of the Imamate as follows : Since 
" Kulayni, Kafi. p. 38. Quoted in Hairi. P 59 
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Islam is described as a community ruled and governed by God, there must be an 
executive authority to represent Him on Earth. Prophet Mohammad was the best 
and the last of God's representatives. He was possessed of two substantial 
attributes: He was appointed by God to rule His community, and He was 
infallible. In order to continue the government of God on Earth in proper fashion 
the successor to Mohammad should also be characterised by these two attributes, 
except that it is enough that he be appointed by God's direct or indirect appointee, 
an infallible person, as an Imam. The Imam should be appointed because, in the 
words of Ibn al-Mutahbar Hilli (1250-1326, CE): 
"The Imamate is a universal authority (riyasa) in the things of religion and of the 
world belonging to some person and derived from (niyaba) the Prophet. And it is 
necessary (wajib) according to reason. For the Imamate is a kindness (from 
Allah) (lutj), and we know absolutely that when men have a chief (rais) and a 
guide (murshid) whom they obey, who avenges the oppressed of his oppressor and 
restrains the oppressor from his oppressions, then they draw near to soundness 
(salah) and depart from corruption" 18 
1.9.5 Imam's immunity to sin 
Another reason for the Imam being infallible is to make him immune to sin; 
"It is necessary that the Imam be immune to sin (ma'sum), otherwise there would 
be an endless chain. For the need which demands the Imam is the restraining of 
the oppressor from his oppression and the avenging of the oppressed from his 
oppressor. Now if it were possible for him to be not immune to sin, then he 
18 Hasan Abn al-Mutahhar al-Hilli. 1958, p. 62. 
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would need another Imam, and there would be an endless chain, and that is 
impossible. And also because if he committed sin (massia) and if it were 
incumbent upon men to disapprove of him, he would lose his place in men's 
hearts, and the value of his appointment would be nullified. And if it were not 
necessary (that he be immune to sin), the command to do what is approved by 
Allah (al-maruf) and the prohibition against what is disapproved (al-munkar) 
would cease to be incumbent and that is impossible. And also because he is the 
guardian of the law, in which case he must be immune to sin in order that it be 
safe from addition or subtraction. And also because of the word of the Most 
High: "My covenant embraces not the evildoers (Qur'an, 2: 118). 
1.9.6 Institution of the Marja'i taglid 
According to Hairi19: 
"The Mujtahid or Muqallad was to rule the state and people or muqallads. The 
concept of Ijtehad and taqlid, therefore, held an important place in Shi'ah thought. 
The Ulama have based their argument on the premise that taqlid is justified by 
reason and tradition. Reason commands that the ignorant should learn from the 
learned; also traditional evidence proves that it is the duty of the ignorant to obtain 
guidance from the learned. The most learned of the Ulama was given the title of 
Marja'i taqlid which means the locus of authority, the person with the right of 
command and rule. Above all else, the Marja is a qualified person to practice 
Ijtehad. Ijtehad means the ability to make an independent decision based upon 
the Qur'an and Hadith on the matters not in conflict with Islamic principles. This 
21 
title, however, cannot be obtained by appointment, selection, or election. The 
authority of Marja will be centred on a person only by the universal recognition of 
the Shi'ah community". 
1.9.7 Prophet Mohammad and his successors 
The task of appointment was first fulfilled by Mohammad on his return from his 
Farewell Pilgrimage, at Ghadir, 20 where he appointed his immediate infallible 
successor, Ali Ibn Abi Talib21 as the first Imam. Thus the concept of the Twelver 
Shi'ah began to take form. Ali of the Imams, who were descendants of the 
Prophet, from the line of Ali and Fatimah, were appointed consecutively as the 
real representatives of God. There are Twelve Imams who are considered by the 
Twelver Shi'ah as the lawful and infallible successors to the Prophet. 
1.9.8 Justice of God, leadership of righteous individual 
According to the Sachedina22: 
"Two doctrines play an important role in the political thought of the Shi'ah sect, 
the justice of God (al-adl) and the leadership of righteous individuals (al-Imama). 
A promise of Islamic revelation was creation of a just and equitable public order 
embodying the will of God. The promise was based on the belief that God is just 
and truthful. Divine justice demands that God do what is best for humanity; and 
divine truthfulness generated the confidence that God's promise was provided by 
the sending of the Prophet to guide humanity toward the creation of an Islamic 
19 Hairi. p 62. For more information on the Institution of the Shi'ah Ulama and marjae-i taqlid, 
consult the following sources; Ann. K. S. Lambton. A Reconsideration of the position of the 
Marja al-Taqlid on the religious Institution. SI, XX (1964) 
20 Mohammad's Farewell Pilgrimage has since been associated with the story of Ghadir Khuºnm 
where All is believed by the Shi'ah to have been appointed as the successor of Muhammad 21 Account on the problem of infallibility (ismah) are given in Muhammad Ibn Babuwayh, Ma'ani 
al-Akhbar ( Tehran, 1959) , pP132-36. A detailed treatment of the subject in connection 
particularly with the infallibility of All can be found in Muhammad Ibn Al-Hasan-Tusi, Takhis al- 
shaft (Najaf, 1963), II, pp. 257-89. Quoted in Hairi p58 
22 Sachedina. A. A. p3 
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world order (this) as a consequence, marked the inevitable interdependency 
between the religious and the political in Islam". 
1.9.9 Imam : his authority to interpret divine law 
Sachedina has stated that, 
"Notwithstanding his lack of political power, the Imam still had 
the right to demand obedience from his followers and in Shi'ism 
his authority was clearly seen in his ability to interpret divine 
revelation authoritatively. What was decided by him through 
interpretation and elaboration was binding on believers. These 
rulings formed part of the obligations (al-taklif al-shariyya) 
imposed on believers. The interpretation of divine revelation by 
the Imam, which in Shi'ism came to be considered part of the 
revelation, was regarded by the people at all times as the right 
guidance. It was, moreover, the divine guidance that 
theologically justified the superstructure erected on the two 
doctrine of 1mami Shi'ism: the justice of God and the designation 
of the Imam, free from any error or sinful deviations, in order to 
make God's will known to humanity. In response to the crisis 
created by the occultation of the Imam, the Shi'tes developed their 
own legal and political jurisprudence in which a prominent place 
was given to the faculty of reasoning (al-aql)". 23 
23 Sachedina. A. A. P. 4-8 
23 
1.9.10 Right of interpretation 
It is not for just anyone to undertake the decisive responsibility of guiding the 
community by interpreting the revelation rationally. It certainly needed 
authorisation from a divine source, a sort of designation that could guarantee to 
Muslims the availability of right guidance based on Islamic revelation. Only such 
an authorised person could, in the absence of the Imam, assume the authority that 
accrued to the Imam as the rightful ruler (al-sultan al adil) in Islam. But in view 
of the prolonged occultation of the Imam and the absence of a special designation 
during this period, no realisation of just rulership was possible. 
This was reflected in the political jurisprudence of the Imamates, where the 
recognition of the lack of specific designation by the Imam reemphasises the 
separation between power (qudra or sultana, which could exact or enforce 
obedience) and authority (welaya, which reserved the right to demand obedience, 
depending on legal-rational circumstances) that had existed even during the 
lifetime of the Imams. Only the investiture of authority and the assuming of 
political power could establish the rule of justice and equality. 
In the Imamite context it is necessary to recognise the belief that the perfect rule of 
justice and equity will be established only by the Imam al-Mahdi, and also that 
this will be through divine intervention when human society will have failed time 
and again to create such order on earth. Until then, reason dictates and revelation 
confirms that human society ought to strive. As the Qur'an puts it succinctly: 
"There is nothing for the human being except to strive" (53: 39). 
1.9.11 Reasoning must discover divine law 
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It is acknowledged that human beings need to perfect their rational faculty in order 
to discover the inevitable conformity between divine laws and that which reason 
demands a priori. The more human reasoning attains maturity, the more it will 
discover and comprehend the divine wisdom in legislating for human society 
through the divinely inspired agency of the Prophet. Thus the effort of human 
resigning must be indirect towards discovering and extracting laws by deduction 
from principles laid down in the divine sources of guidance, and not towards 
legislation by inductive reasoning. In the final analysis, the debate centres on the 
classical theme of Muslim theology: reason versus revelation. 24 
24 Sachedina. P. 26 
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Chanter 2 Shaykh FadlAllah Nuri 
2.1 Introduction to this chapter 
No doubt, Shaykh Fadl Allah Nuri is the most outstanding opponent of 
Constitutionalism; thus in this chapter his debate and argument on 
constitutionalism will be discussed. A crucial point about Nuri is that he had the 
reputation of being a pious and knowledgeable Mujtahid. Nuri had advocated an 
Islamic constitution and had held that the Persian Constitution was un-Islamic. 
Constitutionalist Ulama openly called Nuri a troublemaker and strongly 
condemned his position. Three eminent Ulama (ma'raji) in Najaf' pointed out in 
a telegram that, 
"Since Nuri disturbs the peace and conducts sabotage 
operations, his intervention in affairs is forbidden". 2 
He was executed by the Constitutionalists in 1907. His execution was perhaps 
beyond what the Ulamas' expected. 3. As an introduction, it is necessary to say 
that Nurfs ideas on constitutionalism are still referred to by a significant number 
of Muslims, and so in a review of relevant literature, his work has a significant 
place. Nuri presents the ideas of traditional groups that had been formed over 
centuries, whose perspective was supported by the main traditional sources 
(Qur'an, Hadith and Fiqh) and who were strongly opposed to constitutionalism. 
Before the revolution (1905), people felt oppression and tyranny, thus they knew 
1 Kasravi. A. 1970, P 528 
2 Ibid., P 528 
3 Ha'iri. Shi'ism p 114. Ha'iri quoted that Khurasani (one of the Maraji-i taqlid(Sources of 
emulation), sent a telegram to Tehran to save Nuri's life, but it was too late and he was already 
hanged. 
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what they did not want, but they did not know what kind of government they were 
looking for. Even the religious leaders of the Constitutionalists were not fully 
conversant with constitutionalism as it was understood in the West; neither the 
perceived necessity for this kind of government nor its specification. This chapter 
will deal with the Nuri's views on the legitimacy of power. 
2.2 Legitimacy of law 
2.2.1 Sacred law: perfect and best law 
Shaikh Nuri explicitly states that Islamic divine law is not limited to acts of 
worship but he reasons, divine law considers every major and minor Muslim 
issue; 
"Fortunately, we the Shi'iie sect have the best and most 
comprehensive sacred law, because it is the law revealed by God 
to His Messenger and the seal of His Prophets: "this day I 
perfected your religion for you and completed My favour unto 
you'(Qur'an 5: 3)"4. 
Nuri accepts the need for law (Qanon), but he argues that divine law is the best 
law for believers, and that this is clear to all Muslims and for them needs no proof, 
"Although the preservation of the worldly order is in need of 
law (Qanon), and the affairs of every nation (mellat) that has 
entered the realm of law and acted accordingly are regulated on 
the basis of the governance of their law, it is clear to all 
believers that the best of all laws is the divine law. For 
Muslims this needs no proof'. 
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"Thus the requisite law can only be the divine law, because of its 
dual orientation, that is, because it regulates both this and the 
other world. Anyone who thinks it is possible and feasible for a 
group of wise and judicious men and a number of politicians to 
come together and, through consultation, make a law that meets 
these two objectives and is also acceptable to God, is obviously 
not a Muslim"5 . 
The question is what is divine law? Does it mean Fiqh? Or does it mean the 
Qur'an? The difference between Nuri and the Constitutionalists was not about 
the divine law; both sides accepted it. But Constitutionalists stated that there 
were many new affairs not mentioned in the divine law, and it is the duty of the 
Mujtahid to deal with these affairs. In this regard, the positions adopted by the 
great and highest clergymen shows that there was and is no common 
understanding amongst them of the divine law. 
For instance, two of the highest Maraji- taglid, wrote a letter to the King of 
Turkey and responded to some question on Islamic legislation. They stated that6: 
"We would like to know if it would be possible to execute Islamic provisions 
without a constitutional regime or how it is possible to enjoin right conduct and 
forbid indecency (al-amr bi al-ma'ruf wa al-nahy anal-munkar) {by any means} 
° Nuri, Shaykh. 1988, P. 354 
s Ibid., P. 354 
6 The letter of the highest Maraji Abd Allah al-Mazandarani and Muhammad Kazim al-Khurasani , 
Quoted in Hairi, Shi'ism, p 243 
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except by uprooting tyranny. When did the Fundamental Law ever conflict with 
the provision of the Shari'ah? What article of (this Law) has ever been in 
contrast with fasting, praying, the Pilgrimage, or alms tax? When did any 
unlawful action become obligatory or any religious principles and subsidiary 
matters(usul al-din wa al-furu) change? ". 
2.2.2 Shari'ah Means Islam!? 
For the Islamic Constitutionalist, Shari'ah, or Fiqh, is the origin of Islam, thus all 
of the non-traditional Islamic laws are against Islam, or are un-Islamic. For 
instance, Tabrizi, in writing on Islamic Constitutionalism cites certain cases, and 
in doing so, claims that all laws concerning the following are against the Shari 'ah: 
tax, custom, rating and animal censuses. 
Thus we see that legal problems were not limited to issues of freedom and 
equality. It is apparent that what had been developed over the previous centuries 
as Shari'ah or Fiqh, was, to the Islamic Constitutionalist, incontrovertible Islam to 
which nothing could be added. Therefore their faith was under threat, and there 
were a hundred Islamic books which supported their ideas, and were recognised as 
the Islamic sources, yet as was discussed in the last chapter, it was the duty of a 
Mujtahid to infer and find solutions for new questions. 
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2.2.3 Intentions of the traditional Ulama 
There is much debate about the intentions of the Ulama, and their reasons for 
supporting Constitutionalism. One voice claims that their aim was to establish a 
religious government, not a constitutional one, or that some of the Ulama were 
looking to their prestige and position. Another refers to the last message of 
Shaykh Nuri, before his execution (July 1909); this statement is ascribed to him: "I 
was neither a supporter of autocracy nor was Sayyid Abd Allah8 a 
Constitutionalist, nor Sayyid Mohammad (one of the clerical leaders of 
Constitutionalism). They oppose me and I oppose them"9 . 
Algar argued that there was a long history of quarrels over power, between the 
Ulama and the Shah of Iran and that Constitutionalism was one of the issues 
involved. As for Na'ini, he claimed that his only motive for writing on the 
concept of constitutionalism was religion. That is to say, the appearance of 
heresy and the commission of injustice to God, to the Prophet, and to religion in 
the society, created a religious responsibility for him. The reasons given by the 
Ulama for their involvement in the revolution can be found from their manifestos, 
faiwas, letters and treatises. The high Mraji Taqlid, Khurasani, pointed outgo; 
"Our aim in taking such trouble is to bring a comfortable life 
for the people, to remove oppression, to support the 
7Arjomand, Amir. 1981. P 133 
s One of the important clergy leaders of the Constitutionalism 
9 M. Q. Hidayat. Mukhbir al- Saltana, Guzarish-i Iran, Vol. 4, P. 107 Quoted in Arjomand. 
Authority. p 150 
10 Na'zim al-Isalm. 1953. P. 264 
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oppressed, and to give aid to troubled persons. We would 
also like to carry out God's laws and protect the Islamic land 
from the infidels' attacks. We intend to practice the Islamic 
concept of amr-ibi ma'ruf va nahy-i az munkar (to enjoin 
right conduct and forbid indecency) and Islamic laws which 
are in the interest of the people". 
Some scholars believe that the main aim of the Ulama was to protect Islam, and 
that they were opposed to tyranny because it worked against Islam, not because it 
was against democracy; 
"The course of events indicates that the main target of the 
Ulama's attacks was the irreligiosity of the Shah Mohammad 
Ali. Since the Shah allied himself with Russian infidels and 
opened fire upon and killed numerous Muslims, the Ulama 
invited the people to disobey him and his government. At the 
same time the Ulama attacked tyranny, not because it was 
against democracy, but simply because the tyranny found in 
Iran worked against Islam. The nationalistic attitude in the 
Ulama's resistance was almost nil; for this reason we see them 
authorizing the Ottoman Sultan to interfere in Persian 
affairs"'' . 
We are looking for the theoretical debate on the legitimacy of power and 
participation, regardless of the intentions of the various theorists. Nevertheless, a 
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study of the writings and reputations of the Ulama reveals that one can make a 
reasonable assumption that at least some of the Islamic Constitutionalists were 
motivated by genuine religious devotion. In studying the points of view of the 
Islamic Constitutionalists the context of their piety and knowledge of Islamic 
tradition cannot be ignored. 
Keddie argues that the intention of the Ulama was to react against the Imperialist 
controls, modernisation and progress. Meanwhile, she accepts that there were 
some pious individuals within the Ulama who had religious intentions. 
" The Ulama's reaction to the west 'appeared reactionary' when it was directed 
against modernisation... and 'progressive' when directed against imperialist 
controls, but in both cases the Ulama were acting constantly... [for] the 
preservation of their own power. It is the writer's view that the both the writings 
of the Ulama and of their biographers and indeed, some of the officials such as 
Khurasani, Tihrani, Mazandarani and Tabatabai, indicate that they were pious 
individuals who were motivated mainly by factors of genuine religious devotion 
and patriotic idealism. 
"As an alternative interpretation, one may suggest that these 
Ulama participated in the Revolution not only to preserve their 
power, but also to save the Muslim people from oppression 
and arbitrary rule and to protect their country and its economic 
interests from foreign aggression. Since they were also 
devoted to religion, their sense of religious responsibility was 
" Ha'iri, 1977. P. 98 
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also, at least partially, the cause for their rising against tyranny 
and advocating a form of parliamentary system which would 
be in the interest of Muslims. These Persian Ulama, however, 
did not know the real meaning and consequences of a so-called 
democratic constitutionalism" 12. 
The motivation of the protagonists in the Islamic Revolution is of interest and has 
relevance, as does the attitude of commentators towards it, but Islamic analysis of 
legitimacy of power and participation is the main theme of this study. While we 
not deny other factors, we are mainly concerned with Islamic theoretical debate on 
the legitimacy of power rather than the personal agendas of the individuals 
involved. We should therefore further investigate theoretical factors and 
obstacles relating to the legitimacy of power in the ICL, how these impinged on 
the practical objective social realities and vice versa. 
2.2.4 Rejecting legislation 
Shaykh Nuri, as an important clergyman, argued that new legislation is forbidden 
in Islam. He stated that Islamic law (Shari'a) is already perfect and does not need 
to be made perfect by new legislation. Perhaps, Nuri could not distinguish 
between the timeless laws, viz, the laws of the Qur'an, and the laws that depend 
on the time and the place. For Nuri, all the laws which were in the traditional 
Fiqh were Islamic law, sacrosanct and complete. It seems that in this lies the 
main problem in Nuri's approach to the legitimacy of legislation. 
12 Keddie. 1972. P. 50 
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"My dear wretched brother; you should know that truth of 
constitutionalism is that the representatives of the provinces, as 
elected by the subjects themselves, gather in the capital. They 
constitute the legislative body of the state, look into the 
contemporary exigencies and draft a law, independently and by 
the vote of the majority, to legislate whatever appeals to and 
pleases their majority according to their insufficient 
intelligence and regardless of compatibility of the equality and 
freedom of all the citizens. Other than this, whatever you 
have heard is a sheer lie"' 3 
2.2.5 Veto power for Ulama 
There was an common slogan for the Islamic Constitutionalists, and it was: 
"We are seeking our Prophet's Religion, not constitutional 
government, alas Our Mohammad, alas our Islam, alas our 
religion, good God of religion in exile" 14 
Nuri recommended that the Ulama should supervise all of the parliament's 
attempts at law making. According to his proposal, there should always be some 
representative of the great Ulama in the parliament, to examine the compatibility 
of the parliamentary legislation with Islam. But there were no articles in the 
13 Shaykh Nuri. 1988. P. 360 
14 Slogan of the Sheikh Fadl Allah Nuri. Vaqaye' Ettefaqiye dar ruzegar (Events Happened in the 
Time). Vol. l. P146 
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Fundamental Law on this issue. According to Article 15 of the Iranian 
Constitutional Laws (1906); 
"The National Consultative Assembly has the right in all 
questions to propose any measure which it regards as 
conducive to the well-being of the Government and the People, 
after due discussion and deliberation thereof in all sincerity and 
truth; and, having due regard to the majority of votes, after it 
has received the approval of the Senate, by means of the First 
Minister of the State, so that it may receive the Royal Approval 
and be duly carried out". 
According to Article 16 of The Constitutional Law (December 30 1906); 
"All laws necessary to strengthen the foundations of the state and throne 
and to set in order the affairs of the Realm and the establishment of the 
Ministries, must be submitted for approval to the National Consultative 
Assembly". 
In the Fundamental Law there is no mention of Nuri's proposal about supervision 
by the Ulama. There was much debate about this issue when the Supplementary 
Constitutional Law (1907) was being drafted. 
One cleric stated that " There will not be any rule of the Customary law that would 
oppose and be contradictory to any rule of the sacred law, and customary laws 
"would not change the rules of the incumbent and for the forbidden" and if "some 
subjects and the execution of the primary rules of the Sacred Law become 
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impractical, it would be possible, with the approval of the Ulama, to replace the 
primary rules by secondary ones according to the principle necessity allows what 
1 is forbidden"5. 
Finally, the majority of Majlis accepted Shaykh Nuri's draft and approved it. 
According to Article 2 of Supplementary Constitutional Law (1907), all laws must 
be in conformity with Islamic law. This article conformed to the main thrust of 
Nuri's argument, and resolved the issue of the Ulama's supervision of 
parliamentary legislation. 
There were some important issues in Article 2 of S. F. L; 
1- No legal enactment was to be at variance with the Islamic law 
(Shari 'ah) 
2- It was the right of the Ulama to determine whether such laws were or 
were not conformable to the principles of Islam 
3- The Ulama had the right to reject and repudiate legislation, wholly or in 
part. 
4- This Article (2) was not be changed until the appearance of the Hidden 
Imam (Proof of the Age). 
5- This article theoretically granted veto powers in legislation, to the 
clerical council (Ecclesiastical Senate). 
Article 2 of S. F. L. states; 
15 Adamiyat, F. 1976. P 416 
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"At no time must any legal enactment of the Sacred National 
Consultative Assembly, established by the favour and 
assistance of His Holiness the Imam of the Age (may God 
hasten his glad Advent), the favour of His Majesty the 
Shahinshah of Islam (may God immortalize his reign), the care 
of the proofs of Islam (may God multiply the like of them), and 
the whole people of the Persian nation, be at variance with the 
sacred principles of Islam or the laws established by His 
Holiness the best of Mankind (on whom and on whose 
household be the Blessing of God and His Peace)". 
It is hereby declared that it is for the learned doctors of theology (the Ulama) (may 
God prolong the blessing of their existence) to determine whether such laws as 
may be proposed are or are not conformable to the principles of Islam; and it is 
therefore officially enacted that there shall at all times exist a Committee 
composed of not less than five Mujtahids or other devout theologians, cognizant 
also of the requirement of the age, (which committee shall be elected) in this 
manner. 
The Ulama and Proof of the Islam shall present to the National Consultative 
Assembly the names of twenty of the Ulama possessing the attributes mentioned 
above; and the Members of the National Consultative Assembly shall, either by 
unanimous acclamation, or by vote, designate five or more of these, according to 
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the exigencies16 of the time, and recognize these as members, so that they may 
carefully discuss and consider all matters proposed in the Assembly, and reject 
and repudiate, wholly or in part, any such proposal which is at variance with the 
Sacred laws of Islam, so that it shall not obtain the title of legality. In such 
matters the decision of this Ecclesiastical Committee shall be followed and 
obeyed, and this article shall continue unchanged until the appearance of His 
17 18 Holiness the Proof of the Age (May God hasten his glad Advent! )". 
After a few years this article was forgotten, and the Ulama did not send anybody 
to the parliament. As a result, some Muslims suggested that the laws of the 
National Consultative Assembly were not Islamic, because representatives of the 
Ulama were not in the parliament. 
This article has remained as part of the Islamic Constitutional Law of Iran up to 
the present day. After the Islamic Revolution (1979), this article has always been 
considered as justification for the clergymen to declare that if the parliament is not 
supervised by the Ulama, the people will be captured by un-Islamic secular 
government. 
According to Article I of ICL (1906); 
"The official religion of Iran is Islam, according to the 
orthodox Ja'fari Doctrine of the Ithna Ashariyya (Twelver 
Shi'ism), which faith the Shah of Iran must profess and 
promote". 
16 Expediency of the time 
17Until the Imam Mahdi shall return and establish of perfect Justice. 
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2.2.6 Creating new law means denying Prophethood 
Nuri argues that because the Prophet is the seal of the Messengers, he brought for 
Muslims whatever is right for them. Believing in the possibility of improving on 
the Prophet's religion is in opposition to Islam. Nuri refers to a rational proof for 
the prophethood. According to his reasoning, because Islam cannot be accepted 
without a rational proof, and the rational proof is our need for a divine law 
brought to us by the prophet, if we were to consider ourselves capable of creating 
new law, then there would be no rational proof of prophethood. 
"The requisite law can only be the divine law, because of its dual orientation, that 
is, because it regulates both this and the other world. Anyone who thinks it is 
possible and feasible for a group of wise and judicious men and a number of 
politicians to come together and, through consultation, make a law that meets 
these two objectives and is also acceptable to God, is obviously not a Muslim. 
There cannot be Islam without the acceptance of Prophethood and the acceptance 
of Prophethood is not conceivable without rational proof. The rational proof of 
Prophethood is no other than our need for such a divine law, and our ignorance 
and incapacity to determine it ourselves. If we considered ourselves capable of 
creating this law, we would then have no rational proof of Prophethood. Our 
Messenger is the Seal of the Messengers, and his of all sacred laws. And the 
"seal" is the person to whom has been revealed whatever is right for the believer 
until doomsday; and he has thus perfected the religion. 
18Browne, E. 1910. p 373 
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Believing in the possibility of perfecting the divine law is therefore obviously in 
opposition to the fundamental belief in the perfection and completeness 
(khatimiyyat) of the Prophet's religion. And challenging this completeness is a 
sin, according to the divine law...... 19 
Therefore, according to Nuri's interpretation, parliamentary legislation is 
"innovation"(bid'at), and it is even against Islam itself, because such legislation 
implies that Islam needs to be improved upon or completed. 
2.2.7 Time and place and sacred law 
Nuri states that there is no role for time and place in the sacred law, thus Muslims 
have no right to legislate any new law; legislation is the prerogative of the 
Prophet, not of any other Muslim. 
"Thus imposing man-made law, whether in general or in 
particular, is contrary to Islam, and legislation is the prerogative 
of a Messenger. It is for this reason that every time a Messenger 
was appointed it was to bring a law". Consequently, he 
(Mohammad) is the Seal of the Prophets, and the divine law that 
he has brought will never be deficient, even in relation to all times 
and all peoples. This is according to the revelation and not 
because of any personal opinion; " Nor does he say of (aught) of 
(his own) desire. It is no less than inspiration sent down to him" 
(Qur'an 3: 53). The inference is that the Muslim has no right to 
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legislate (ja'li Qanun). By God; I could never believe that 
somebody could actually sign a man-made law, and accept 
anything but the divine law for the Islamic country, or that anyone 
could consider the exigencies of our time in opposition to some 
elements of the divine law, and yet profess to the completeness 
and perfection of the religion of Mohammad, (may God's 
benediction be upon him and his family). 20 
2.2.8 Man-made Law and Sacred Law 
Islamic penal law was one of the issues of conflict. Islamic Constitutionalists 
demand that all laws which were the inference of Fuqaha must be fulfilled. But 
according to the Constitutionalists' views, Islamic laws were instituted thirteen 
hundred years previously for Arabs, not for the people of Iran at the present time. 
" If this group had no aim but to implement the divine law, why was their 
penal code contrary to the latter? Do not say that it was a state law, as 
if the state could defy the divine law with impunity, considering itself 
beyond its jurisdiction, make a law and implement it in the country 
and thus render the divine law outmoded. If the purpose were to 
protect Islam and Muslims, why then have they turned the Ministry of 
Justice into the hotbed of such infamous individuals, and why did they 
appoint that godless, faithless, scurrilous person a judge? " 
2.2.9 Islam Is Perfect, No Need For Legislation: 
19 Shaykh Nuri. 1988, P355 
20 Shaykh Nuri. 1988, P 354 
41 
Islamic Constitutionalists state that legislation is innovation (bid'ah), and it is 
against Islam. According to their point of view Islam does not need any revision 
or reviewing. 
"God, who is perfect and just, has a purpose in creation and in 
sending the Prophet with a perfect system to create Islamic 
public order. That being the case, the question of revision of 
the system does not arise, because, according to the Qur'an, God 
has declared: "'This day I have perfected your religion for you" 
(5: 5). Consequently, there is no need for further legislation in 
the Islamic state: all that is needed for human society has already 
been legislated by the divine lawgiver". 2' 
The declaration quoted by Nuri, which appears in 5.5 of the Holy Qur'an is 
recorded as having been revealed as the Prophet completed the pilgrimage to 
Meccah (Hajj), near the end of his life in Ghadir Khom. 
Despite Nuri's use of the above Quranic quotation in his argumentation, for 
Islamic Constitutionalists of which he was one, all subsequent traditional Fiqh 
was (and is) also regarded as the principles of Islamic law. For others, legislation 
meant, and continues to mean, dealing with the affairs of the nation in such a way 
that it will involve numerous new issues. These people believe that no particular 
Islamic text refers specifically to these matters and that therefore for new 
conditions unmentioned in Islamic texts, Muslims need new laws, which need not 
necessarily be opposed to Islamic law. Legislation in the Islamic countries does 
not automatically mean that members of parliament challenge the principles of the 
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Qur'an. What it does mean, they argue, is that Muslims need to find new 
answers to new questions, which arise in an altered set of circumstances. Another 
important issue in this regard is that Nuri and other Fuqaha had no experience of 
government and therefore they did not have an informed opinion regarding 
running a state and the related legislation. 
2.2.10 Differentiation not Equality 
According to Article 8 of the S. F. L (1907); " The people of the Persian Empire are 
to enjoy equal rights before the Law". And according to Article 9 of the S. F. L 
(1907); "All individuals are protected and safeguarded in respect to their lives, 
property, homes, and honour, from every kind of interference, and none shall 
molest them save in such case and in such way as the laws of the land shall 
determine". 
An important issue is raised in the above articles. The word "people" in Article 8, 
and the word 'individual" in Article 9, refers to all individuals who live in Iran, 
regardless of religion, gender and so on; thus it follows that everybody who lives 
in the territory of Iran has equal rights. Nuri however was strongly opposed to 
these articles; 
"Consequently, in obedience to Islam, we should consider equal 
whoever is considered equal in the divine law; and treat differently 
every group that is differentiated from every other. This must be 
done in order to avoid religious and worldly corruption. Do you 
zý Schedina. P. 25 
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not know that equality necessitates, among other things, that the 
misguided and misleading groups be treated with similar respect as 
the Shi'ite sect, whereas the divine law makes the execution of the 
apostates incumbent, their wives irrevocably divorced from them, 
and their property transferable from their inheritors to Muslims. 
Their commands no respect, requires no ritual washing, no shroud, 
no prayers, no burial, and their body is impure. All commercial 
transactions with them are prohibited and annulled; and their work 
requires no compensation. As for the Jews, the Christians, and the 
Zoroastrians, they have no right to retribution {in response to injury 
by a Muslim); and their blood money is eight hundred Dirham 
(Arabic currency). If the purpose had been the execution of the 
divine law, they would not have demanded equality between 
Muslims and infidels, would not have intended to eliminate so 
many distinctions that separate different groups in the divine law, 
and would not have designated "equality" as the law of their 
landi22. 
A number of Constitutionalists, pointed out the problems that could 
occur if the above Fiqh laws espoused by Nuri were promulgated. 
Inequality in the treatment of various classes of citizens would be the 
result. For instance, Habl al Malin (a newspaper), wrote that: "If 
we do not have equality, we will face great difficulties. For 
example, if an Armenian or Jew sees the price of his blood-money in 
the amount of only 25 tumans (=roughly $ 3.00), he will forget about 
22 Shaykh Nuri. 1988. P 357 
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his nationality and will appeal to foreign governments. If they so 
treat us because we are the people of the Book then why did the 
government pay 65,000 tumans as blood-money for the murder of a 
Christian priest in Arumiyah? 23 Is this justice? It is to be found out if 
this law will be accepted in the Council of Human Rights, and what 
will be the value of our fellow-citizens in the eyes of other 
nations? "24 
Shaykh Nuri argues that in Islam there is no equality between the mature and the 
immature, the sane and the insane, the healthy and the ill, the slave and the free, 
wife and husband, the learned and the ignorant, the Muslim and non-Muslim, and 
so on. He asks how a Muslim can be subject to a law which decrees equality 
25 among all people. 
Shaykh Nur? s argument is diametrically opposed to Article 8 of the Iranian 
Constitutional Laws (1907). 
Concerning his objections on the matter of equality, such as for instance that of 
Muslim and non-Muslim, this is not the view of the Qur'an, but is an inference of 
Fuqaha which had been formulated in subsequent centuries. We can refer to the 
Iranian Constitutional Law's acceptance of the Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Christian 
as recognised religious minorities as an example of its embodiment of Qur'anic 
23 The writer is referring to an English missionary who was killed in Iran on the eve of the Persian 
Revolution. Since the murderer was not found, an amount of 50,000 tuman had to paid to the 
British authorities as blood-money. Quoted in Hairi p 226 
24 Torkman, M. 1982, PP. 27-47 
25 Malik-Zadah, Ingilab, I V, p. 214 
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injunction. On the other hand, there is no text in the Qur'an to justify Nuri's 
concepts of inequality under the law. 
According to Article 19 of the Iranian Constitutional Law (1980): 
"All people of Iran, whatever the ethnic group or tribe to which they belong, enjoy 
equal rights; and colour, race, language, and the like, do not bestow any privilege". 
Shaykh Nuri states that: " The Zimmis (free non-Muslim subjects 
living in a Muslim country), for example, are subject to special 
provisions in their marital relation with a Muslim. Non-Muslim 
men cannot marry a Muslim, but Muslim men can have non-Muslim 
women as concubines and on a temporary basis. Apostasy of either 
partner of a married couple entails the cancellation {of marriage}; 
conversion of either partner of a {non-Muslim} couple to Islam also 
has special different provisions. With regard to the problem of 
inheritance, infidelity denies the reverse is permissible. Also an 
apostate has special definite provisions; his property will be 
transferred to his heirs, his wife automatically divorced, his body 
becomes unclean, and it is obligatory to punish him with death... "z6. 
All Nuri's above examples are again, the Fuqaha's inference of Islam. Since it is 
Fuqaha it would be logical to admit that since over time it had already been 
changed and/or developed, then it could continue to be changed into a new 
26 Malik-Zadah. Inqilab IV, PP, 214-215 
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direction in the future. Yet Nuri argues that it should remain as it is. For 
instance, there is no article in the Iranian Constitutional Law which, mentions that 
people's beliefs can deprive them of their rights. 
Article 23 of the Iranian Constitutional Law (1980): "The investigation of 
individuals' beliefs is forbidden, and no one may be molested or taken to task 
simply for holding a certain belief'. 
2.2.11 Autocracy not Democracy 
Nuri argues that there is no freedom in Islam. He explicitly states that Islam and 
any other religion is autocratic not democratic. According to his point of view, 
the foundation of Islam is obedience, not freedom. Nuri believes that freedom 
and equality are principles that destroy the fundamental foundation of the divine 
law. The Constitutional Law, however, recognised these principles. 
According to Article 21; 
"Societies (anjumans) and associations (Ytima'at) which are not 
productive of mischief to Religion or the State, and are not injurious 
to good order, are free throughout the whole Empire, but members of 
such associations must not carry arms, and must obey the regulation 
laid down by the Law on this matter. Assemblies in the public 
thoroughfares and open spaces must likewise obey the police 
regulation. " 
Nuri writes; 
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"My dear brother, if their intention were the implementation of divine 
law, and if the purpose of constitutionalism were to preserve the 
Islamic commandments, why did they want to base it on equality and 
freedom, as each of these pernicious principles is the destroyer of the 
fundamental foundation of the divine law? The foundation of Islam is 
obedience, not freedom; and the basis of its commandments is the 
differentiation of collectivities and the assemblage of the different 
elements and not equality". 
Shaykh Nuri goes on to ask: " In which school in Vienna or Paris was 
this inauspicious term, freedom, thought and in which store was this 
colourful merchandise found, that has been sold, like a beautifully 
designed but biting and deadly snake, to the poor Iranian people? 
Freedom and equality belong to their forgotten laws and imagined 
suppositions. Other religious laws are not worth considering and are 
unworthly of Islam and followers of Islam. It is astonishing that by 
confusing the issue they spread the notion that the seekers of Islam are 
dictatorial; of course they must be dictatorial. Islam and every 
religion is autocratic". 27 
27 Torkman. M, 1982. PP, 27-47 
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2.3 Legitimacy of Legislator 
According to the Qur'an; 
"All that is in the heavens and the earth magnifies God. His is the Kingdom, and 
His is the Praise, and He is powerful over everything". (Qur'an. 64.1). 
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2.3.1 Absolute sovereignty for Allah (God ) 
According to Muslim belief, Allah (God) has absolute sovereignty over the world 
and man. Allah is the centre and goal of every Muslim's motive. According to 
the Qur'an, He is the basic reason for Muslim unity; 
1-Say: Surely, my prayer and my sacrifice and my life and my death are 
(all) for Allah, the Lord of the Worlds. (6.162) 
2-Surely we are Allah's and to him we shall surely return. (2-156) 
3-He is the first and the last and the Ascendant (over all), and the knower 
of hidden things, and He is cognisant of all things. (3-57) 
4-And to Allah is the eventual coming. (2-28) 
Gustave E. von Grunebaum summed up the Muslim view of the role of Allah in 
the following way. He presents the Muslim view accurately, but Muslims vary in 
its interpretation: 
"Islam is the Government of Allah. He is the living truth to which it owes its life. 
He is the centre and the goal of its spiritual experience. But He is also the 
mundane head of his community which, He not only rules but governs. He is the 
reason for state's existence, He is the principle of unity.... What is more, He plans 
the life of the community in its entirety as well as the private lives of the 
individual members under His direct legislative and supervisory power". 
28 
28 Hairi. P. 55 
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2.3.2 Who is the Legitimate Ruler? 
The Representative of God or The People? 
"And concerning the events which occur, refer to the transmitters of our traditions: 
they are my proof unto you, as I am the proof of God unto you". 29 
The above quotation is one of the famous statements of the Hidden Imam. 
According to his command, persons who have knowledge about the infallible 
Imams are qualified to deal with the Muslim's affairs. 
Therefore Shi'ah considers all governments of the Islamic period to be usurpers. 
This is because Shi'ah believes that rightful rule, the Imamate, belongs to their 
first divinely appointed Imam, Ali, and his appointed descendants, the last of 
whom was believed to be in concealment until his reappearance at the end of time. 
Islamic Constitutionalists referred to this principle in their debate on the 
legitimacy of power. The basic religious focus is the Imam of the Age, who 
represents God on earth. Given the occultation of the Imam, the Shi'ah focused 
its religious belief on the deputy of the Hidden Imam as the spokesman of the 
Imam and the Gate (bab) between him and his followers. 
Shaykh Nuri states that30: " My dear; suppose this Constitution were 
not based on making new laws, which is infidelity (Kufr). Yet there 
were those Representatives who would express their opinions about 
matters of general concern (umuri amma), that is, matters pertaining to 
29 Ali-Nagi Tughi, Himam al-thwaqib, library of Sipahsalar: Madrasa, MS 1845. Quoted in 
Arjomans. Shadow of God p 143 
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all citizens of the state, and would in fact consider anything other than 
matters of general concern outside their domain of responsibility. 
Then are the members of the Majlis (parliament) called 
"representative"(vakil)? Do you not know that in matters of general 
concern, representation (vikalat) is impermissible, and that such 
matters pertain to guardianship according to the Sacred Law (Welayati 
shari yya)? That is to say, intervening in matters of general concern 
and public welfare is the prerogative of the (Hidden) Imam (peace be 
upon him) or his General Deputies. It is no concern of others. Any 
other person's intervention in these matters is forbidden (haram) and is 
the usurpation of the seat of the Prophet (upon him be God's 
salutations and benedictions), and of the (Hidden) Imam( peace be 
upon him). Have you not heard that our Imams have said that during 
the period of Occultation corruption will reach a point where those 
who have no authority to speak on matters of general concern will do 
so"? 
Nuri argued that it is the duty of the people to oppose an unqualified person who 
sits in the seat of the Ulama, as the representative of the Imam: 
"My dear; do you not know that if an unqualified person sits in this 
seat of authority, it is obligatory to oppose him and forbidden to 
support him? Do you not know that (the occupation of the seat of 
30Arjomand. 1988. P. 362 
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authority) by anyone other than General Deputies is the usurpation of 
the right of Mohammad and his House"? 31 
Nuri's views on the legitimacy of the legislator raise some questions; for instance, 
how can people recognise who is the person who is the true deputy of the Hidden 
Imam? Furthermore another important issue is the role of the nation. Is it 
practicable for the deputy of the Hidden Imam to rule a country without the will of 
the people? If people were not interested and willing for this government, would 
they be free to choose their own way? The best argument against Nuri's 
assertions is that, just at the time when he was presenting his case, there were 
other Highest Ulama and Marja'i Taqlids who actually supported 
Constitutionalism; now which of these was the representative of the Hidden 
Imam? A Highest Ulama who supported constitutionalism or a Highest Ulama 
who opposed it? If the Imam is infallible, he cannot follow the wrong way, 
therefore the problem remains unsolved. 
One of Nuri's main concerns was the issue of whether or not human beings should 
formulate law. He believed that ordinary people have been given no right to 
legislate; it is the duty of the representative of the Imam on Earth. 
In this regard he wrote32: 
"According to the Shi'ah belief, during the rule of the Imam, law- 
making depends on the preference of his Agents who represent him in 
31Ibid., P. 363 
32 Ibid., P. 354 
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different regions. In the course of the Imam's Greater Occultation, this 
task is left to his General Agents (nuvab-i'amm), i. e. the highest marja'- 
i taglid, or even to a person authorised by the marja'-i taqlid. Also, our 
people have never been interested in getting to know this law, despite 
the fact that it contains whatever a people needs. It is as if we have 
become particularly fond of ignorance. Furthermore, it is obvious that 
our divine law is not limited to acts of worship but, on the contrary, 
embraces every major and minor political issue, down to the indemnity 
for a minor abrasion. Consequently, we will never be in need of man- 
made law, especially in view of the fact that we are Muslims and must 
organise our worldly affairs in such a way as not to disturb our situation 
on the day of judgment". 
In summarizing, it is important to recognise that what Nuri indicated about one 
hundred years ago remains an issue for a significant number of Muslim scholars in 
the present day. One of these was Maududi, one of the prominent Islamic authors 
in Pakistan who died recently. 
2.3.3 Maududi: Sovereignty of God not people 
Maududi stated that: 
"Law making in the western countries rests on the desires of the 
masses, but in Islam, sovereignty is for God and for vice regency of 
man ". 
33 
33 Abul Al'a Maududi. 1976. P. 23 
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Maududi's interpretation is in some aspects similar to that of Nuri, in spite of the 
fact that Maududi was of the Sunni sect of Islam and Nuri was Shi 'ah34. 
"Islam, speaking from the viewpoint of political philosophy, is the very 
antithesis of secular Western democracy. The philosophical foundation 
of Western democracy is the sovereignty of the people. In it this type 
of absolute powers of legislation of the determination of values and of 
the norms of behaviour rests in the hands of the people. Lawmaking is 
their prerogative and legislation must correspond to the mood and 
temper of their opinion. If a particular piece of legislation is desired by 
the masses, howsoever ill-conceived it may be from a religious and 
moral viewpoint, steps have to be taken to place it on the statute book; 
if the people dislike any law and demand its abrogation, howsoever just 
and rightful it might be, it has to be expunged forthwith. This is not the 
case of Islam. On this count, Islam has no trace of Western democracy. 
Islam, as already explained, altogether repudiates the philosophy of 
popular sovereignty and rears its polity on the foundation of the 
sovereignty of God and the vice regency (Khilafat) of man". 
As can be seen, legitimacy of power continues to be one of the most vital issues in 
Islamic thought; how there can be accommodation between the divine law and 
man-made law on legitimacy; whether the legitimacy relates to the people or God? 
In Islamic countries these issues are both political and religious questions and 
34 Ibid., P. 23 
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many of the Muslim's affairs depend on how these questions are to be answered. 
A detailed study of how the Iranian constitutional law deals with these issues will 
be presented in the following chapter. 
2.3.4 Nuri's Idea on the Legitimacy of Parliament 
Shaykh Nuri challenged the idea of parliament on the following grounds; 
1- Dealing with the affairs of the people is a responsibility of the qualified 
Mujtahids, not of any individual from among the people, such as a grocer 
or a draper. 
2- The idea of majority, whose agreement makes the law, is an innovation 
that is against Islam. 
3- The third point on which Shaykh Nuri took issue with the 
Constitutionalists, was the idea of representation (vakil). In the Fiqh, the 
problem of vikalat has been discussed in the sense that one person appoints 
another as his lawyer to perform certain actions on his behalf. This 
arrangement involves individual matters; for instance, one person may 
appoint another to buy a house for him and sign necessary papers on his 
behalf. The lawyer is called vakil and his action vikalat. However, when 
a problem belongs to the public domain and a vikalat is required, no one 
but the Mujtahids is capable of handling the matter. In spite of the Shi'ah 
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belief on the source of legitimacy, in reality the Shah's position was 
predominant. In this regard, Weber states that35; 
"Even thought the Persian Shiites reject (the religious) role of 
the Caliph and place their eschatological hope in the parousia 
of the Prophet's legitimate successor, in Persia, the Shah's 
position is predominant; this is not changed by the fact that the 
mood of the local population is considered in the appointment 
of a priest (presumably the Imam Jum'a- Friday prayers 
Imam)". 
35 Weber. Economy and society, G. Roth and C. Wittich. eds. Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press 1978. quoted in. Arjomand. Shadow of God. p. 22 
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2.3.5 European Support is the Reason for Illegitimacy 
According to the Qur'an, Muslims should not consider infidels as friends in 
preference to Muslims or confidants. For Nuri, European people were infidels, 
therefore British support of the cause of constitutionalism became a source of 
criticism for Nuri. Also Islamic Constitutionalists claimed that constitutionalism 
is a European idea and not Islamic, thus such an idea would destroy Islam and 
would be the source of corrupting Iranian society. 
"My dear; If the purpose (of Constitutionalism) were to enforce Islam, 
England would not have supported it. And if they wanted to act 
according to the Qur'an, they would not have deceived the masses, 
taking refuge in unbelief and considered the English their friends, 
supporters, and confidants; while there are a number of verses in the 
Qur'an that command us not to consider infidels our supporters, 
friends, or confidants. Who would be so stupid, may I ask, to believe 
that infidelity would support Islam ...? ". 
36 
These discussions were very important for the people therefore Constitutionalists 
were trying to address Nuri's debate, and were worried about the influence of his 
questions on the people. For instance, Bibahani, one of the clerical leaders of the 
Iranian Constitutional Revolution in 1906,. states37: 
36 Torkman, M., P. 24 
37 Adamiyyat. F. 1976. P. 153 
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"You should never state that they (Western countries) did so in this 
or that state, and we should do the same. The common people do 
not understand, and it is insulting to us. We have laws and we 
have the Qur'an. I do not want to say 'do not name the country'. 
Name it and mention it, but explore the matter so that it becomes 
clear that what we have done has been based on wisdom and 
derived from our Sacred laws". 
Shaykh Nuri stated that parliament is a European creation; they need a parliament 
because they have no sacred law... but Muslim countries have sacred law, 
therefore they do not need a parliament. 
"We see that in the Majlis, they have brought in the legislative books 
of European parliament and based on their need for law, they have 
expanded them, not realising that European nations had not devised 
sacred laws.... But we, the followers of Islam, have a heavenly and 
eternal Sacred Law, which is so dignified, proper, perfect and firm that 
it cannot be abrogated... ". 38 
2.3.6 The affairs of the monarchy and the affairs of the population 
According to Nuri, with regard to new legislation, the affairs of the Monarchy and 
the affairs of the people should be viewed differently. Laws concerning the affairs 
of the people needed no change, but laws concerning the monarchy did. 
'BTorkman, M. 1982, P 29 
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He states39: "... our need, the need of the Iranian people, to devise a law 
is merely in terms of the affairs of monarchy, which, in the course of 
world events, have been separated from the course of religious law 
and, as the religious jurists explain, the government has become a 
government of injustice and as politicians are wont to say, it has 
become a dictatorial government". 
Mudarris, Sayyid Hasan, who was an active and notable member of the Ulama 
committee in the parliament, made a particular proposal about divine and civil 
law. According to his proposal disputes are divided into three kinds; 
"First, religious matters, such as conflicts concerning marriage, 
divorce, kinship endowment, ownership appointment of guardianship 
bankruptcy ruling and legal dispute about which the injunction of the 
Ulama differ in regards of the principle of the ruling. In such 
disputes, the religious magistrate alone should investigate the matter. 
Secondly, civil matters, such as disputes concerning government taxes 
and concessions, to be investigated by the Ministry of Justice courts. 
Thirdly, common matters, that is, matters other than religious and civil 
issues, provided there is no doubt whether it is a religious or civil 
matter, must be referred to the religious courts. In such cases, too, if 
both parties to the dispute first consent to investigation by a Ministry 
39 Ibid., PP. 27-47 
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of Justice court, the court will do so, otherwise it must be referred to 
the religious court". 
40 
Nuri said that there is no obligation to obey the parliament's law, because 
parliament by its very existence, cannot recognise the Sacred Law of God; thus, 
how can the people obey its laws: "It is not obligatory to obey the Majlis 
(parliament). Obedience is obligatory to God, the Messenger of God, the Imams 
and those who are deputies of the Imam, the Ulama. Obviously this Majlis is 
none of the above; but it is a government by consultation, which is not obligatory 
for the Ja'fari sect to obey if it is headed by other than God or one of the other 
4 
.1 three groups" 
The above quotations from Nuri raise the issue of how he viewed the 
relationship between the affairs of the monarchy and the affairs of the 
ordinary people, and both their relationship to the law. The question is : did 
Nuri recommend the separation of power between religion and state? It 
seems that he did not recommend such separation because he constantly said 
that the law of Islam covers every major and minor political issue, even the 
indemnity for a minor abrasion: " It is obvious that our divine law is not 
limited to acts of worship but, on the contrary, embraces every major and 
minor political issue, down to the indemnity for a minor abrasion. 
Consequently, we will never be in need of man-made law, especially in view 
40 Sadr al-Ashraf, Khatirati az Dadgustari, cited in M. I. Bastani Parizi. Talash-i Azadi (1347/1968) 
pp. 515- 
41 Torkman, M. 1982., PP. 27-47 
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of the fact that we are Muslims and must organise our worldly affairs in 
such a way as not to disturb our situation on the day of Judgment". 42 
Therefore, Nuri did not recommend the separation of power between state and 
religion. In his view, the Ulama should dominate all the nation's affairs, as they 
are the representatives of the Hidden Imam. Nuri did not believe in the separation 
of state and religion. 
What he did recommend was that the area where new legislation was necessary, 
was regarding the monarchy which he said had become unjust and had moved 
outside the Islamic fold. (see section 1.4.6. ) This legislation, presumably, would 
not be innovation (bid'at), since it was to bring the Monarchy back within the 
Islamic framework. 
2.3.7 Natural contradiction between Islam and constitutionalism 
According to Nuri's definition of constitutionalism, it can be said briefly that he 
was aware of the contradiction between his traditional Islam and 
constitutionalism. Thus he claimed that a Constitutionalist government did not 
conform to the Shari 'ah or Fiqh. 
"My dear wretched brother; you should know that truth of 
constitutionalism is that the representatives of the provinces, as elected 
by the subjects themselves, gather in the capital. They constitute the 
legislative body of the state, look into the contemporary exigencies 
42 Arjomand, 1988. P. 354 
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and draft a law, independently and by the vote of the majority, to 
legislate whatever appeals to and pleases their majority according to 
their insufficient intelligence and regardless of compatibility of the 
"equality" and "freedom" of all the citizens. Other than this, whatever 
you have heard is a sheer lie". 43 
Nuri argued that there is a natural contradiction between Islam and 
constitutionalism, and that it is impossible to combine the two, yet The Highest 
Ulama who were the sources of emulation disagreed. 
2.3.8 The constitutionalist Ulama's position on constitutionalism 
The three sources of emulation in Najaf issued a decree (1910) as follows; 
"Constitutionality and the freedom of Iran mean the government 
and the nation not deviating from the laws but conforming to 
special and general injunctions taken from the religion and based 
on the implementation of divine law... and preservation of 
religious and national principles, prevention of what Islam 
prohibits, and the proliferation of justice... In the second chapter 
of the supplement to the Fundamental Law, which we signed 
earlier, the necessity of the opposition of the laws therein to 
religious injunctions has been clearly stated.... and no person 
with corrupt intentions or corrupter shall have the power, God 
forbid, to meddle in this affair and, by eliminating the laws and 
injunctions of the Ja'fari sect or by forging a law, to create 
43 Ibid., P. 360 
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atheism and heresy, in violation of the Constitution and principle 
of Iranian Constitutionalism, thereby establishing autocracy in 
another cursed form by the most abominable of vile men". 44 
The Highest Ulama's viewpoint indicates that Nuri's stance regarding the 
contradiction between Islam and constitutionalism was not the decisive position of 
all the Muslim clergymen. Their viewpoint also presages the subsequent 
evolution of Muslim scholars' thought concerning how to address new problems 
as they arose. 
2.3.9 Some Western scholars' views on legitimacy in Shi'ah 
The role of the Shi'ah debate on legitimacy has been discussed by a number of 
famous western scholars. The following are some examples of their ideas. 
Keddie: " Many scholars, including myself, have cited the Twelver Shi'ah 
doctrine of the illegitimacy of any state (sic) even a Twelver one, pending the 
return of the Hidden Imam, as a basis of the Iranian Ulama's effective and growing 
hostility to Iran's Qajar dynasty in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries". 45 
" After the Greater Occultation, of the Twelth Imam there is no really legitimate 
power pending his return". 46 
According to the Algar: " With the occultation of the twelfth Imam, Mohammad 
al-Mahdi, in 874, even the possibility of the legitimacy of power disappeared from 
44 Sharif, Kashani, Opcit, Vol, I, pp. 204,209,222-23,245 
45 Keddie, N. The opposition role of the Ulama in 20th century Iran, in Scholar, Saint and Sufis, 
P. 212 
46 Keddie, N. 1972 
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the world. Hence all states are inalienably usurpatory, even those of formal 
Shi'ah affiliation. 47 
Lambton : "The Shi'ah's Ulama withdrew from active participation in political 
affairs, awaiting the coming of the Mahdi". 48 
Therefore, the legitimacy of power rests on the representative of the Hidden Imam. 
2.4 Criticism of Nuri's View 
According to Na'ini49, Shaykh Nurr"s point of view was based upon negligence or 
feigned negligence and feigned ignorance vis-a-vis religious principles. 50 
For Shaykh Nuri as a Mujtahid, it was clear that there were new affairs which were 
not mentioned in the Islamic law, and he knew that the duty of the Mujtahid was 
to deal with these affairs according to the Qur'an and Sunnah. As Na'ini 
mentioned: "If there are already any specified Islamic provisions, then there is no 
need for new law-making in those areas. But if there are a number of problems 
which have not been predicted by the Shari 'ah, and to which, consequently, no 
solution has been proposed, it is the duty of the authorised ruler, to decide about 
5 these things". 1 
The Highest Ulama's support was crucial for the legitimacy of the constitutionalist 
government and, as mentioned before, the people's support was vital for victory 
47 Algar, H. Opposition role, p 232 
48 Lambton, A. K. S. 1970, P. 133 
49 See Chapter three 
so Talgani, S. M. P. 101 
51 Hairi, A. H. 1977, P. 210 
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for both the absolutist Ulama and Constitutionalist Ulama. The Ulama's support 
of constitutionalism shows that Nuri could not claim that his interpretation was 
the most Islamically authentic, and The Highest Ulama, who had great influence 
on the people, were reconciled to a form of constitutional government. 
2.4.1 The crucial role of interpreter 
The interpretation of Islam is crucial and is a constant factor in Islamic politics. 
That Nuri's interpretation differed from that of Na'ini and the Highest Ulama 
illustrates how responsible is the interpreter's position. It can affect the fate of 
millions of people. Clearly there was no consensus about the legitimacy of power 
within the Shi'ah sect at the beginning of the twentieth century. The dispute has 
reverberated down the succeeding decades to the present day. 
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2.4.2 Nuri and modern problems 
There are several questions which can be asked. Why did Nuri not address the 
contemporary issues and problems which had not arisen at the time of Prophet? 
Why did he appear to ignore the new situation and new conditions extant in his 
own time? And why could other Ulama, the Constitutionalist ones, consider 
these factors while Nuri did not? Perhaps the reason was that he was not 
personally involved in the new problems, or that he and his friends were unaware 
of the people's affairs. Another important factor is his lack of knowledge of how 
and why the European thinkers were searching for new solutions for their own 
new problems. 
2.4.3 Role of time and place 
A key aspect of the reasoning of Islamic Constitutionalists like Nuri, is that they 
did not consider the role of time and place. If they had been informed of the new 
situation and social change, perhaps it would have been possible for them to deal 
with the new circumstances Muslims faced, as Na'ini had done in his 
consideration of constitutionalism (Chapter Three of this work). Nuri states that 
all laws (Fiqh) that were made since the time of the Prophet, as Islamic law, must 
be accepted and fulfilled, but ignores the move into contemporary and future 
circumstance. 
2.5 Interim Conclusion 
1- Islamic Constitutionalists insisted on three essential requirements regarding the 
legitimacy of power and participation: 
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a. That state law should be in accord with divine law 
b. That the doctrine regarding the representative of the Hidden Imam (Ulama) 
should be adhered to. 
c. That the law should be non-European 
Re: 1) As far as divine law was concerned, both Constitutionalists and Islamic 
Constitutionalists accepted its supremacy. 
Re: 2) The Islamic Constitutionalists believed that laws approved by the Qualified 
Mujtahid, who is the representative of the Hidden Imam, were legitimate . The 
Constitutionalists went further, however, in believing that when there were 
representatives of the highest Ulama (the proof of the Imam) in parliament, then 
these laws were legitimate. 
Re: 3) As for non-European laws, Constitutionalists maintained that since there 
were new issues resulting from new conditions then it was incumbent on Muslims 
to find new solutions to these in their way, not that the solutions should be 
European. Islamic Constitutionalists on the other hand, emphasized not only that 
the Fiqh was Islam, but also that nothing new was permissible. As we have 
argued, the inference of the Fuqaha is not necessarily Islam. In addition, the 
Islamic Constitutionalists maintained that the formulation of new laws was 
"innovation" (bid'at) and therefore unacceptable. They made one exception to 
this ruling and this was where the new laws were to bring the Monarchy into line; 
in which case the law making was considered to be permitted, in that it was 
bringing the Monarchy back into the fold of Islamic Law. 
2-Nuri rejected constitutionalism but his alternative was the absolute power of the 
King and traditional role of the Ulama. He confirmed tyrannical government and 
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denied a constitutional one. Thus the Ulama would have been in overall control 
of everybody (the People and the Shah). 
3- The main criticisms of the Islamic Constitutionalists must be : 
a. They lacked familiarity with new ideas or theories on the legitimacy of power. 
They referred only to the traditional and orthodox references of Islam. 
b. They were ignorant of social change, the new situations of industrialisation and 
the growth of cities, which brought new problems which required legislation. 
c. Some had a close association with the rulers who were isolated from the 
people, and this resulted in their ignorance of the people's problems. 
d. Some were ignorant of the people's problems, such as oppression and 
inequality, as a result of isolation within their religious vocation. 
e. Nuri and other Islamic Constitutionalists could not present any alternative to 
the Monarchy. Meanwhile, they rejected the struggle of the Constitutionalist 
Ulama who, according to their mutually accepted concept of Ijtehad, were 
searching for new solutions to new problems. 
4- It is clear that the role of the theoretical debate on the legitimacy of power was 
one of the factors which influenced the process of Constitutionalism. More than 
one hundred books and articles were written for and against constitutionalism. 
This demonstrated the importance of the theoretical debate and the extent of the 
disagreement on this issue between scholars and Ulama. Even now, after almost 
one hundred years, Nuns"s ideas are discussed in the Iranian Ulama and one can 
find his ideas and reasoning in newspapers and magazines. 
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5- For the Islamic Constitutionalists, Islam determined every minor and major 
need of Muslims fourteen hundred years ago, and it is still valid in all aspects 
now. But Constitutionalists believed that Islam brought to the Muslims the 
Principles of Life and that it is the duty of the Ulama to infer new regulations from 
these principles, to serve any new needs of the Muslim state. 
6-One of the most interesting issues on constitutionalism was the united position 
of two opposite ideologies: that of the non-Muslim intellectuals and the 
traditionalist Muslims. Both sides believed that there was no conformity between 
Islam and constitutionalism. 
Intellectuals referred to the traditionalist Ulama's reasoning, and the traditional 
Ulama referred to the intellectuals opposed to the mass beliefs; yet Nuri often 
referred to the intellectual insult to Islam, while the intellectuals referred to 
Islamic Constitutionalists as having inappropriate ideas for modem life. 
7- It is interesting to compare the different backgrounds of Nuri (anti- 
Constitutionalist), and Na'ini (Constitutionalist). 
a. Na'ini had the experience of fighting against British influence and tyranny 
and had political experience, but Nuri's life shows that he was more related to the 
Iranian monarchy. 
b. Na'ini was the student of an eminent clergyman, Ayatollah Mirzay Shirazi, 
who played a crucial role in cancelling the English-Iranian contract on Iranian 
tobacco production. 
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c. Na'ini had encountered the Western idea of Constitutionalism in Iraq and 
had had the opportunity to study some of those theories, but Shaykh Nuri referred 
almost exclusively to the traditional view of the Shi'ah. 
d. Na'ini was influenced by Saeed Jamal'ldin Asad Abadi, who is recognized 
as the leader of the Islamic movement in the Muslim and Eastern countries. 
Saeed Jamal'ldin was the first Muslim to propose the idea of Constitutionalism for 
Muslim countries, but Shaykh Nuri had not been exposed to such information and 
experience. 
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Chapter 3 Na'ini 
3.1 Chapter Introduction 
3.1.1 Changing legal concepts during the past 150 years. 
During the past 150 years or so, legal concepts have gone through many changes 
in states where the majority of the population is Muslim. Concepts including the 
rights of the people and the legitimacy of power, the power of God, individual and 
women's rights minority and party's rights, etc. have been analysed and 
evaluated in new ways. Enayat in this regard maintained that': 
"Muslims do not have a unified and monolithic perception of their 
faith, any more than the followers of other great religions. However, 
much as the orthodox dislike it, different groups of Muslims interpret 
Qur'anic injunctions and the Prophetic sayings differently each 
according to its historical background and the realities encircling it - 
and not always in terms conducive to a dictatorial conduct of 
individual and social affairs". 
Certain principles related to legitimacy of power and so on are enshrined in the 
constitutional laws of all countries, even a comparison of the constitutional laws 
of the ex-Soviet Union and the U. S. A clearly shows such issues to be common in 
most constitutional laws around the world. According to this concept, legitimacy 
of the government depends on the consent of the people, so the sovereignty of the 
nation is a common principle in almost all countries. 
The Iranian Constitutional Law, (ICL 1980), in some aspects, has similarities with 
most constitutional law around the world, but differs on some issues. A point of 
departure from other constitutions is the question of legitimacy of power and 
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equality of political rights. It raises the following fundamental issues: Whose is 
the final authority? Is it God's or the people's? Who is accountable to whom? 
Who is the ultimate author of the legitimacy of a government, God or the people? 
3.1.2 Procedure in this study 
Having now introduced the contradictions within the Islamic Constitution of Iran 
1980, this study will proceed to present an investigation into the historical and 
religious background leading to the establishment of the Islamic Constitution of 
Iran 1906. An investigation of the work of the influential theorist, Mirza 
Muhammad Husain Na'ini will follow. The influence of his thought can be seen 
to have been in two waves; the first from when his book entitled "Tanbih" was 
published in 1909; the second from 1955 when "Tanbih" was reprinted in Tehran. 
Na'ini's theories and related debates will be explored and analysed. 
3.2 Mirza Muhammad Husain Na'ini 
Mirza Muhammad Husain Na'ini was born in 1860 in Iran (Na'in), He died in 
1936. 
He became a prominent member of the Ulama and a Mujtahid of repute. His 
views represented those of the non-Absolutist Ulama. Not only was Na'ini 
recognised as a great mujtahid but he also played an influential role in Iranian 
politics. His book "" Tanbih" (The admonition and refinement of the people) 
which presents his views on legitimacy and participation was approved and 
supported by two of the highest ranking Shi'ah leaders, Mazanrani, Shaykh Abd 
Allah, and Khorasani, Mohammad Kazim, and Tehrani. 
3.2.1 The Purpose of this study of Na'ini's work 
` Enayat. H. 1982. P. 1 
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The purpose of this study is to examine the analysis of the legitimacy of state 
power and political participation presented in the writings of the Iranian Shi'ah 
Muslim cleric Mirza Muhammad Husain Na'ini (1860 -1936) and relate it to the 
hypothesis that there are contradictions in the Islamic Constitutional Law of Iran 
regarding legitimacy of power and political participation, in view of the fact that 
Na'ini's writings are both the best, and best known presentation on this subject 
from amongst the work of the entire body of constitutionalist Ulama. 
Na'infs work, "tanbih" is recognised by the Ulama of Iran as the most authentic 
presentation of the views of that section of the Ulama who have become known as 
the consitutionalist Ulama. Na'ini's presentation of constitutionalism reconciles 
it with the Qur'an and Hadith. His views are representative of the religio- 
political reasoning which brought about the drafting of the 1906 Constitution of 
Iran and, later, the Islamic Constitution of Iran 1980. Even today, Na'ini's 
approach to the issues can provide a most valuable and clearly argued basis for 
assessing the continuing discussions, debates and controversy regarding 
legitimacy and participation in the Islamic Republic, based as it is, upon the 
origins of that system, namely The Qur'an and the Hadith. In today's world, the 
issues involved may be considered relevant not only to the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, but also to a greater or lesser extent to other societies with a majority of 
Muslims, world-wide. 
3.2.2 Context of the publication of "tanbih" 
In June 1908 The Shah (Muhammad Ali) abrogated the 1906 Constitution. Na'ini 
wrote his book a few months after the Shah bombarded Parliament and killed 
many constitutionalists because they were encouraging people to resist the tyranny 
of his rule. The Shah quoted precedent as justification for what he had done. 
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Na'ini's theory of tyranny and non-legitimacy of government was partially 
provoked by this situation. However in his analysis he did not limit himself to 
current events. The history of previous Shahs was taken into account. 
Na'ini was in Najaf, a city in Iraq renowned for its Islamic institutions and 
religious erudition , when 
he wrote his important work in co-operation with great 
and religious leaders of the Shi'ah, Mazanrani, Shaykh Abd Allah, and Khorasani, 
Mohammad Kazim, and Tehrani. 
3.2.3 Significance of Na'ini's work 
Na'ini's interpretation of constitutionalism is the most organised and coherent 
among all those produced by the Ulama. He employs rationalism as well as 
traditional argument and his view is of great significance because it represents the 
view of the highest ranking clerical leaders involved in the Iranian Constitutional 
Revolution 1906. 
An informed study of Iranian constitutional thought must include an examination 
of Na'ini's position on constitutional government; yet insufficient attention has 
been paid to it either in Iran or in Western countries. Na'ini's work on 
constitutionalism systematically presented the Shi'ah position on Legitimacy. A 
study of his writings on constitutionalism will enable us to appreciate how he, a 
leading mujtahid himself, viewed legitimacy and participation and thus, how those 
reforming Ulama who have opposed the rule of the Shahs in the twentieth century 
have viewed it. The significance of his discussion of the issues is that it was 
within the framework of the Shi'ah system of government that he attempted to 
reconcile constitutionalism with Islam. 
3.2.4 Na ini's reason for publishing "Tanbih" 
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Many books had been written that strongly condemned constitutionalism. Few of 
these have in fact become known to observers. However, in the early 1900s, little 
writing in favour of constitutionalist thought had become available, especially to 
the general public. Because of the victory of constitutionalist thought among the 
Ulama, Na'ini had felt that it was necessary to write a book on an Islamic form of 
constitutional government that was easily understood by the general public. This 
he considered important, as the absolutist Ulama and their adherents remained 
unconvinced by the new way of thinking, and their views held strong sway 
amongst large swathes of the general population. 
3.2.5 Sources of Na'ini's thought 
The main source of Na'ini thought is the tanbih. His condemnation of tyranny 
can be seen to have certain similarities with that of Alfieri and Moniesquieu, but in 
presenting evidence to support his argument, like Kawakibi, he based his 
reasoning principally upon Islamic Sources, which they did not. In Na'ini's work, 
any appreciation of European thinkers "who divided tyranny into political and 
religious" 2 or "the first philosopher who based constitutionalism on liberty and 
equalityi3 is also rare. 
A persistent question is, how did modern European thought about 
constitutionalism reach Na'ini? Study of Na'ini's work indicates that his strongest 
influence from outside Iran was the work of Kavakibi, "Taba-i al-istibdad' (The 
Characteristics of Tyranny) and that it was mainly through the medium of this 
work, that Na'ini became acquainted with western constitutionalist ideas. Prior 
to the Persian Constitutional Revolution 1906, "Taba-i al-istibdad' had been 
2 Talqani, M. P. 44 
3 Ibid., p 27 
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published in the Arab world. Na'ini, who knew Arabic, employs Kavakibi's 
terminology in his own book and it is clear that he directly benefited from 
Kavakibi's work. Ha'iri a mujtahid of whom more later, believed that Kavakibi 
was Na'ini's most important outside source. Kavakibi himself was influenced by 
Vitttorio Alfieri (1749-1803), the forerunner of Italian nationalism. 5 
3.2.6 Publication of "Tanbih" 
"Tanbih" was published in Baghdad6 in 1909 and its lithographed edition appeared 
in Tehran in 1910. A third edition was printed in 1955 in Tehran, in which 
Ayatolah Haji Sayyed Mahmud Taligani who was recognised as an influential 
leader of the opposition to the then Shah wrote the preface and provided 
interpretation and summaries in footnotes. This edition is particularly relevant to 
recent times and its effect differed from the other editions, in that, by 1955, it was 
not necessary to propagate the idea of a constitutional system. It did, however, 
contain the strong attack against the tyranny of the monarch and therefore was an 
indirect attack against the Shah of the time (1955-1979). This edition received 
much attention from people in Iran. 
The book contained letters of praise, printed on the front page, written by two 
eminent religious leaders in Najaf and this gave the book added weight. They 
supported wholeheartedly what Na'ini had written about constitutionalism and it 
was therefore evident that the book not only contained the views of Na'ini but also 
those of the most important leaders of Shi'ah of the period. Up until the present, 
Na'ini's book has remained the only one of its sort to have the potential to be an 
influential reference work on the problem of the harmony between Islam and 
° Ha'iri. A. H. 1977. P161 
5 Ibid., PP. 161-164 
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constitutional theory. Most of the Ulama's works have sunk into oblivion, but 
Na'im"s book continues to be highly regarded among a variety of groups in Iran. 
3.3 Specified and unspecified Islamic rules 
Na'ini made a distinction between two bodies of knowledge: 1) What is 
mentioned in the Qur'an and Hadith and 2) what is not. Since there are many 
issues concerning state, government, equality and so on, that are not mentioned 
specifically in the Qur'an and Hadith, he suggested that, when dealing with these 
issues we can use science and reason to manage our society. He refers to 
constitutional law as a convention between people and government. 7 
Na'ini "emphasises that if there are already any specified Islamic provisions 
(mansusat)concerning political or judicial problems, then there is no need for new 
law-making in those areas. The existing mansusat will be sufficient and will be 
valid and unchanged until the Day of Judgement. But if there are a number of 
problems which have not been (explicitly) predicted by the Shari 'ah, and to 
which, consequently, no solution has been proposed, it is the duty of the 
authorised ruler (valiy-i nawi)to decide about these things, that is to say, to 
establish appropriate law. The latter procedure is, of course, subject to change 
according to expediency, time and place. Therefore, during the rule of the Imam, 
law-making of this sort depends on the preference of his agents who represent him 
in different regions. In the course of the Imam's Greater Occultation, this task is 
left to his General Agents (nuvvab-i amm), i. e. the highest Marja-i taqlid, or even 
an authorised person who may be a middle-ranking clergyman authorised by the 
Ma, ja-i taglid. 
6 The Capital of Iraq, and one of the famous and religious Shi'ah centres in Iraq 
Talgani, M. P. 200 
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Na'ini notes that whatever is supposed not to be discussed, questioned or changed 
is therefore limited to Specified Islamic Laws (mansusat), and whatever needs to 
be discussed and consulted about makes up the matters which fall into the 
category of "Unspecified Rules" (ghayr-i mansusat). Under the rule of the Imam, 
as mentioned earlier, the Imam's representatives can decide on unspecified 
matters". 8 
Ha'iri argues that Na'ini's concept of government is neither the parliamentary 
system nor is it democratic constitutionalism: 
"Na'ini goes on to argue that law-making of this nature is, of course, one of the 
tasks of the Ulama. However, (Ha'iri maintains, )under the then present 
circumstances, (i. e. with a constitution )law will be effective only if it is passed 
by a parliament. Therefore, if a person who is authorised by the religious 
authority approves the legislation, there should be no room for doubt about the 
religious legitimacy of parliament. 
Ha'iri continues; "Na'ini, as was noted, made a distinction between the mansusat 
and ghayr-i mansusat. His argument on this point is in fact quite inadequate. 
The ideas of mansusat and ghayr-i mansusat are entirely irrelevant to a regime 
based on democratic constitutionalism. In this argumentation, Na'ini plainly 
shows that he was not prepared to recognise a truly sovereign parliament. He was 
Fighting tyranny, and the advocacy of a constitutional form of government seemed 
a convenient way to victory in his campaign. By limiting the function of 
parliament so that it might deal only with matters about which there is no clear 
provision in Islam, Na'ini undercut the entire rationale of democracy and 
constitutionalism which he thought he was supporting and gave approval to a 
' Ha'iri. 1977. P. 210 
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paralysed and non-sovereign parliament. There would remain, on this ground, 
very little room for setting up a modem constitution, because the main body of a 
constitution would be formed of a number of Qur'anic verses and Hadith. The 
regime he conceived would be closer to theocracy than to democratic 
constitutionalism, the latter being the historical enemy of the former". 9 
To counter Ha'iri's criticism, it could be maintained that Na'ini, as a religious 
man, and in the circumstances of his time and place, was looking for a solution for 
his country and people for that time; thus judgements about his work could be 
related to the context of those particular conditions, and it should be acceptable to 
allow him to use any western concept provided that he could adapt it to Islam. 
This point of view should be seriously considered in view of the fact that the 
culture of a significant section of the Iranian elite was becoming more and more 
westernised while at the same time, western ideas were not familiar to the mass of 
the people. As Enayat put itlo: 
"Whatever the case, the fact that during the Revolution the urban 
masses, who were surely no less religious-minded than they are now 
responded so enthusiastically to the call for a constitutional 
government, should be proof enough that the opinion of the freedom- 
seeking Ulama held great sway over them. There was one other 
possible centre for dissemination of democratic ideals among the 
people: the writing of such westernised thinkers of the period as 
Sipahsalar, Mirza Malkam Khan and Talibov. But what should make us 
cautious in estimating the influence of such modernists is not only 
9 Ha'iri. 1977. P. 212 
10 Enayat, H. 1982. PP. 156-166 
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their exotic ideology, but also their style of prose. Containing 
numerous Persianised forms of European political terms, as well as 
newly coined words and phrases belying unassimilated Western 
notions, their work could not possibly produce the same effect as the 
tracts of the Ulama, whose style, however equally stilted, was at least 
familiar to the indigenous bourgeoisie, and comprised many symbols 
which could not fail to galvanize popular feelings and many arguments 
which afforded evidence of greater originality of mind and powers of 
synthesis". 
3.4 Illegitimacy of tyranny. 
In Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and Iran, there were a great number of Islamic 
thinkers who employed the term stibdad (despotism) as a characteristic of a bad 
and stubborn ruler. This term signifies tyranny or despotism. In Europe, 
thinkers such as Montesquieu and Rousseau used the word tyrant to describe a 
ruler who imposed his oppressive will upon his subjects. In Iran works on a 
variety of topics including politics, technology, history, military science etc., were 
translated into the Persian language. Particularly within the years 1906-1909, 
many works on constitutionalism were translated and published. For Na'ini, 
tyrannical government is evil. It is against God, against the well-being of the 
people, against the Islamic spirit and is the opposite of the truly Islamic System. ti 
In Na'ini's opinion, living under tyranny is the equivalent of slavery. He made 
reference to the Qur'an and the words of the twelve Imams of the Shi'ah, all of 
whom are regarded by the Shi 'ah as infallible, in order to illustrate that both the 
" Talgani, M. PP. 18-27 
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Qur'an and the Twelve Imams had, on a variety of occasions, made it clear that 
they viewed tyranny as the slavery of the people. 12 
3.4.1 References from the Qur'an 
The Pharaoh is viewed by Jews, Christians and Muslims alike, as the archetypal 
despot. 
Na'ini used the following references in his argumentation: 
(1)In the Qur'an, Moses, a prophet of the one God, rebukes the Pharaoh thus: - 
"And this is the favour with which thou dost Reproach me: That thou enslaved the 
Children of Israel". ( Qur'an. 26/22) 
(2) In Qur'an 23: 47, Pharaoh and his chiefs react thus to Moses and Aaron when 
they approach the court with the message of the one God: 
"They (Pharaoh etc. ) said: "Shall we put faith in two mortals like ourselves? And 
their people are in servitude to us? 
(3)Qur'an (7: 127): 
"Said the chiefs of Pharaoh's people (to Pharaoh), "Will you allow Moses and his 
people to spread mischief in the land, and to abandon you and your gods? 
He said: "We will slay their male children. Their females we will save alive; and 
we have complete power over them. 
Na'ini explains that these verses concern the Israelites, and the Qur'an's reference 
to their slavery means their being subjected to the tyrannical rule of the Pharaoh. 
12 According to the Shi'ah opinion these leaders are infallible, and the latest one is absent and he is 
alive 
82 
(4) Qur'an (24: 55) 
In describing how true believers should behave, Allah says: 
"They will worship Me (alone) and not associate anything at all with Me". 
The Qur'an continues, "If any do reject faith after this, they are rebellious and 
wicked". 
(5)Qur'an ( 9: 31) 
"They take their priests and monks to be their lords in derogation of God, and they 
take as their lord, the Messiah Son of Mary: yet they were commanded to worship 
but one God. There is no God but He. Praise and glory to Him. 
Number (5) clearly refers to some among the Christians, but by analogy can refer 
to any other community that has been commanded to worship One God. Na'ini 
argues unequivocally that "As obedience to tyrannical rulers is slavery, obedience 
to the arbitrary desire of religious leaders is also slavery; it is easier to get rid of 
the former than the latter. 13 
3.4.2 References from the Hadith 
Na'ini refers to the speeches and sayings of the first Imam of Shi'ah. 
"Na'ini quotes several passages from Nahj al-Balaghah together with 
sayings ascribed to Husayn, the third Imam of Shi'ah. In these 
quotations, the oppressive rule of the Pharaoh, the Kisras (a ruler of 
Persia contemporary with the Prophet), Caesar, and finally the 
Umayyads was critically attacked. Historical evidence, in Na'ini's 
view, will demonstrate that tyrannical government is evil, against the 
13 Talgani, M. P. 27 
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Islamic spirit, and in sharp contrast with that ideal system that the 
founders of Islam had meant to establish". '4 
. 
Vu 'ini argues that the first Islamic rulers after the prophet were not tyrannical, but 
that later Islam suffered a decline when it came to be ruled by tyrants. In the holy 
Qur'an and Hadith the term "consultation" is supported. By its very nature, 
tyranny renders consultation impossible and is clearly condemned in the Qur'an. 
Constitutionalism on the other hand, involves consultation. A salient Hadith of 
the Prophet states, "Consultation is of the Sunnah (exemplary practice of the 
Prophet) and stihdad(t)ranny) is a characteristic of the devil. 15 
A great number of people supported the absolutist cause and a point of major 
concern for Na 'ini was that they did so without understanding either the meaning 
of "constitutionalism" nor that of "tyranny". Na'ini argues that although the 
people heard these terms, they did not know the difference between the two. 
They knew neither the role nor usefulness of a constitutional regime nor were they 
aware of the rights and duties of the ruler, according to Qur'an and Hadith. 
3.5 Legitimacy of constitutionalism 
To understand Na'ini's idea of legitimacy, it is necessary to examine his 
description of constitutional government. He argues: 
"The second type of government is that in which there is absolutely no 
state of possessorship subjugation and despotism. Rulership here is 
based on the performance of certain duties in the interests of the 
public. The ruler's authority is limited to those duties, and he has no 
right to transgress this limit. In this office the person in charge has to 
"N1 'inl. PP{ R-27 quoted in f-! a'iri. P. 175 
Is Quoted in Na'iri. P167 
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employ all the forces of the country to establish order and protection. 
For this reason, his authority is of the type of benevolent 
supervisorship (Welayat). Every one of the people, in such a state, is 
equal to the ruler and shares with him all affairs, financial or 
otherwise. Those responsible for any office are only public trustees, 
not possessors or lords, and all are responsible to the people and are 
liable to be questioned by them. Everyone has the right to protest and 
is not to be subjected or subdued by the ruler. Such government is 
called bond, limited, just, constitutional, and responsible". 16 
Na'ini argues that when the Imam is absent, a parliamentary system can replace 
the ideal rulership because in his view Islam advocates a constitution, and 
alternation made possible by provision for elections is the best means for limiting 
the authority of the ruling body. 17 
"The absolutist "Ulama" have mocked these principles and branded 
our struggle for them as heresy, they have made people believe that 
one of the consequences of a constitutional regime is that women will 
be unveiled. They lose sight of the fact that there is no connection 
between these two problems. We see, for example, that Russia, as a 
despotic state, and England and France, as two constitutional 
countries, all have permitted their women to be unveiled. These 
countries have this custom because in their religion there is no 
16 Talqani, M. PP. 11.12 
17 Ibid., PP. 54-55 
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restriction against unveiling. Those Ulama are religious thieves and 
their aim is to lead weak-minded people astray. 18 
Since the theory of Na'ini is so significant , 
it is necessary to go more deeply into 
this issue. According to the Qur'an, polytheism is a great sin, and God never 
forgives the man who believes in it. (Qur'an 4: 48) 
Na'ini makes a radical point with respect to polytheism. In a general sense 
polytheism is defined as believing in more than one God. As the centuries moved 
on from the Prophet's lifetime, this had come to be seen as manifesting itself 
mainly in a person's belief, rather than in conduct. Thus a person with good 
deeds and wrong ideology about God would be associated with polytheism 
(classed as a polytheist). Conversely, a person who believes in monotheism, but 
does not do good deeds, would be classed as a monotheist. 
The interesting and novel approach taken by Na'ini is that he associates 
polytheism with social conduct instead of its sole association with belief and 
ideology, i. e., he has transferred a previous subjective into an objective 
consideration with a social dimension. In the words of Mutahhary'9 "Na'ini is 
the hero of polytheism interpretation in the history of Islam". 
3.6 Na'ini on polytheism in politics. 
Na'ini asks, why did God, in the Qur'an, focus on the issue of the Israelites being 
forced to worship Pharaoh? He answers: because when a ruler does anything he 
wants, and ignores the orders of God, his nation is in slavery and he has set 
18 Ibid., PP. 36-38 
19 One of the most famous religious thinkers in Iran 
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himself up as another god. From Na'ini's point of view, this is a form of 
polytheism and is thus the reason why a tyrannical government is illegitimate. 20 
According to Na'ini's understanding of the concept, tyranny is illegitimate 
because: 
1. It is based on the personal desires of a (human) ruler. 
2. The people become slaves of that ruler. 
3. The life of the people in a tyrannical government is no more than that of plants, 
because they are working for the benefit of the ruler, not for their own independent 
benefit. 
3.7 Problems of Na'ini's dual approach methodology. 
Na'ini's study is based on a dual approach methodology. This methodology led 
to several contradictions in his work. His understanding of legitimacy contains 
contradictions which result from his incoherent methodology. When he 
employed the "rational and Qur'anic approach" he was able to offer new insights 
into the issue. But his use of the "Traditional" approach would lead him to 
conclusions which contradicted the outcomes of his first approach. 
3.8 Qur'anic approach vis a' vis traditional approach 
Na'ini was wrestling with two aspects of the Muslim inheritance which over time 
have become contradictory. The first inheritance is that of the words of the 
Qur'an itself. The second inheritance, or "Tradition" developed from the same 
source, but strongly adhered to changes in emphasis and detailed interpretations of 
the originals which were deeply affected by the succeeding times, places and 
cultures of the people who formulated them. 
20 Talgani, M. PP. 18-20 
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Whereas the holy Qur'an had universal relevance for all time, and apart from 
certain specific rules of conduct, contains universal principles with open ended 
possibilities for application according to time and place, the great mass of other 
traditions and resultant Fiqh (Islamic Jurisprudence) was closely linked to the 
viewpoints of scholars who were limited in their outlook to their own time and 
place, and hence the laws and rulings they produced lacked flexibility and became 
less relevant to the succeeding time-environments. There was therefore a 
problem of how to present coherent and rational arguments, for anyone who tried 
to use the principles of the original source, together with certain of the later time 
and culturally limited accretions. 
When it came to the issue of legitimacy of power and rights of participation, etc., 
the two great strands of influence can be seen to contradict one another, or rather, 
Fiqh could be seen to contradict its original source. Using the two together, 
therefore, prevented Na'ini from presenting an entirely coherent argument about 
this overwhelmingly important issue. 
Na'ini's passionate critiques of tyranny which are based on the rational and 
Qur'anic approach clash with his advocacy of the "Traditional" approach. In his 
view, the latter itself promotes tyranny. 
This is a problem for many Ulama. On the one hand, they are opposed to tyranny 
and inequality, whilst on the other hand, in the traditional or classical sources, 
there are many texts in Fiqh which contradict this opposition. Over the centuries, 
the Qur'an as the main and central source of Muslim thought has remained 
untouched, but the culture, customs and knowledge of the Muslims have 
influenced their traditions and Fiqh. 
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Na'ini can prove his interpretation of tyranny and equality of people, by reference 
to the Qur'an and history of Islam, but when he refers to Fiqh, he seems forced to 
accept inequality and tyrannical government, under the sources of the Fiqh. In 
other words, when Na'ini explains about tyranny, and the illegitimacy of a 
tyrannical regime, he employs rational methods, with evidence from the Qur'an, 
but when he uses Fiqh, or the traditional sources of Fiqh, he faces major problems 
to establish his ideal government. This is an extremely important point in the 
present day and has been so in the history of the Muslim world. 
It can be said in general, that wherever Muslim thinkers refer to the Qur'an for 
their main source of reasoning on any issue, they can extract highly valuable 
concepts. However, if the source of reasoning is mixed with other factors, such 
as history, culture and social context, then they are faced with this great dilemma. 
It cannot be stated too strongly that Fiqh is the reflection of a faqhih which is 
heavily affected by the place, time and knowledge of the person, on the social, 
cultural and historical background of that person. 
3.9 Legitimacy of election 
The absolutist Ulama were strongly opposed to elections which led to the setting 
up of a parliament by the rule of the ordinary people. 
Fadl Allah Nuri, as the most famous absolutist, challenged the idea of parliament 
on the following grounds: 
1. Dealing with the affairs of the people is the responsibility of qualified 
mujtahids, not of any individual from among the people, such as a grocer or a 
draper. 
2. The idea of the majority, whose agreement makes the law, is an innovation 
that is against Islam. 
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3. The third point on which Nuri took issue with the constitutionalists was the idea 
of the representative (vekalat). In the Fiqh, the problem of the vekalat has been 
discussed, in the sense that one person appoints another as his lawyer to perform 
certain legal acts on his behalf. This arrangement involves individual matters; for 
instance, one person may appoint another to buy a house for him and sign 
necessary paperwork on his behalf. The lawyer is called vakil and his action 
vikalat. However, when a problem concerns the public and a vikalat is required, 
no one but the mujtahids are capable of handling the matter21. 
This section of Na'ini's work is an answer to the questions and criticisms which 
Nuri poses. Na'ini argues that: 
" First legislation would be an innovation (bid'at), and consequently against Islam 
only if one declares a non-Islamic provision to be a provision of the Shari'ah and 
puts it into effect. But if one does not associate the non-Islamic provision with 
the Shari 'ah, then there would be no innovation. For instance, one person can 
make a certain schedule for himself so that he may operate in an organised way; or 
the people of a certain territory may decide to establish regulations to govern their 
own affairs in a particular manner. Such a schedule or set of regulations can also 
be written down in a book and can be called a constitution. As long as no claim 
is made that the constitution is established by the Shari 'ah, there would be no 
ground for this innovation or legislation against Islam (tashri) ". 22 
To solve this problem Na'ini argues that, in a Muslim country, only Ulama are the 
legitimate rulers, but he refers to a new idea about representative of Fuqaha: "The 
dissatisfaction of the sacred law-giver [i. e., the Prophet] with the topsy-turvy order 
21 Ha'iri. 1977. p 205 
zz Ha'iri. 1977. P. 200 
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and with the loss of Islamic territory [is most evident]. It is also most evident that 
the duties relating to the protection and [establishment of] order in Muslim 
countries are more important than all hisah[such as administration of justice, for 
instance]. Therefore, the representative of the fugaha and the general Agent [of 
the Twelfth Imam] during [his Greater] Occultation in performing those duties 
[i. e., rulership] is a settled matter in [our] religion". 23 
According to the Na'ini analysis, the representative of the fugaha can solve the 
problem of the representative of the ordinary people. Na'ini adds that when the 
Prophet is not satisfied with misconduct and corruption, then how can he agree 
with political disorder in the Muslim society? 
For Na'ini, the representative system is the only possible way to limit the power of 
a tyrannical government, and he adds that, since the Ulama themselves cannot 
take power, the constitutional regime is the best choice. 
Nuri argues about the terms of the parliamentary representative, vakil (member of 
the parliament, MP). He mentions that in religious discourse, a representative of 
the ordinary people can discuss religious problems, but that these problems should 
be handled under the authority of the mujtahids in the absence of the twelfth 
Imam. 24 
To support his argument, Na'ini made reference to the second article of the 
supplementary Fundamental law25 which started that, "At no time must any legal 
rule of the National Consultative Assembly be at variance with the sacred 
principles of Islam. It is hereby declared that it is for the Ulama to determine 
whether such laws, as may be proposed, are or are not conformable to the 
23 Talgani, M. P 46 
24 Ibid., p. 205 
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principle of Islam; and it is therefore officially enacted that there shall at all times 
exist a Committee composed of not less than five mujtahids or other devout 
theologians, cognisant also of the requirements of the age. The Ulama shall 
present to the Assembly the names of twenty of the Ulama and the members of the 
Assembly shall designate five or more of these and recognise these as Members, 
so that they may reject and repudiate, wholly or in part, any such proposal which 
is at variance with the sacred Law of Islam, so that it shall not obtain the title of 
legality. "26 
3.10 The idea of convention 
"0 you who believe; fulfil the contracts". Qur'an (5-1) 
According to the Na'ini: 
" Just as a number of things which were not originally compulsory may become 
so under the force of a vow (nazr), a convention (ahd), or an oath(yamin), etc., so 
also certain non-compulsory action depends upon them. "27 
For example, if one makes an oath in the presence of an agent of the Shari 'ah to 
give a certain amount of money to someone, it will become obligatory to pay the 
money even though before his oath the person making it did not owe any money to 
the other. This is a good example which clarifies how a non-compulsory action 
may accidentally become compulsory. 
3.11 Na'ini and tyranny 
Na'ini repeatedly employs the word istibdad (tyranny) which is an Arabic word 
and has been used in the Islamic traditional sources (hadith), and its general 
meaning is an arbitrary action or decision taken by one person without considering 
25 Talgani, M. P. 79 
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anyone else in performing his action or decision, and in Arabic and Persian 
countries has the meaning of oppression. 
Na'ini describes tyranny thus: 
"The person who is ruling in a despotic regime treats the country and 
its population as his private property. He considers the people as 
slaves or animals to serve only his aspirations and passions. Any 
person who devotes himself to serving the ruler's purposes will be 
rewarded by the ruler; otherwise, the ruler banishes him, hangs him, 
and tears him into pieces. The ruler lets the inhabitants eat him and 
provokes bloodthirsty persons to shed his blood and rob his property. 
The ruler takes anyone's property for himself or for giving it to the 
robbers who are under his authority. He reserves to himself the right 
to give justice to anyone or to violate anyone's rights. " 
"In a tyrannical regime, taxes are exacted as rents for the ruler's 
personal land and are spent on his personal purposes. Since the 
country is considered as the ruler's own property, its order and 
protection are also at his own will; if he wishes, he will protect it; 
otherwise, he may grant the country to his rivals for the sake of a few 
flattering statements. He might also sell or mortgage it in order to 
finance his trips of debauchery. He even takes measures against the 
honour of his subjects. In spite of all these defects that the ruler 
possesses, he ascribes to himself God's attributes such as sacredness 
(aqdasiyyat). His assistant believes that all the power of the country is 
26 Browne, E. 1910, PP. 372-73. 
27 Talgani, M. pp. 74-5 
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subject to the ruler's personal wrath, domination, and lust. In brief, 
he will not be questioned on what he does. Since this kind of 
rulership is based on the personal desire of the ruler, and the latter is in 
the position of an owner of his country, his regime is called 
tamallukiyyah (proprietorship), istibdadiyyah (tyranny), istibadiyyah 
(enslavement), tisafyyah (compulsion), tasalutiyyah (oppressive 
domination), and tahakummiyyah (arbitrary power). Thus, the ruler of 
such a regime is called hakim-i mutlaq (absolute ruler), hakimi-i bi 
amr (autocrat), malik-i riqab (slave master), alim (oppressor), qahhar 
(subdue), and the like". 28 
3.12 Under-valued life 
Na'ini believed that, since people in a tyrannical state are treated as plants, their 
lives are under-valued. 
"For the people whom such a ruler governs, they should be called 
usara (captives), adhilla (abject), ariqqa (weak people), because they 
are treated like slaves, and such a regime is imposed on them. Since 
these people are like orphans and minors, and do not know about the 
usurpation of their wealth, they are called mustasgharin (under- 
valued). The benefit that these people enjoy from their life is like that 
of plants which are made to fulfil human needs. Since such people, 
like plants, do not have their own independent benefits from life and 
simply serve their ruler's purpose, they are called mustanbatin (treated 
28 Talgani, M. PP. 8-I 1 
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as plants). The extent of oppression, irresponsibility and arbitrariness 
in a regime of this sort depends, on the one hand, upon the extent of 
the traits of character, wisdom, and discernment of the ruler and his 
assistants. On the other hand, it depends on the extent of the people's 
education and awareness of the rights and duties of the ruler. This 
form of rulership will continue and will reach its highest degree unless 
the intellectual power of the country refuses to obey such rule. In 
such a country, every person following the ruler's pattern will also do 
injustice to the people under his own authority. The reason behind 
the existence of such an unhappy regime is twofold the people's 
unawareness of kingship and common rights, the absence of 
responsibility on the part of the ruling power, and its being free from 
check and control29. 
As mentioned before, Na'ini's Islamic constitutional theory is the best clerical 
interpretation of constitutionalism. Na'ini's book is important not only because of 
his condemnation of tyranny, but also because of his presentation of evidence to 
support his argument which was based on reasoning, principally upon Islamic 
sources. For example, he used the history of Islam to establish a strong reason 
against tyranny : 
"All the disruptions and destructive obscenities from which Iran has 
so far suffered and all the religious corruption that the Iranians have 
faced, are derived from tyrannical rule; this goes without saying. So 
long as the Islamic government did not become tyrannical, Islam 
flourished astonishingly. But after Muawiyah's ascendancy all the 
29Talqani, M. PP 8-11. 
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principles and subsidiary directives (usul vafuru) necessary for lawful 
rulership were replaced by elements of opposite character. As long as 
other nations, like us, were suffering tyranny, Islam was passing 
through its time of stagnation. But, when other nations discovered the 
natural basis of Muslim progress and followed the pattern of early 
Islam, the oppressors enslaved Muslims and created a miserable 
situation for the Islamic peoples" . 
30 
Ha'iri argues that Na'ini was looking to find a way to rescue himself from some 
problems: 
"To rescue himself and other clerical constitutionalists from this odd position, 
Na'ini adopted an interesting alternative. He divided the Ulama into two 
categories: 1) Those who are devoted to religion, who are enemies of oppressive 
rule, who think of the welfare of the people, who are not selfish and deceptive, 
and who understand the real meaning of Islam and constitutionlism. 2) Those 
who possess exactly opposite qualities. Of course Na'ini and other 
constitutionalist Ulama fall within the former category 31 " 
Is this theory a way to rescue Na'ini himself from some odd position? 32 or is this a 
struggle for a religious man who is searching to find a solution for what he 
believes as an ideology? It will be more useful to know exactly what Ha'iri said 
about Na'ini, because as Ha'iri mentioned, unfortunately little attention is 
unfortunately paid by scholars in Iran and western countries to Na'ini. Ha'iri 
believes that Na'ini has a personal position in this issue, and it is related to 
Na'ini's role as leader of Shi'ah, so what Na'ini said about the branch of religious 
30 Talgani, M. P 59 
31 Ha'iri. 1977. P 178 
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tyranny is as a way to save or protect his qualification and his position as a 
mujtahid. Ha'iri argues that: 
"Modem thinkers, such as Montesquieu, Alfieri, and Kawakibi on a certain 
occasion, held that the religious sciences and the religious authorities 
are two influential forces of tyranny and that in a constitutional state 
they cannot play a role. These emphases posed a crucial problem for 
Na'ini. The point is that the European thought on constitutionalism 
proceeds as a form of opposition to religion, in any event, on a non- 
religious basis. Na'ini wants the same thing but on a religious basis. 
Were he to follow European thinkers, he would be placed in an 
untenable position because, on the one hand, he was himself a 
religious authority with the potentiality for leadership in the Shi'ah 
world, and he had all of his mature life learning the very religious 
sciences which constitutional thinkers had condemned. On the other 
hand, Na'ini had hazarded the rejection of tyranny and the approval of 
constitutionalism. What position was he to take? Were he to agree 
with the modem trends which were unfavourable to religion, he would 
have denied all his own qualifications and his position as a Mujtahid. 
An alternative to this choice could have been the rejection of 
constitutionalism. In Na'ini's case, the latter alternative was 
irrelevant, because he and many other Mujtahids were working 
towards the establishment of a parliamentary institution". 33 
Ha'iri's criticisms of Na'ini will be dealt with in the next section. 
32 Ibid., P 179 
" Ha'iri. 1977. P 179 
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Ha'iri's analysis of Na'ini's work is not fair, and it seems that if Ha'iri had paid a 
little attention to the history of Islam and what Na'ini said, it would have been 
more useful for him in judging Na'ini's analysis. What Na'ini explained about 
two categories of Ulama is just the text of the Qur'an which said: 
"0 you believe most surely many of the doctors of law and monks eat away the 
property of men falsely, and turn (them) from Allah's way, and (as for) those who 
hoard up gold and silver and do not spend it in Allah's way, announce to them a 
painful chastisement. " 
The history of the Muslim, and particularly Shi'ah, is full of Ulama who were the 
friends of oppressive rule and in fact the enemy of the people. Doctor Shariaty34 
said in his famous book "Religion against Religion" that the history of Islam is in 
fact the history of religion against religion. By this he means, the religion of God 
and the religion of the men who were the enemy of God, who wear the dresses of 
the religious to defraud the people. The history of the prophets such as Jesus, 
Mohammad and others shows that their relationship with people was non- 
tyrannical. Therefore it is not surprising if Na'ini divided Ulama into two 
categories. It can be said that it is the real history of religion. Furthermore, how 
is it possible to demonstrate the mind of a thinker by referring to his position, 
without any evidence. 
What Ha'iri said about the intentions of Na'ini is not a correct methodical 
approach, because judgement in this area is very difficult and it is out of the 
political context. Furthermore, Na'ini's struggle is not the first one and would 
not be the last; this is, and always has been, the Muslim struggle to find new 
answers to new questions. There are many Muslims who believe in 
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constitutionalism, and some others who believe in socialism, and so on. How 
can it be possible to judge them when they believe that these kinds of researches 
are one of their duties as a Muslim? 
3.13 Criticism 
The researcher's assessment of the Na'ini's ideas is based on Iqbal's definition of 
Tauhid (monotheism). This concept is a guideline which has made it possible to 
draw the following conclusions: 
1. A major paradox in Na'ini's approach is that on one hand he maintains two 
main legislative and judicial powers for Ulama, while at the same time he reserves 
equal rights for individual Muslims and non-Muslims. It is however important to 
note that the Ulama based on Fiqh did not believe in equal rights for these two 
groups. 
2. While Na'ini reserves the legislative and judicial powers for Ulama, he seems 
to have overlooked a very important point which may be traced as a traditional 
problem associated with Ulama. The problem is that Ulama have not 
theoretically concerned themselves in matters such as politics and government. 
Religious personal affairs seem to be their dominating theoretical debate. 
Na'ini accepted that the majority of state affairs are unspecified in the Islamic law, 
and that three main elements of time, place and expediency will be the 
fundamental and basic measures to infer the rules. The question which may be 
raised is whether Ulama have the knowledge and experience on these issues. Did 
34 Most famous Iranian religious author in the Islamic world 
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they know their time, place, and the expediency? And did they have any answer 
for these new questions? It is apparent that almost all of them had gained little 
knowledge about constitutional government. So how would one expect that they 
would be able to manage a government? The following quotation from Behbehani, 
the clerical leader of the revolution (1906), best describes the above argument. 
He states: "We knew how to bring people in to the streets to protest against the 
Shah, but we did not know how to run a constitutional government". 
3. For the deliverance from tyrannical government of a King as the absolute 
governor, Na'ini suggests an alternative authority which is composed of Mama. 
But according to the Ulama's view at the time, every one who does not believe in 
their presented ideas of the Shi'ah interpretation of Islam is an infidel and is 
therefore accused of being in heresy. Although Na'ini aims to represent a non- 
tyrannical government, it seems his alternative can lead to a tyrannical 
government. It is for that reason that some Muslim thinkers perceive the 
existence of a major paradox, or contradiction, in the kind of solution, presented 
by scholars like Na'ini. 
According to Enayat, the diagnosis of Reda(Islamic Egyptian thinker)the 
corruption of the Ulama and their subservience to rulers is one of the main causes 
of the distortion of the Caliphate35. Enayat asserts that 
"from its ideal form under the Rashidun into an apparatus serving the basest 
interests of the despots and dynasts, thus making tyranny the normal form of 
government in Islamic history. Hence the very people who are charged with the 
task of preserving the justness of the system prove be the mainstay of its abuses. 
The vicious circle is complete. Freedom from injustice is not possible without 
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the Ulama taking the lead, but the Ulama themselves perpetuate injustice by 
giving it an air of divine providence. The conundrum is not exclusive to the 
theory of the Caliphate, but is inherent in any political system shielded by an 
ideology, since this is bound to produce after a while self-appointed guardians of 
its truth ready to hurl accusations of heresy at all potential or actual rivals. 36 
4. One of the criticisms of Na'ini's work centres around his presentation of the 
concepts such as parliament, and legitimacy in the western culture. The 
fundamental problem for Ulama and Na'ini was that they knew so little about 
western ideas, and consequently had imperfect information about those issues. 
Consequently, their interpretation and inference from these issues tend to be 
incorrect in many aspects. This seems to be one of the major deficiencies of 
Ulama in the past. 
5. One of the other major difficulties in Na'ini's work is that he does not seem to 
have drawn a line of demarcation between the two concepts of democracy and 
theocracy. His constitutional theory of the state is actually based on two grounds, 
which essentially contradict each other. This problem, according to Ha'iri, lies in 
the essential difference between the concepts of democracy and theocracy which 
he asserts as being the enemy of each other. However, it is the researcher's belief 
that it is possible to overcome this contradiction if the Islamic theory of state is 
based on Igbal's definition of religion (monotheism), which joins together the two 
concepts of democracy and theocracy only thus: 
"The essence of Tauhid (monotheism) as a working idea is equality, 
solidarity, and freedom. The state, from the Islamic standpoint, is an 
35 Islamic successor 
36 Enayat, H. 1982, P 73 
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endeavour to transform these ideal principles into space-time forces, 
an aspiration to realise them in a definite human organisation. It is in 
this sense alone that the state in Islam is a theocracy, not in the sense 
that it is headed by a representative of God on earth who can always 
screen his despotic will behind his supposed infallibility. "37 
6. Disproportional correlation 
One of the most important criticisms of Na'ini's work is the reconciliation 
between two different concepts with wholly different backgrounds and conditions. 
Constitutional philosophy has evolved in Western countries through major 
economic and social structural changes, whereas, at the time of Na'ini, the 
economic and social situation in Iran was not ready for a constitutional 
government. Only in the big cities was there access to education and information, 
such as newspapers (which were limited in number) for a minority of people. 
Additionally, the majority of people lived in villages and had limited access to the 
benefits of the cities. So only a small minority of people could know their 
political rights and the difference between their government and a constitutional 
one. With this being the reality of Iranian society, how could a constitutional 
government be formed and run? 
7. Another important criticism of his work is his non-consideration of the poor 
economic status of the majority of people. The farmers in the villages were under 
severe pressure from the landowners, and in the cities, workers and other ordinary 
people had many problems with their daily living. The constitutional regime 
could not solve these problems because there was no economic reform, even in the 
Iranian Constitutional Law (1906) for the welfare of the lower classes. 
37 Iqbal, M. 1965, P 154 
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Na'ini was familiar with the Prophet's life and compares contemporary issues to 
the life of the Prophet in the Qur'an and the first Imam of the Shi'ah 'Ali'. 
However, Na'ini has not considered the close relationship between them and the 
poor people which allowed the prophet and Imam Ali to experience a practical 
understanding of the situation. For example, Ali in his famous letter to his 
governor wrote: 
"... and the most comprehensive with regard to the argument among those under 
you, because the disagreement among the common people sweeps away the 
argument of the chiefs which can be disregarded when compared with the 
agreement of the common people". 38 
The most important issue in this research is the new definition of religion and its 
role in the society. The question is 'what are the political and social principles of 
religion? ' Can we differentiate between the real Islam and Muslim interpretation 
of Islam? If we can differentiate between these two issues it should be possible to 
have a clear understanding of both. 
It seems that Na'ini has realised some aspects of this difference between the two 
issues whilst not realising others. The Qur'an discusses the history of the 
Pharaoh and how he treated his people. " Surely Pharaoh exalted himself in the 
land and made his people into groups, weakling one group from others 
(Qur'an. 28-3). 
The first Iranian Revolution did not bring improvements to the quality of life of 
the lower classes since this was a bourgeois revolution and was not intended to do 
so. For many decades after the constitutional revolution the situation of the lower 
38 Nahjul Balagha. Imam Ali, letter to Malik Ashtar 
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classes remained unchanged, thus it can be a serious criticism of Na'ini that he did 
not consider the problems of the majority of people. 
Perhaps as Muttahary39 stated "One of the obstacles of Shi ah thought is to lie in 
the dependency of the Ulama for their livelihood on the individual donations of 
the faithful (Imam's share or Sahmi-Imam) and hence their inclination to steer 
clear of any idea that might offend popular predilections"40. Or as Dr. Shariaty41 
wrote: "There was great and close relationship between clerics and landowners in 
the period of feudalism, so the clerics did nothing against feudalism in spite of 
severe oppression imposed upon the farmers and poor people". 
39 Iranian Islamic thinker 
40 Mutahhari, M. Marjaeyat wa ruhanyat. PP 181,182 & Mutahhari, Dah Ghoftar, P 256 
41 Iranian Islamic thinker 
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Chanter 4 Khomeini before Revolution (1979) 
4.1 Chapter Introduction 
The object of this chapter is to discuss the deliberate intention of Ayatollah 
Khomeini's works, concentrating on what he said and what he meant. 
Here is a summary of the Ayatollah Khomeini's career. Algar, the translator of 
the Ayatollah's Khomeini's book into English wrote: ' 
" Imam Ruhullah Al-Musavi Al-Khomeini was born on September 24,1902 into a 
family of strong religious traditions in Khumayn, a small town some hundred 
kilometers to the south-west of Tehran. Both his grandfather and father were 
religious scholars. At the age of nineteen, the young Khomeini was sent to study 
the religious sciences in the nearby town of Arak, a small town near Tehran. 
Given the current fame of Imam Khomeini as a revolutionary leader who has 
achieved a rare degree of success in the purely political sphere, it may appear 
surprising that he first gained fame as a writer and teacher concerned with 
devotional and mystical matters ... The early years of Imam Khomeini's activity in 
Qum (a holy city in the centre of Iran), coincided with the establishment of the 
Pahlavi state by Reza Khan (King of Iran). Reza Khan transformed the Iranian 
monarchy into a dictatorship of a modern, totalitarian kind and made its chief 
internal aim the elimination of Islam as apolitical, social, and cultural 
force. 
. . 
Imam Khomeini 's first public statement of a political nature came in a 
book published in 1943, Kashf al Asrar... The book is essentially a detailed, 
systematic critique of an anti-religious tract, but it also contains numerous 
passages that are overtly political and critical of Pahlavi rule... Throughout the 
spring of 1963, Imam Khomeini continued to denounce the Shah's regime... He 
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concentrated his attacks on its tyrannical nature, its subordination to the United 
State, and its expanding collaboration with Israel... Ayatollah Khomeini was 
arrested in spring 1963 and taken to confinement in Tehran... The arrest of Imam 
Khomeini brought popular disgust with the Shah's regime to a climax, and a major 
uprising shook the other cities... unarmed demonstrators confronted the Shah's 
U. S-trained and equipped army, which, upon the command to shoot to kill, 
slaughtered not less than 15,000 people in the space of a few days... On November 
4,1964, Imam Khomeini was arrested again and sent into exile in Turkey-the 
Najaf (one of the Shi'ah shrine cities of Iraq). On November 23,1977, the elder 
son of Imam Khomeini assassinated by the Shah U. S instituted security the police, 
SAVAK... In September 1978, the Shah's regime requested the Baathist 
government of Iraq, to expel Imam Khomeini from its territory ... 
(Then) Ayatollah 
Khomeini went to France.. . and returned to 
Iran in February 1979... and died in 
Tehran in June 1989". 
As mentioned before, politics in Islam is not an independent field of inquiry, 
separated from religious matters; religion is considered to embrace all aspects of 
life, the political realm included. 
This chapter will deal with Ayatollah Khomeini's ideas on the legitimacy of power 
and participation prior to the Iranian Revolution (1979) as they are in some 
aspects different from those he stated after the revolution. 
Before the revolution, for instance, Ayatollah Khomeini considered the Shari'ah 
(Islamic law) a universal guide for humanity regardless of time and place. After 
' Algar, H. 1985, PP. 13-22 
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the revolution, and several years later, he declared that time and place are the main 
and critical factors for any inferences from Islamic law. 2 
Ayatollah Khomeini believed that the legitimacy of the state is based on two 
factors, (a): fulfillment of the divine law (Fiqh), (b): the sovereignty of a just and 
learned Faqih. This view can be seen as a traditional view of legitimacy. There 
are, however, some important differences of emphasis between Ayatollah 
Khomeini and other traditionalists such as Nuri. Ayatollah Khomeini focussed on 
tyranny and corruption and the role of the supreme powers (USA, former USSR 
and Great Britain) in the Iranian government. In his view, tyranny and corruption 
are two of the reasons for the illegitimacy of the Shah's power. He also did not 
believe that, in contrast with ordinary people, the Faqih has the divinely ordained 
power of a prophet. 
Ayatollah Khomeini believed that Islam (Shari'ah) had all mankind's needs for 
managing life. It is important to notice that divine law in his view is Shari 'ah and 
Fiqh, the traditional inference from the main text of the Islam which has been 
developed over hundreds of years and is the main source of the traditionalists' 
ideas. After the Revolution (1979) the practical problems of managing the 
country's affairs seriously affected Ayatollah Khomeini's ideas. This evolution of 
his ideas may be seen, on the one hand, as the dynamic approach of Shi'ah thought 
in action, or on the other hand, as a departure, entire or partial, from the purely 
religious approach to a secular or non-religious one. 
For Khomeini (before the Revolution) the power of the Faqih is greater than the 
power of a high official; the Faqih has the supreme power, and is to be regarded 
as judge and guardian. He presents two ways for preventing the misuse of the 
2 Khomeini, R. 1983, Vol. 21. P. 98 
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Faqih's power; the personal piety and justice of the Faqih, and the Shi'ah belief 
that no Faqih has power over other Fuqaha. He believes that this is the best 
approach for a Muslim country. 
An issue that Ayatollah Khomeini inevitably had to take into account was his 
position. He had the highest level of traditional position in the Shi'ah, perhaps 
like the Pope, the head of the Roman Catholic Church. He was Mar jaee 
Taghlid, which has two complex and contradictory aspects. On one hand, this 
position had and has great influence on the ordinary people; on the other hand, a 
man who possesses such an important position can not move away rapidly from 
the ordinary people's belief, because there is a chance of losing his position in the 
mind of the people. That is what happened to Na'ini who was discussed in this 
study. Na'ini lost his position as an alternative to the contemporary Mar jaee 
Taghlid because of his ideas on constitutionalism. This issue can be seen as an 
element which probably limited Ayatollah Khomeini's scope for presenting new 
ideas. 
4.2 Dynamic inference of Ijtehad 
One of the most important issues in Islamic thought is the dynamic inferences of 
Islam (Ijtehad). According to Ijtehad, it is the duty of the Islamic jurist to deal 
with the Muslim's affairs. The Mujtahid should consider time and place 
according to Islamic principles. Therefore, in Islamic political science, except for 
some central ideas on political issues, there are no timeless principles whose 
practical application cannot be changed according to time and place. By 
exercising Ijtehad, every mujtahid can change his ideas on political issues, and 
this does not mean that he is changing his Islamic principles or that he is an 
opportunist. 
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4.2.1 Legitimacy of laws 
4.2.1.1 Ayatollah Khomeini: Islamic Laws encompass all human affairs 
Ayatollah Khomeini believed that Islam contains all the laws necessary for human 
life. Therefore, Muslims do not need to devise any new laws; they only need to 
apply to the specialists to find the appropriate way for fulfilling divine laws. 
Ayatollah Khomeini shared this belief with Nuri and perhaps all traditionalist 
Muslims. 
Ayatollah Khomeini, maintained: 3 " He (the Prophet) instituted laws and practices 
for all human affairs and laid down injunctions for man extending from even 
before the embryo is formed until after he is placed into the tomb. In just the 
same way that there are laws setting forth the duties of worship for men, so too 
there are laws, practices, and norms for the affairs of society and government. 
Islamic law is a progressive, evolving, and comprehensive system of law. All the 
voluminous books that have been compiled from the earliest times on different 
areas of law, such as judicial procedure, social transactions, penal law, retribution, 
international regulations pertaining to peace and war, private and public law, taken 
together, these contain a mere sample of the laws and injunctions of Islam. There 
is not a single topic in human life for which Islam has not provided instruction and 
established a norm". 
In the next chapter we shall see that after the Revolution, it became clear to 
Ayatollah Khomeini that implementing the Shari 'ah did not banish all the 
disasters and poverty in society. 
' Enayat, H. 1983 P 163 
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4.2.1.2 Islam has all the Laws Necessary for Mankind 
One of the most important features of Ayatollah Khomeini's thought is his ideas 
on "time and place". Before the Revolution, he believed that the Islamic law, was 
for all times and places. He claimed that Islam concerns itself with all economic, 
social and even individual affairs, meaning that Islamic law can be implemented 
regardless of time and place. But after the Revolution he declared that 
consideration of time and place is a necessary condition for any inference and 
interpretation of the Islamic law. 
According to Ayatollah Khomeini: " Islam and Islamic government are divine 
phenomena, the utilisation of which insures the happiness of man for all times in 
this and in the next world. They can put an end to injustice and corruption and 
help man achieve ideal perfection. Contrary to non-monotheistic schools of 
thought, Islam is concerned with and supervises man in all his individual, social, 
economic and military affairs. It does not overlook the smallest issue that affects 
the education and the moral and material progress of man and his society". 
After the Revolution, it was clear to Khomeini that implementation of the Shari 'ah 
does not banish all the disasters and poverty of society. 
4.2.1.3 Islamic Laws are Comprehensive 
Lack of experience of government is considered to be one of the major 
characteristics of the thought of Shi'ah clergy. As Sadre puts it, this factor affects 
the views of the Ulama on economic, political and even family issues, including 
the rights of women. For instance, for Ayatollah Khomeini, Muslims needed only 
Enayat, 1983 p 164 
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to take power, and then they would have no problems, because they have all the 
divine laws necessary to govern their society: 5 
"The entire system of government and administration, together with the necessary 
laws, lies ready for you. If the administration of the country calls for taxes, Islam 
has made the necessary provisions, and if laws are needed, Islam has established 
them all. There is no need for you, after establishing a government, to sit down 
and draw up laws, or, like rulers who worship foreigners and are infatuated with 
the west, run after others to borrow their laws. Everything is ready and waiting. 
All that remains is to draw up ministerial programs, and that can be accomplished 
with the help and co-operation of consultants and advisers who are experts in 
different fields, gathered together in a consultative assembly". 
4.2.1.4 God Revealed a Body of Laws and a Particular Form of Government 
Ayatollah Khomeini believed that God has laid down a particular form of the 
government: 6 
"A body of laws alone is not sufficient for a society to be reformed. In order for 
law to ensure the reform and happiness of man, there must be an executive power 
and an executor. For this reason, God Almighty, in addition to revealing a body 
of law (i. e., the ordinances of the Shari 'ah), has laid down a particular form of 
government together with executive and administrative institutions". 
Ayatollah Khomeini's idea on the particular "form" of government is contrary to 
that of Na'ini. As mentioned in Chapter Two, Na'ini believed that the form of 
government in Islam comes within the area defined as "changeable law", and thus 
S Khomeini. R. 1992, P 30 
6Khomeini, R. 1992. P 16 
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it is possible to change the form of Islamic government by considering the "time" 
and "place". But Ayatollah Khomeini was looking to a divine decree about the 
form of government. He referred to the Islamic sources to confirm his ideas. 
After the Revolution he changed his view on this issue, and this will be dealt with 
in the next chapter. 
4.2.1.5 Necessity of Government 
As previously illustrated, Ayatollah Khomeini believed that by establishing a 
government the Muslims could solve all their problems, and so he struggled to 
establish an Islamic government and presented theoretical support for his belief. 
It is very important to understand this belief, because if he had been convinced 
that having obtained the power of government it would not have been possible to 
practice all Islamic laws, he could probably have looked to alternative ways of 
solving the Muslims' problems; as for instance a cultural campaign involving 
non-Islamic governments. Again, if he had been informed that there were much 
more important factors than capturing power, which should have been considered 
in order to resolve the Muslims' problems, probably he would not have followed 
the path of establishing a government. It is worth mentioning that at the time 
when he was writing his book published in 1971, there was much struggle around 
the world by many elites for capturing power. 
Here are some quotations from Ayatollah Khomeini's ideas on the necessity of 
government in Islam: 7 "The sunna8 and path of the Prophet constitute a proof of 
the necessity for establishing government. First, he himself established a 
7 Khomeini, R. 1985, P 41 
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government, as history testifies. He engaged in the implementation of laws, the 
establishment of the ordinances of Islam, and the administration of society. He 
sent out governors to different regions; both sat in judgement himself and 
appointed judges; dispatched emissaries to foreign states, tribal chieftains and 
kings; concluded treaties and pacts; and took command in battle. In short, he 
fulfilled all the functions of government. Secondly, he designated a ruler to 
succeed him, in accordance with divine command. If God Almighty, through the 
Prophet, designated a man who was to rule over Muslim society after him, this is 
in itself an indication that government remains a necessity after the departure of 
the prophet from this world. Again, since the Most Noble Messenger 
promulgated the divine command through his act of appointing a successor, he 
also implicitly stated the necessity for establishing a government". 
4.2.1.6 By practising Islamic laws, crimes would be eliminated 
According to Ayatollah Khomeini, if the Islamic laws were fully administered in a 
country, all crime would be eliminated 9: " If the Islamic law of Qisas 
(retribution), Dyat (blood money), and Hudud (punishments) were put into 
practice even for single year, the seeds of justice, theft, and unchasteness would be 
eliminated from the country". 
The above reasoning is an important example of the Islamic scholars' views about 
the effectiveness and quality of Islamic laws. 
But after the Revolution and within a few years, they realised that for solving 
social problems there are more factors which should be considered. It seems that 
8 Sunna: The practice of the Prophet, accepted by Muslims as the norm and ideal for all human 
behaviour 
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insufficient attention to new knowledge of the problems which occurred within 
time and place was the reason for their originally simplistic solutions. As far as 
the basis of Islam is concerned, there is no indication in the Qur'an that by 
practising Islamic penal laws, all crimes would be eliminated. Furthermore, some 
scholars like Ghazzali and Maududi argued for "suspending the divinely ordained 
punishments until all the pre-requisites of an Islamic state had fully 
materialised". 10 
4.3 Legitimacy of legislator 
4.3.1 Legislative power belongs to God 
Divine law in Islam is a pre-condition for legitimacy of power. But the 
interpretation of Divine law is vital. For Ayatollah Khomeini, all traditional 
inferences of the Qur'an and Hadith were Divine laws, therefore, he believed that 
fulfilling this law is a duty for all Muslims. For Ayatollah Khomeini, as Nuri, no 
one has the right to legislate, except the Ulama who are familiar with the Islamic 
texts. This is the reason for the existence of the supreme power of the Guardian 
Council in the Iranian Constitutional Law, which has the right to reject any laws 
endorsed by the Parliament. Therefore the interpretation of Divine law defines 
the power of the Ulama, and is crucial for any theoretical evolution in the Islamic 
world. 
"The fundamental difference between Islamic government, on one hand, and 
constitutional monarchies and republics, on the other, is that: whereas the 
representatives of the people or the monarch in such regimes engage in legislation, 
in Islam the legislative power and competence to establish laws belongs 
9 Enayat, H. 1983, P 176 
10 Enayat, H. 1983 P 175 
114 
exclusively to God Almighty. The sacred legislator of Islam is the sole legislative 
power. No one has the right to legislate and no law may be executed except the 
law of the divine legislator". " 
A very problematic issue is the result of this definition of Divine law. Divine law 
is interpreted as sacred law, this means that it is the will of God, and nobody can 
reject or even criticise it. This concept is clear in Ayatollah Khomeini's book: " 
Islamic government is a government of law. In this form of government, 
sovereignty belongs to God alone and law is his decree and command. The law 
of Islam, divine command, has absolute authority over all individuals and the 
Islamic government. Everyone, including the most noble messenger (peace be 
upon him) and his successors, is subject to law and will remain so for all eternity; 
the law that has been revealed by God, Almighty and Exalted, and expounded by 
the tongue of the Qur'an and the most noble messenger". 12 
4.3.2 Islamic State and Monarchy 
In defining monarchical government, Ayatollah Khomeini ignored the limited 
powers of the constitutional monarch. His description of monarchy was that of 
absolute monarchy and he used it in reference to the Shah and his government. 
This is not to suggest that Ayatollah Khomeini was unaware of limited 
constitutional monarchy, but that it served his purposes to define monarchy purely 
in terms of the monarchy he was opposing. 
" Islamic government is not a form of monarchy, especially not an imperial 
system. In that type of government, the rulers are empowered over the 
property and persons whom they rule and may dispose of them entirely 
11 Khomeini, R. 1992 p. 55 
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as they wish. Islam has not the slightest connection with this form and 
method of government. For this reason we find that in the Islamic 
government, unlike monarchical and imperial regimes, there is not the 
slightest trace of vast palaces, opulent buildings, servants and retainers, 
private equerries, adjutants to the heir apparent, and all other 
appurtenances of monarchy that consume as much as half of the 
national budget". 13 
Ayatollah Khomeini rejected the Pahlavi reign and not the monarchy, simply 
because what the Shah did was not according to the Iranian constitutional 
monarchy laws. 
4.3.3 Divine laws and bureaucracy 
Ayatollah Khomeini predicted that by fulfilling Islamic Laws (Shari'ah) in penal 
law, there would be no bureaucracy in the Ministry of Justice. This is an 
excellent example of how Ayatollah Khomeini imagined that Islamic laws and 
Islamic government would function. 
" The method established by Islam for enforcing people's rights, adjudicating 
disputes, and executing judgements is at once simple, practical, and 
swift. When the juridical methods of Islam were applied, the Shari 'ah 
judge in each town, assisted only by two bailiffs and with only a pen and 
an inkpot at his disposal, would swiftly resolve disputes among people 
and send them about their business. But now the bureaucratic 
12 Khomeini, R. 1985 p. 56 
" Ibid., p. 57 
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organisation of the Ministry of Justice has attained unimaginable 
proportions, and is, in addition, quite incapable of producing results". 14 
Incidentally, after the Revolution there was very little change to the Ministry of 
Justice and the judicial organisation. 
4.3.4 Faqih's authority over the ruler 
The authority of the Faqih is one of the crucial issues in Islamic law. It is 
assumed that because he is conversant with the divine laws, consequently he is the 
only person who can recognise Islamic laws. Ayatollah Khomeini, on this basis, 
claimed that the Faqih has authority over the ruler. The result of this idea is the 
supreme power of the Fuqaha as the interpreter of the Islamic laws. In this regard 
there is no difference between Ayatollah Khomeini and other Muslim thinkers of 
modern times, such as the Pakistani Abu'l-A'la Maududi, the Syrian Rashid Rida, 
and the Egyptian Muhammad al-Gazzali: 
"It is an established principle that "the Faqih has authority over the 
ruler". If the ruler adheres to Islam, he must necessarily submit to the 
Faqih, asking him about the laws and ordinances of Islam in order to 
implement them. This being the case, the rulers are the Fuqaha 
themselves, and rulership ought officially to be theirs, to apply to them, 
not to those who are obliged to follow the guidance of the Fuqaha on 
account of their own ignorance of the law". 15 
Thus, the view of the Shi'ah concerning government and the nature of the 
persons who should assume rule was clear from the time following the death of 
14 Khomeini, R. 1985, P 58 
'S Enayat. H. 1983, P 164 
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the Prophet (upon whom be peace and blessing) down to the beginning of the 
occultation". 
16 
4.3.5 Leader (Welayat Faqih) in the role of Prophet 
The Qur'an says that all Muslims should obey the Prophet as the Messenger of 
God (Qur'an 3.32). What Ayatollah Khomeini said in his book in this regard is 
one of the most debatable issues in the whole area of debate about Islamic 
government. The problem is that when people believe that the Faqih has power 
and authority as the Prophet had, then there is no room for them to reject or 
criticise the rulers and hence the Islamic ruler can possess a position so strong that 
there would be little to prevent his catastrophic abuse of power if he were so 
inclined. 
"If a worthy individual possessing these two qualities (just and learned), 
arises and establishes a government, he will possess the same authority 
as the Most Noble Messenger (upon whom be peace and blessing) in the 
administration of society, and it will be the duty of all people to obey 
him. God has conferred upon government in the present age the same 
powers and authority that were held by the Most Noble Messenger and 
the Imams (peace be upon them) with respect to equipping and 
mobilising armies, appointing governors and officials, and levying taxes 
and expending them for the welfare of the Muslims". 17 
Ayatollah Khomeini believed that because the Infallible Imam, according to the 
Shi 'ah belief, should be obeyed, the Faqih should also be obeyed. This idea 
16 Khomeini, R. 1985 p. 61 
17 Ibid.,, P 62 
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crucially implies that the establishment of the legitimacy of power in The Islamic 
State would not involve consulting the will of the people. 
There is no consensus in the Shi'ah school of thought on this aspect of Ayatollah 
Khomeini's thought. For instance, Shaykh Murtada Ansari (d. 1864), one of the 
greatest figures of Shi'ah jurisprudential theory in the nineteenth century, believed 
that "absolute authority" over the people in both temporal and spiritual matters 
falls within the jurisdiction of the Imams. 18 Ansari explicitly stated that: "In 
principle no individual, except the Prophet and the Imam, has the authority to 
exert wilaya over others". 19 
Mughniya, too, is opposed to Ayatollah Khomeini's doctrine on the equal position 
of the jurisconsultant with that of Prophet or Imam. He argued that: "In principle, 
no human being should have custodianship over another, except by virtue of an 
explicit Qur'anic injunction or authenticated tradition. The function of (the) 
Faqih is to extract religious rulings from the sources and formulate them in a form 
comprehensible to the people". 20 Later, after the Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini 
stated that the people determine the legitimacy of the ruler. It is worth 
mentioning that in the Iranian Constitutional Law, the power of the ruler derives 
from both God and the vote of the people. We will discuss this issue in the next 
chapter. 
Another important issue is the nature of monotheistic laws. For instance, justice 
and freedom are the aspiration of all human beings. Are these aims monotheistic 
aims or not? As was discussed in the introduction, some Muslim scholars like 
Iqbal, believed that: 
18 Enayat, 1983, P 163 
19 Ibid., P 162 
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"The essence of Tauhid (monotheism) as a working idea is equality, 
solidarity, and freedom. The state, from the Islamic standpoint, is an 
endeavour to transform these ideal principles into space-time forces, an 
aspiration to realise them in a definite human organisation. It is in this 
sense alone that the state in Islam is a theocracy, not in the sense that it 
is headed by a representative of God on earth who can always screen his 
despotic will behind his supposed infallibility". 21 
The difference between these two views is very important, and each having 
varying consequences. According to Iqbal's definition, the measure for 
assessment of an Islamic government is justice and freedom and solidarity, and 
these issues can be considered as human values which are recognized by the entire 
human family. Therefore they are real and accountable issues which can be 
assessed and supervised by the people. But with respect to Ayatollah Khomeini's 
idea, Fuqaha are the authority to interpret the Islamic laws and therefore the only 
measure for assessment of their performance is their position. Thus there would 
be no accountability. This is one of the key problems with Ayatollah Khomeini's 
views before the revolution. 
As Enayat puts it, the system of government that Ayatollah Khomeini proposed 
was "meant to be government for the people, it is certainly not government by the 
people". 22 
4.4 Illegitimacy of dependency 
4.4.1 Imperialists are after our oil and market, not prayer. 
20 Enayat, H. 1983, P 168 
21 Iqbal, M. 1965, P 154 
22 Enayat, H. 1983, P 172 
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Ayatollah Khomeini's view on government is known as "political Islam", because 
he emphasises the political issues in his religious language. An example of his 
political argumentation is his claim that one of the reasons for the illegitimacy of 
Shah's regime was its dependency on imperialism. In Iran, the concept of 
"imperialism" was recognised as a socialist slogan. The analyses of Ayatollah 
Khomeini in this regard were familiar to the enlightened students in the 
universities and most Iranian scholars. 
It was the period of the Cold War and there was much cultural context about 
imperialism in Iran. In fact, Ayatollah Khomeini was speaking in a language 
understandable to the students and the people. At that time, there was much 
discussion about British and US interference in Iranian State affairs, and this was 
an issue that caused a great deal of dissatisfaction among the Iranian people. 
Therefore, discussion of dependency provided a new and modern slogan. 
Furthermore, it was a period when many Third World countries had been gaining 
independence from European colonialism/imperialism. Independence was in fact 
one of the three main slogans of the people before the Revolution. The slogans 
were: "Freedom", "Independence" and "Islamic Republic". 
"If we Muslims do nothing but engage in the canonical prayer, petition God, and 
invoke His name, the imperialists and the oppressive governments allied with 
them will leave us alone. If we were to say, " Let us concentrate on calling the 
azan23 and saying our prayers, when, if they come to rob us of everything we 
own-God will take care of them! There is no power or recourse except in Him, 
23 Prayer call, call to prayer 
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and God willing, we will be rewarded in the hereafter. If this were our logic, they 
would not disturb us". 24 
He continued: 
"If you pay no attention to the policies of the imperialists, and consider Islam 
to be simply the few topics you are always studying and never go beyond 
them, then the imperialists will leave you alone. Pray as much as you 
like; it is your oil they are after. Why should they worry about your 
prayers? They are after our minerals, and want to turn our country into a 
market for their goods. That is the reason the puppet governments they 
have installed prevent us from industrialising, and instead, establish only 
assembly plants and industry that is dependent on the outside world". 25 
A characterisitic of Ayatollah Khomeini's writing is that he was referring to the 
material and practical concerns of all people, in contrast to some Muslims who see 
Islam as a spiritual matter unrelated to the day to day world, and a people's 
material concerns. This is the reason why he gained increasing support from and 
influence on the Iranian nation. In fact, he could draw from both the religious and 
political culture to present the Iranian government as an illegitimate authority. 
"Now the Prophet (peace and blessing upon him) was also a political person. 
This evil propaganda is undertaken by the political agents of imperialism 
only to make you shun politics, to prevent you from intervening in the 
affairs of society and struggling against treacherous governments and 
24 Khomeini. R. 1992, P 39 
25 Khomeini, R. 1985, P 39 
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their anti-national and anti-Islamic policies. They want to work their 
will as they please, with no one to bar their way". 26 
4.4.2 Tyrannical, puppet and imperialistically 
imposed regimes are not legitimate 
After the coup d'etat against Dr Mussadegh, the Iranian Prime Minister, in 1953, 
almost all the educated and ordinary people resented the dependency of the Iranian 
government on foreign superpowers. Thus Ayatollah Khomeini's language was 
understood by all sections of society. He used the term "puppet government" for 
the Iranian government, and told the students and people that their government 
was not independent, and therefore was not legitimate: 
" You must address yourselves to the university people in particular, the educated 
class. The students have had their eyes opened. I assure you that if you present 
Islam and Islamic government to the universities accurately, the students will 
welcome it and accept it. The students are opposed to tyranny; they are opposed 
to the puppet regimes imperialism imposes; they are opposed to thievery and the 
plundering of public wealth; they are opposed to this consumption of what is 
forbidden and this deceitful propaganda". 27 
Ayatollah Khomeini's political position regarding the government was therefore 
seen to be the common view of both the general population and specific 
opposition groups. 
4.4.3 Co-operation with Israel is a reason for illegitimacy 
26 Ibid., P 39 
27 Khomeini, R. 1985, P 129 
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Ayatollah Khomeini believed that all prophets were against any kind of 
oppression, supporting the poor and the oppressed. It is the core of Ayatollah 
Khomeini's belief in political Islam. Before 1971 (date of publication of his 
book, Welayat-I Faqih), to Fiqh and attack Israel was a great and most influential 
slogan shared among Muslims in the Middle-East. The news of Palestine 
dominated all Muslims' affairs. Every day there was some news of the killing and 
wounding of Muslims by Israeli soldiers in Palestine. Arab governments had to 
be seen to have no open relations with Israel, because of the sensitivity of the Arab 
nations towards that country. Meanwhile, Ayatollah Khomeini referred to the 
contact between the Iranian government and Israel. It is understandable how the 
position taken up by Ayatollah Khomeini could be interpreted as a brave and 
Islamic position toward the policy of a military government such as that of Iran. 
His focussing of attention on the Israel/Palestine issue and also how it related to 
the policies of the Iranian Government was a new approach for traditional 
Muslims, inviting them to consider the issue of the legitimacy of power through 
the context of a contemporary political reality in the region. 
"Our wretched people subsist in conditions of poverty and hunger, while 
the taxes that the ruling class extorts from them are squandered. They 
buy Phantom jets so that pilots from Israel and its agents can come and 
train in them in our country. So extensive is the influence of Israel in 
our country that Israel, which is in a state of war with the Muslims- and 
so great is the support the regime gives it that Israeli soldiers come to 
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our country for training! Our country has become a base for them! The 
markets of our country are also in their hands". 
28 
Ayatollah Khomeini's position against both Israel and the Iranian government was 
generally recognised to be a unique position for a high clergyman. 
4.4.4 Islamic government is neither tyrannical 
nor absolute, but constitutional 
Ayatollah Khomeini's reasoning on the illegitimacy of the tyrannical government 
is important, because it is a temporal and political measure recognised by political 
scholars all over the world. The outcome of such reasoning should be that he 
must recommend a system of government which has no form of tyrannical means 
and aims. Thus he had given a criterion to the people to call to account the 
Islamic government. This form of reasoning does not cohere well with that which 
he employed in some other parts of his writing. For instance, if the people should 
obey the government because it is in the place of the Infallible Imam, then how 
could the people call the government to account? 
"Islamic government does not correspond to any of the existing forms of 
government. For example, it is not a tyranny, where the head of state can deal 
arbitrarily with the property and lives of the people, making use of them as he 
wills, putting to death anyone he wishes, and enriching anyone he wishes by 
granting landed estates and distributing the property and holdings of the people. 
The most noble Messenger (peace be upon him), the Commander of faithful Imam 
Ali) (peace be upon him), and the other caliphs did not have such powers. 
Islamic government is neither tyrannical nor absolute, but constitutional". 29 
28 ... . ... ....,. - 
9n Anornernr, tc. iys: ), r izu 
" Khomeini, R. 1992, P 55 
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It is clear that the image of constitutional government in Ayatollah Khomeini's 
mind is not that which is recognised as such in the western countries. He referred 
to the practice in Iran. But we should remind ourselves that the name of the 
Iranian government after the Revolution became "Islamic Republic of Iran". This 
title clearly indicates that the form of the government is not a permanent concept 
in Islam, and that it can change and develop within time and place, and that what 
Ayatollah Khomeini suggested was not a timeless form of Islamic government; he 
suggested Islamic constitutional government before the Revolution, and after the 
Revolution he accepted the Islamic Republic of Iran as an Islamic form of 
government. 
4.4.5 Islamic government is not based on the opinion of the majority 
As was discussed in Chapters One and Two, the contradiction between divine law 
and man-made laws is one of the great sources of debate among Muslim scholars. 
The problem is that Muslims believe God sent the Prophet to humans with 
particular laws for their happiness and deliverance and since Islamic laws are as 
the will of God, laws created by the will of the majority cannot be considered as 
Islamic laws. It is clear that the whole question is based on the interpretation of 
the Islamic texts and human values. Ayatollah Khomeini, before the Revolution, 
believed that all Shar'a should be considered as Islamic laws, hence there would 
no room for the will of the people. His view on this matter is similar to Nuri's 
idea, and as mentioned in the last chapter, on this issue Na'ini had a new idea. Of 
course, after the Revolution Ayatollah Khomeini began to view matters differently 
and this will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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"It (Islamic government) is not constitutional in the current sense of the 
word , 
i. e., based on the approval of laws in accordance with the opinion 
of the majority. It is constitutional in the sense that the rulers are 
subject to a certain set of conditions in governing and administering the 
country, conditions that are set forth in the Noble Qur'an and the Sunna 
of the Most Noble Messenger. It is the laws and ordinances of Islam 
comprising this set of conditions that must be observed and practised. 
Islamic government may therefore be defined as the rule of Divine law 
over men". 30 
He continued: "the body of Islamic laws that exists in the Qur'an and the Sunna 
has been accepted by Muslims and recognised by them as worthy of obedience. 
This consent and acceptance facilitates the task of government and makes it truly 
belong to the people. In contrast, in a republic or a constitutional monarchy, most 
of those claiming to be representatives of the majority of the people will approve 
anything they wish as law and then impose it on the entire population". 31 
30 Khomeini, R. 1992 P. 55 
31 Ibid., P 56 
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4.4.6 Authority of Fugalza has been vested in them by God 
There are two different concepts of Faqih in Ayatollah Khomeini's views. One is 
his definition of the Faqih as a man who is accredited by God, another is the 
concept of the Faqih as a just and knowledgeable man. In the first concept 
Ayatollah Khomeini refers to a man who has divinely appointed responsibility to 
protect all society's affairs. In the second, the Faqih is a person who can be 
supervised or controlled. In the second definition of Faqih, Ayatollah Khomeini 
refers to rational and accountable personalities. But when he discusses the Faqih 
as a man who is accredited by God, naturally the Faqih can possess an 
extraordinary position, which cannot be supervised by the people. 
"It is necessary that the Fuqaha proceed, collectively or individually, to establish 
a government in order to implement the laws of Islam and protect its territory. If 
this task falls within the capabilities of a single person, he has personally 
incumbent upon him the duty to fulfil it; otherwise, it is a duty that devolves upon 
the Fuqaha as a whole. Even if it is impossible to fulfil the task, the authority 
vested in the Fuqaha is not voided, because it has been vested in them by God". 
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4.4.7 Leader has not the status of the Prophet 
The duality of the concept of Faqih is also mentioned in Ayatollah Khomeini's 
book (Welayat-I Faqih). Ayatollah Khomeini distinguished between the functions 
of a leader and his status. He believed that a leader does not have the status of the 
Prophet and hence he has no supernatural powers. 
"When we say that after the occultation, the just Faqih has the same authority 
that the most Noble Messenger and the Imams had, do not imagine that 
the status of the Faqih is identical to that of the Imams and the Prophet. 
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For here we are not speaking of status, but rather of function. By 
"authority" we mean government, the administration of country, and the 
implementation of the sacred laws of the Shari'ah. These constitute a 
serious, difficult duty but do not earn anyone extraordinary status or 
raise him above the level of common humanity. In other words, 
authority here has the meaning of government, administration, and 
execution, but a grave responsibility". 33 
He continued that although Ulama do not have the position of the Prophet, they 
are the successors of the Prophet: 
"considering the fact that the Fuqaha do not have the rank of 
prophethood, and they are indubitably not "wretched sinners", we 
conclude that, in the light of the tradition quoted above, they must be the 
legatees or successors of the Most Noble Messenger (peace and 
blessings be upon him)". 34 
It is clear, therefore, that the legitimacy of power in this part of Ayatollah 
Khomeini's thinking depends on a religious factor rather than public opinion. 
Because the Prophet was not chosen by the people, and his power was directly 
derived from God, Ayatollah Khomeini's definition of the Ulama as the successors 
of the Prophet can cause some confusion for Muslims about the sources of 
legitimacy in Islam. 
4.4.8 Safeguards against the Fagihs' abuse of power 
Ayatollah Khomeini reserved some conditions upon the power of the Fuqaha in 
that the Fuqaha's power is restricted by other Fuqaha: "The authority that the 
32 Khomeini, R. 1985, P 64 
33 Khomeini, R, 1985, P 63 
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Prophet and Imam had in establishing a government, executing laws, and 
administering affairs exists also for the Faqih. But the Fuqaha do not have 
absolute authority in the sense of having authority over all Fuqaha of their own 
time, being able to appoint or dismiss them. There is no hierarchy ranking one 
Faqih higher than another or endowing one with more authority than another". 35 
This inter Ulama pluralism can be seen as a way to control the ruler. But it is not 
public control and it is not democratic constitutionalism as recognised in the West. 
Ayatollah Khomeini stated that the authority of the Faqih is not an extraordinary 
status; it is a duty rather than a privilege: " By "authority" we mean government, 
the administration of country, and the implementation of the sacred laws of the 
Shari 'ah". 36 
Another safeguard, according to Ayatollah Khomeini, is the Faqih's personality; 
his own moral integrity: " He (the ruler) must be just and untainted by major 
sin". 37 What Ayatollah Khomeini suggested in the personal safeguard against the 
Faqih's abuse is not a systemic approach toward the problems which may occur in 
a government. According to his analysis, the Shah's problem was his character, 
therefore the solution in this regard was to replace a bad man by a good man. 
After the Revolution it became apparent to Ayatollah Khomeini that the solutions 
to the Iranian government's problems were more complicated than had been 
recognised previously. 
That there is no mention in Ayatollah Khomeini's book of public control of the 
ruler indicates that the system emerging from his ideas cannot be considered as a 
3' Ibid., P 82 
35 Ibid., P 64 
36 Ibid., P 62 
17 Khomeini, R. 1985, PP 60-61 
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democratic or a republican system. After the Revolution some articles on the role 
of the public were inserted in the Iranian Constitutional Law, and we will discuss 
these in the next chapter. 
Another important point is that the power which Ayatollah Khomeini apportioned 
to the Faqih as a ruler raises some serious problems. First of all, it seems that for 
one man in the society to have such a huge responsibility is not practical and 
realistic. How can one man control all the affairs of society in a complicated 
world? Secondly, the modern concept of state is wholly different from the time of 
the Prophet. Thirdly, the country is not a society based on a single ideology, and 
"nation" does not necessarily mean people who hold a common outlook or 
political ideal, as was made clear in the introduction of the I. C. L. Fourthly, a man 
is liable to be feared or mistaken. For all these reasons, the leader of a society in 
the contemporary age cannot be compared with the Prophet (peace be upon him). 
It seems that it is not enough to rely on the safeguards which Ayatollah Khomeini 
proposed. In this regard, Muhammad Javad Mughniya, a prominent Lebanese 
writer and scholar whose works on Shi'ah jurisprudence, exegesis, and political 
theory have enjoyed much influence among Iranian Shi'ah intellectuals, makes 
some pertinent comments: 
4.4.9 Mughniya : the Faqih is liable to become conceited, forgetful, or 
mistaken 
In Mughniya's view, "the issue becomes clearer when the position of the Faqih is 
compared with that of the Infallible Imam. The latter has custodianship over all 
human beings, whether learned or ignorant, and his pronouncements have the 
same authority as divine revelation. But, being a mortal himself, a Faqih is liable 
to be conceited, forgetful, or mistaken. He may be swayed by his personal 
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feeling, and his judgements are inevitably shaped by the environment and the 
socio-economic circumstances of his time. Thus, although he has the competence 
and duty to act as the guardian of certain areas of social life (e. g., public 
endowments) and certain categories of Muslims (e. g., (the) legally incompetent 
and those who die without heir), he cannot be the guardian of all areas of social 
life and all categories of Muslims". 38 
Despite these comments we must record that Mughniya had a very great 
admiration for Ayatollah Khomeini and the Iranian Revolution. 
4.4.10 The Purpose of the Prophets is Social Justice and True Humanity 
As mentioned before, the paradox of Ayatollah Khomeini's opinion is that, on the 
one hand, he referred to the Islamic texts as supernatural values which people 
should obey because they derive from the will of God, and on the other hand, he 
referred to some accountable criteria, such as justice and human values. Some of 
his views on accountable values which can be supervised by the people follow: 
"In accordance with reason and the essential nature of religion, the 
purpose for sending the prophets and the task of the prophets cannot be 
simply the delivering of judgement concerning a particular problem or 
the expounding of the ordinances of religion. For in fact the most 
important function of the prophets (peace be upon them all) is the 
establishment of a just social system through the implementation of laws 
and ordinances (which is naturally accompanied by the exposition and 
dissemination of the divine teachings and beliefs). This emerges clearly 
from the following Qur'anic verse: "verily we have sent our messengers 
38 Muhammad Jawad Mughniya, Al-Khumayni wa'l-dawla al-islamiyya, Quoted in Enayat, H. 
1983, P. 169 
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with clear signs, and down with them the book and the balance, in order 
that men might live in equity"(Qur'an 57: 25). 
The general purpose for the sending of prophets, then, is so that men's 
lives may be ordered and arranged on the basis of just social relations 
and true humanity may be established among men". 39 
The rational outcome of this sort of reasoning would be the rights of the people to 
supervise and control the government, because, for instance, justice is one of the 
reasons for legitimacy of power. But as mentioned before, Ayatollah Khomeini 
did not discuss the people's rights to supervise the government, although he hinted 
at some accountable measures for people to control the government. 
4.4.11 Scholars are the heirs of the Prophets 
For Ayatollah Khomeini, "scholars" means the Fuqaha. That is one of the 
arguable issues regarding his views. Because Fuqaha were considered as men 
who have knowledge about divine laws, it followed that they are the only 
individuals who have a right to interpret the Islamic texts. In other words, when 
there is a holy text which came directly from God, and the Fuqaha are the only 
persons who can rightly understand and interpret it, the position of interpreter can 
be seen as holy and therefore a post unaccountable to the people. "The scholars 
are the heirs of (the) prophets, for although the prophets bequeathed not a single 
dinar or dirham (a silver coin) they bequeathed their sayings and tradition". 40 
39 Khomeini, R. 1985, P 77 
40 Khomeini, R. 1985, P 100 
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4.5 Illegitimacy of the corruptible government 
4.5.1 The lack of concern about the poor as a reason 
for illegitimacy of power 
According to Ayatollah Khomeini's view, even poverty would be eliminated by 
Islamic laws. He referred to the Qur'an to prove that Islam is concerned with the 
welfare of poor people. But it is very important to mention that people in all 
societies, whether Muslims or not, believe in equality and justice; the problem is 
how to practise it and make these aims possible for human beings. 
Ayatollah Khomeini was correct regarding the aim of Islam and of all 
monotheistic religions, as described by the Qur'an, but what is expected from a 
leader of society is to show how or to find the way how to put these principles into 
practice. 
"Do you imagine all that bombastic propaganda being broadcast on the radio 
is true? Go see for yourself at first hand what state our people are living 
in. Not even one out of every two hundred villages has a clinic. No 
one is concerned about the poor and the hungry, and they do not allow 
the measures Islam has devised for the sake of the poor to be 
implemented. Islam has solved the problem of poverty and inscribed it 
at the very top of its programme: "Sadaqat (alms) is for the 
poor"(Qur'an, 9: 60). Islam is aware that first, the conditions of the poor 
must be remedied, the conditions of the deprived must be remedied. 
But they do not allow the plan of Islam to be implemented". 41 
After the Revolution when Ayatollah Khomeini was faced with new questions 
about the implementation of Islamic laws he then declared that we have a long 
41 Khomeini, R. 1985, P 120 
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way to go to reach the aim and principles of Islam. We will deal with this issue 
in the next chapter. 
4.5.2 By implementing the Islamic laws nobody will go hungry 
It is interesting to mention that Ayatollah Khomeini is discussing the people's 
affairs, and he considered these issues as a reasons for the legitimacy of power in 
Islam. As mentioned in Chapter 2, in the period of the constitutional revolution 
some Islamic scholars focussed on and adhered to the Islamic laws alone, 
regardless of what might happen to the people as a result. But Ayatollah 
Khomeini insisted on addressing the issues of poverty, independence, corruption, 
and so on. This focus illustrates how Islamic thinking on the Islamic laws was 
evolving. It now followed that the results of the implementation of Islamic law 
would be a form of welfare state and a society of equality and freedom for the 
poor and hungry. 
"If the Ulama, who are the trustees of God's decrees concerning what is 
permitted and what is forbidden and who possess the two characteristics 
of knowledge and justice as set forth above, if they were to implement 
God's ordinances, to execute the penal provisions of law, and generally 
to conduct and administer the affairs of the Muslims, the people would 
no longer be hungry and wretched and the laws of Islam would no longer 
be in abeyance". 2 
4.6 Interim Conclusion 
42 Khomeini, R. 1985, P 123 
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1. In the first part of his reasoning, Ayatollah Khomeini referred to the main 
debate in the Shi'ah sect about the legitimacy of power; he drew on the Qur'an 
and hadith to confirm that Fuqaha are the only and right individuals to govern an 
Islamic society. It followed that the legitimacy of power depends on the 
Fugaha's rulership. 
In the second part he referred to some political and social factors which were 
familiar at the time to the people and the Iranian elite, for instance, justice, 
independence, negation of corruption, and so on. For Ayatollah Khomeini, the 
first section, textual debate, was an important issue, because he could not obtain 
the traditional support without such reasoning. And the second section was a 
mode of reasoning that was acceptable and relevant to the political elite and to the 
ordinary people who were suffering from inequalities and tyrannical government. 
2. Another considerable issue in Ayatollah Khomeini's book is that he, as an 
important and famous Marjaee Taqlid accepted that tyranny and corruption and 
dependency are the criteria within Islamic law for measuring illegitimacy of 
power. As mentioned in the last chapter, Na'ini's reasoning condemned tyranny 
because it denied monotheism and was hence illegitimate. He referred to the 
Qur'an and Hadith to substantiate his argument, but Ayatollah Khomeini did not 
need to reason in that way, because his reference to the political and social reality 
was sufficient to make it clear that the absolute power of the ruler was not 
acceptable to the people. Earlier, at the time of the constitutional revolution 
(1906-7) there were some ideas in currency that the ruler is as the shadow of God. 
3. Converting religious values into the political and social sphere is an important 
step in the Islamic tradition towards the recognition of the concept of accountable 
principles. Na'ini's view that tyrannical government is a polytheist one, was a 
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giant step forward in the religious analysis of the legitimacy of power, and 
Ayatollah Khomeini to some extent continued on the same track. There remains 
the question as to whether it is practical to convert religious principles into social 
and political principles. For instance, are tyranny and corruption and 
discrimination common problems when considering both religious and political 
principles? As mentioned before, Ayatollah Khomeini's work crosses the divide 
between two sets of principles. This duality is reflected in the Iranian 
Constitutional Law (1980). We will discuss the issue in the next chapter. 
4. Another vital issue in Ayatollah Khomeini's work is the role of the majority. 
According to his view, in the Islamic laws there is no role for the majority, and 
people should obey the laws that are confirmed by the Ulama. On the other hand, 
he believed that people trust the Ulama, who are religiously and naturally the 
representatives of the people. It followed therefore that the only duty the people 
and Ulama and elite shared, was to remove the tyrannical government; after this 
everything would be ready to establish an Islamic government. 
Ayatollah Khomeini espoused this view prior to the Revolution, but on the very 
day that he returned to Iran from exile, he declared that the will of the people was 
the reason for the legitimacy of a government. 
5. Ayatollah Khomeini, on the one hand, did not believe in the people's 
supervision of the government, but on the other hand, he presented some 
accountable principles for legitimacy of power which can be controlled by the 
people. According to his religious interpretation of government, there would be 
no room for public influence, such as independent media might have. But 
according to his principles, the people are entitled to control and supervise the 
Islamic government. This is a vital issue in his model of Islamic government. 
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The reason and root of such belief is Ayatollah Khomeini's perception of Islamic 
law. Islamic law, according to Ayatollah Khomeini, is textual, and so only people 
who are familiar with the holy text can enact Islamic laws. Thus it can be 
concluded that Ayatollah Khomeini's view on the legitimacy of power contains 
both religious and political criteria. 
6. An examination of Ayatollah Khomeini's understanding of the state, 
government, power, and laws is the key to understanding his outlook. He had not 
had experiential contact with the new ideas of the concept of state in the modem 
world, so his assessment of the issues was somewhat different from reality. This 
was a problem for most Muslims thinkers, particularly Shi'ah scholars. As 
Ayatollah Khomeini himself said after the Revolution, the concept of state at the 
time of the Prophet was completely different from the present time. Therefore 
comparison between these two times cannot afford to be too simplistic as this can 
lead to confusion. This paralleling of the situation at the time of the Prophet with 
the contemporary situation is one of the fundamental problems in the Shi 'ah 
thinking about the legitimacy of power. 
7. Ayatollah Khomeini believed that the ruler should be just and have knowledge 
of the Islamic laws, but after the Revolution it was clear to him that a ruler needs 
more than these two qualifications. The accountability of the government to the 
people is a vital factor which was ignored in his model. We will deal with his 
view on this issue in the next chapter. 
8. In a comparison between Na'ini and Ayatollah Khomeini, it is interesting that 
Na'ini presented a new idea on Islamic constitutional government, and used the 
main Islamic sources to confirm his model. Although Ayatollah Khomeini took 
up a strong position against tyranny and corruption, he finally replaced the 
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traditional power of the Ulama with the constitutional state, (which is close to 
Nuri's model). Na'ini presented a very strong theoretical debate on tyrannical 
government, but there is not such powerful debate in Ayatollah Khomeini's work. 
Ayatollah Khomeini took a more practical position against tyranny rather than a 
theoretical one. It can be said that Ayatollah Khomeini was a political and social 
revolutionary clergyman, whereas Na'ini was a revolutionary thinker in the 
Islamic world. Of course, after the Revolution Ayatollah Khomeini presented 
some new views, which will be dealt with in the next chapter. 
9. Another confusing concept in Ayatollah Khomeini's work is the concept of "the 
nation". In Ayatollah Khomeini's analyses there is no distinction made between 
the concept of the nation and the concept of the Islamic community. All the 
people who live in Iran are the Iranian nation, but they are not necessarily Muslim 
or Shi'ah. Ayatollah Khomeini's model for the legitimacy of power is a theoretical 
debate for the Shi'ah sect, but it is not the common view of the Sunni people or of 
other groups who live in Iran. 
10. Ayatollah Khomeini's reasoning on the legitimacy of the clergy is based on 
the following: 
a: Societies need a government 
b: The ruler should be a knowledgeable man 
c: The Iranian nation are Muslims, therefore they are looking for Islamic laws 
d: Clergy are the appropriate individuals to direct Islamic societies, because they 
are aware of the Islamic laws. 
Some important considerations on the above reasoning: 
a: First of all about knowledge. It is clear that managing a government in the 
modern world needs knowledge, but the key question on the issue is which 
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knowledge? Did the Ulama have suitable knowledge? Ayatollah Khomeini 
himself, after the Revolution, stated that a man who does not have new knowledge 
cannot be a Mujtahid. 
b: What are Islamic laws? Ayatollah Khomeini assumed the interpretation of the 
Islamic texts within history to be the Islamic laws. But there are some other 
Shi'ah scholars like Baqer Sadr who believed that the Shi'ah Fiqh should be 
considered as the historical interpretation of the Islam. Sadr believed that 
because Shi'ah was not in power, the interpretation of the Fuqaha could not be 
used for the time that they are in the power. 
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Chapter 5 M. Mutahhari 
5.1 Introduction 
This section deals with the Ayatollah Hajj Sheikh Murtada Mutahhari 
Farimani's views on the legitimacy of power. He was one of the most well 
known and influential Islamic thinkers in Iranian Muslim society before and 
after the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979). Some authors present him as " 
one of the principal architects of the new Islamic consciousness in 
Iran "'Ayatollah Khomeini described him as: "a high ranking thinker, 
philosopher, jurist, and a rare Islamologist"; Khomeini continued :" He was 
a part of my flesh" and "a fruit of my life". 2 
He was a philosopher, jurist, preacher and writer. He was educated in 
Qum, a holy city of Iran, but spent most of his life in Tehran. Mutahhari 
was assassinated in Tehran about 80 days after the Revolution (1979). He 
wrote several books on Islamic issues, some which have been translated 
into English and Arabic. 
5.2 Mutahhari's political philosophy 
Because of Mutahhari's knowledge of philosophy, his discussion is strong 
on political philosophy. Exploration of philosophy requires a rational and 
well argued approach, and thus we find that Mutahhari makes every effort 
to present the Islamic concepts in a objective manner. An example is the 
method he employs to maintain that Islam has certain principles which, 
govern all its laws. 
1 Algar, Hamid, Murtada Mutahhari, Berkley, 1985, P 9. 
2 Khomeini, R. 1983, P 104 
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Mutahhari presented four important principles vital for understanding 
Islamic values, according to his view. These principles are presented in 
order to distinguish between those laws which are timeless and those which 
are not. 
5.3 Attention to essence and meaning as opposed to shape and 
form: 
According to Mutahhari, one of the important principles is that Islam is 
concerned with the "essence" not the "shape" or "form". It follows, 
therefore, that there would be no contradiction between Islam and the 
development of culture and civilisation. Islam keeps the aim of life under 
its own authority, and gives the form, models and tools to the realm of 
knowledge and skills. Mutahhari maintains that Islamic instructions are 
concerned with the spirit, meaning and aim of life and not the form and 
shape". 
"Islam has not meddled with the outward pattern and form of life, which is 
wholly dependent upon the standard of human knowledge. Islamic 
instructions are concerned with the spirit, meaning and aim of life and the 
best course that a man should adopt to attain that final aim. Knowledge 
neither alters the aim and spirit of life nor directs a better, shorter and safer 
route to attain the aim of life. Knowledge always places in the power of 
man better and more perfect resources for attaining the aim of life and for 
traversing the route to reach and attain those aims". 4 
3 Mutahhari, M, The Rights of Women 1991, P l00 
4 Ibid., 1991, P 100 
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He stated that the ways and means of life depend upon the level of 
information and knowledge of individuals, and these depend upon the time 
and circumstances; on the extent to which man's life is perfected and 
replaced by the new means. 
But, according to his view " In Islam, no one single means, and no one 
particular external or material form can be found that has an aspect of 
`holiness' in it, so that a Muslim could consider himself / herself 
constrained to retain that means or form for ever". 5Mutahhari believed that 
justice is the main Islamic measure; he maintains " It is not correct to 
assume that whatever religion says is justice, but rather, religion says (talks 
of) what is already justice". 6 
It can be said that Mutahhari's reasoning makes a very significant 
contribution to Islamic culture because he implemented a rational approach 
to establish his conceptual structure. It is reasonable to expect Mutahhari 
to accept the full implications of his approach. Also because there was no 
clear definition of aims and means in Islam, it remains dependent on the 
interpretation of the interpreter to determine which one of the Islamic laws 
are "aim" and which are "means". We will argue in this section that 
Mutahhari could not accept all the implications of his own approach. 
5.4 Permanent law for permanent requirement, and variable law 
for varying requirement: 
The second important principle in Islam, according to Mutahhari's view, is 
the distinction between permanent and non-permanent laws. 
5 Ibid. 1991, P100. Also, see Mutahhari, M. 1985, P 162 
6 Mutahhari, M. Dah Goftar, P 144 
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Mutahhari maintains that Islam established some permanent laws for 
permanent human requirements, and maintained a changing attitude 
towards varying requirements. He explained the permanent laws thus: 
"The discipline that human beings maintain in respect of their instincts, and 
the discipline that they establish for their society is, as a general rule, 
always the same". 7 Mutahhari is directly influenced by Na'ini's view about 
the distinction between changeable and timeless laws in Islam. Mutahhari 
himself acknowledged this influence in his book. 8 Mutahhari, however, 
failed to establish as strong an argument on the basis of his assumption as 
Na'ini did. 
"One of the other peculiarities of Islam which has much importance is that it has 
permanent human requirements, and has maintained a changing attitude 
towards varying requirements. Some requirements, which may be 
personal, individual, general or social, are unchanging and permanent. 
They are the same for ever. The discipline that human beings maintain in 
respect of their instincts, and the discipline that they establish for their 
society is, as a general rule, always the same". 9 
Mutahhari, like Na'ini, argued that there are some kinds of laws in Islam 
which are not timeless. These laws can be changed within time and place. 
Mutahhari attempted to persuade Muslims to address one of their greatest 
problems. This problem referred to the interaction between permanent and 
non-permanent laws. The question that needed to be addressed was simply 
7 Mutahhari, M. The Rights of Women, P 102 
'lbid., P 95 
9 Mutahhari, M, The Rights of Women, 1991, P 102 
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"How can a law which was established about one thousand four hundred 
years ago be suitable for today? " 
"Another section of human requirements comprise varying human needs 
which call for non-permanent laws. Islam has kept in mind a variable 
position with respect to these varying human needs, by means of linking the 
varying conditions with invariable and stable principles. These invariable 
principles create particulate auxiliary laws for each changing condition". 10 
5.4.1 Question of "ahamm wa Muhim" 
Mutahhari believed that another principle which can allow Islam to adapt to 
the requirements of the time, is the principle "aham wa muhim". 
According to this principle, Islam has given its followers to understand that 
all its commands arise from a series of supreme exigencies; and what is 
more, Islam has established the degree of importance of these exigencies. 
According to Mutahhari's definition, when there is conflict between the 
laws, Islam ordered to follow what is more important. 
"This consideration has facilitated the task of knowing the reality of Islam 
in cases where diverse exigencies find themselves in conflict with each 
other. Islam has permitted that, in these circumstances, those who are 
deeply acquainted with Islam should determine the degree of importance of 
the exigencies, and select the more pressing exigencies, always in 
accordance with the guidelines set down by Islam itself ". 11 
10 Ibid., P 102 
" Ibid., P 107 
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This rational principle can be seen as a useful approach for understanding 
the exigencies of the Islamic laws. But there are some considerations: 
What is the measure for knowing the importance of a command? How can a 
society be safe from the mistaken or unscrupulous preferring of some 
principle; for instance, it is clear that dictators use the resources of the 
entire society as the means to accomplish their own unjust aims. In this 
regard, Article 9 of the Iranian Constitutional Laws (1980) stated that: 
"In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the freedom, independence, unity, and 
territorial integrity of the country are inseparable from one another, and 
their preservation is the duty of government and all individual citizens. No 
individual, group or authority, has the right to infringe in the slightest way 
upon the political, cultural, economic, and military independence or the 
territorial integrity of Iran under the pretext of exercising freedom. 
Similarly, no authority has the right to abrogate legitimate freedom, not 
even by enacting laws and regulations for that purpose, under the pretext of 
preserving the independence and territorial integrity of the country". 
This Article clearly shows the anxiety of Islamic experts about 
unscrupulous or mistaken usage of the principles. Furthermore, a problem 
arises when it is considered that Mutahhari did not supply any protection 
for inappropriate usage of his own principles, particularly when all these 
principles are presented as religious duties for believers, duties which are 
often seen as the will of God. 
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5.4.2 Governing principles: no harm, no blame 
Mutahhari presented another principle which can give Islam, according to 
him, the property of mobility and adaptability. According to his analysis, 
there are some "governing principles" (al-qawa'idu al-hakimah), which 
have authority through Fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence). He continued that 
"The purpose of this series of principles is to control and harmonize other 
laws. In fact, Islam has acknowledged these principles as having the right 
of veto over all laws and precepts". 12 
A governing principle, as Mutahhari introduced it, is a way to protect the 
Islamic principles against any harm which may be caused by fulfilling the 
Islamic laws. For instance, the principle of " no harm" ( la darar) is one 
of the greatest principles in the Islamic laws. 
"The principle of " no harm" (1a darar) applies when the performance of an 
injunction would result in illness to the person concerned, and likewise 
allows him/ her to abstain from performing it". 13 
Mutahhari referred to another of the "Governing principles", and that is the 
"no blame" (la haraj) principle. 
"The principle of la haraj (no blame), is applied when excessive difficulty 
would occur from the carrying out of an injunction in the Shari'ah, and 
allows the person concerned not to carry it out". 14 
It can be said that Mutahhari employs his theoretical ability to respond to 
some criticisms which arose on the compatibility and harmonizing of the 
Islamic laws with time and place. He was looking to make Islamic laws 
12 Mutahhari, M, The Rights of Women, P 108 
13Ibid., P 108 
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logical and progressive. For instance, he discussed women's rights and 
tried to prove that the rights of women in Islam (in Fiqh) were rational and 
reasonable. 
The next section will deal with Mutahhari's ideas on the legitimacy of 
power, and we will discuss how Mutahhari employs these principles for 
adapting Fiqh to respond to the new questions and whether he was 
successful in his approach. 
5.5 Responsibility of government before the people 
As mentioned before, one of the important issues in Shi'ah thought is the 
role of the people. As stated in the last chapter, some Fuqaha believed that 
the government is the representative of the Hidden Imam, and is therefore 
responsible before the Imam and God, not before the people. But 
according to Mutahhari's view, the government has responsibility before 
the people. He explicitly stated that: 
"From the viewpoint of Islamic social philosophy, believing in God (by the 
people) does not justify absolute domination of a ruler without 
accountability to people. On the contrary, according to this very 
philosophy, it is the very belief in God (by the ruler) that makes him 
socially accountable. People are not only empowered, but also expected to 
hold rulers accountable". is 
According to Mutahhari, there is no contradiction between Islam and 
democracy. He believed that everybody who believes in the contradiction 
14 Ibid., P 108 
15 Mutahhari, Al. Elal grayesh bi Maddigari, P 180 
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between Islam and democracy does not know about the rights of the human 
being. 
" Believing in the eighteen century's democracy which is abstract in the 
eating and living means and housing and clothing and the freedom of 
choosing the way of material life is the reason for the mistake of those who 
believe in contradiction between Republicanism and Islam". '6 
He maintained that believing in the contradiction between religion and 
national sovereignty is the main reason for this mistake. According to his 
analysis, the form of government depends on the will of the people but it 
does not mean that the people have no right to choose other religions. 17 
It can be said that Mutahhari believed that there is compatibility between 
Islam and democracy and that he also believed that it is the right of the 
people to determine their form of government, but the content of the 
government is established by God and clergymen who are the only 
individuals who have the right to interpret the Islamic text. It is clear that 
the democracy which is mentioned by Mutahhari is not the same as in 
western countries, because for Mutahhari it is the right of the people to 
determine the form of government, not the principles and laws which were 
approved by the Islamic laws previously. Secondly, if the people were to 
choose dictatorship can we describe this government as a democratic one? 
Mutahhari did not have enough time to experience Islamic government, and 
so he did not have the opportunity to extend his theory or to touch on the 
16 Mutahhari, M. Piramoun Inqilab Islami, P 65-66 
17 Mutahhari, M, Piramoun Inqilab Islami, P63 
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practical problems on the issue that arose after the Islamic revolution in 
Iran. 
Despite the above quotations on the responsibility of the government before 
the people, it can be said that Mutahhari did not expand upon the rights of 
the people in his writing. Regarding the rights of the ruler and the ruled, he 
referred to some words of Prophet Mohammad (peace be upon Him) and 
All Ibn Abi Talib (The First Infallible Imam of the Shi'ah). 
He referred to a saying from 'Ali ibn Abi-Talib delivered at the Battle of 
Siffin: "So now, Allah has, by placing me over your affairs, created my right 
over you. A right is very vast in description but very narrow in equability 
of action. It does not occur to any person unless it accrues right and duty, 
and right does not accrue against a person unless it also accrues in his 
favour. If there is any right which is only in favour of a person with no 
(corresponding) right accruing against him, it is solely for Allah, and not for 
his creatures". 1s 
Mutahhari continues "It is also reported from 'Ali ibn Abi-Talib that he 
stated: "It is a duty of the Imam to rule (the society) in what Allah has 
revealed and to perform the Trust (amanat) to people. If he does that, it 
would be the duty of the people to listen to him, and obey him and respond 
when he calls them". 19 Mutahhari believed that if the ruler turns to 
aggression and oppression, it is certainly the ruler who must be condemned, 
18 Ibid., P 124 
19 Ibid., P 130 
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but he did not explain how the people can be enabled to make contact with 
such government. 20 
5.6 Fagih is a holder of ideas not governor 
Mutahhari; in an interview with Iranian television, after the victory of the 
Islamic Revolution (1979), maintained that the duty of the clergymen is not 
to govern the country directly, rather, they should watch the process of 
Islamic affairs as holders of ideas and to see whether Islamic laws are being 
implemented correctly or not. 
Mutahhari maintained: "Welayat-I Faqih does not mean that a Faqih 
himself is to be established as the head of government to run the country 
practically. The position of a Faqih in an Islamic country, whose people 
have accepted the ideology of Islam and are committed to it, is the position 
of an ideologue, not that of a ruler (hakim). The duty of an ideologue is to 
watch (nizarat) how correctly that ideology is operated in society. He 
considers the suitability of a person who wants to be the head of 
government. Welayat-I Faqih is in fact an ideological authority, and (the) 
Faqih is to be elected by the people. This is exactly the same as 
democracy. It would be against democracy if an appointed Faqih were to 
appoint the following Faqih. But it is clear that a Marja'-I Taqlid is also 
chosen by the people through consultation". 21 
What Mutahhari suggested is inserted into the Iranian Constitutional Laws. 
According to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, "In keeping 
20 Ibid., P128 
21 Ibid., PP 85-6 
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with the principles of governance (welayat al-amr) and the perpetual 
necessity of leadership (imamah), the constitution provides for 
establishment of leadership by a Faqih possessing the necessary 
qualification (jami al-shara-et). Such a leader will prevent any deviation by 
the various organs of State from their essential Islamic duties". 
There are some considerations on Mutahhari's proposal on leadership. 
Firstly, how can a person, even by possessing high Islamic qualification, 
supervise the correct implementation of all Islamic laws by the 
government? There are more than twenty-two ministry offices in the 
Iranian government, and every one needs hundred of specialists for the 
management of their affairs. It is beyond the capability of one individual to 
control even the main issues concerned. Secondly, as mentioned before, 
there are some Islamic principles which are inserted in the Qur'an and 
Iranian constitutional laws, while other laws are concerned with the daily 
needs of the society and require more scientific knowledge than can be 
provided by Islamic text alone. Thirdly, what is the meaning of Islamic 
laws? Does it mean all Fiqh? Or all laws which can be inferred by Muslim 
scholars according to time and place ? As a theoretical debate, Mutahhari 
believed in the latter, but when introducing the Islamic approach, he relies 
on the Fiqh as a main source for Islamic laws, and it is for this reason that 
Mutahhari is considered as a traditionalist. It is apparent that Mutahhari's 
conception of Islamic government and Islamic laws was not touched by the 
practical experience of Islamic government owing to his death shortly after 
the revolution, and his approach toward Islamic government was also 
affected by the typical lack of experience of the Shi'ah clergymen. 
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5.7 Mutahhari and Ayatollah Khomeini 
Mutahhari had two different views about the governor. One he held before 
the Iranian Revolution (1979), and the other after the Revolution. In his 
first view, Mutahhari supported the Khomeini's interpretation of the 
authority and power of the Islamic leader (Welayat-I Faqih). According to 
his analysis and argument, "the Islamic ruler is granted by Islam a wide- 
ranging authority. This authority was exercised by the Prophet during the 
time of his rule, and was granted by him to the Imam after he passed away. 
It was also granted by the Twelfth Imam to the office of his general deputy 
(nayib-Imam) during the time of his occultation". 22 
In his second and later interpretation of the legitimacy of the ruler, 
Mutahhari clearly asserts that the people could have the power to choose 
their ruler. 
"A ruler is a person who is legitimately (willingly), not by force, obeyed. 
He can legitimately be obeyed in two ways: by Welayat and also by vikalat 
(representation). However, the discussion between the fugaha in Fiqh are 
about the (source of) Welayat of a ruler, not the vikala of a ruler". 23 He 
continued: " The right of choosing a ruler is left to the people during the 
time of occultation. The ruler must be, according to the Shi'ah law, 
qualified with justice and figahat. However, the electors of the ruler are to 
be either the Fuqaha or, as with the choice of marja'-I taglid, the people. 
22 Mutahhari, M. Islam va Mugtaziyat-I Zaman, 199 
23 Mutahhari, M. Piramun-I Jumhuri, 1991, P150 
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The first can be regarded as a kind of aristocratic rule, the second a type of 
democracy". 24 
He believed that Welayat can be considered as the real reason of the 
Prophethood, but vikalat (representation) should be seen as the aim of the 
government, which is only seeking the material needs of the human being. 
Whereas others had not done so, Mutahhari according to his argumentation 
proved that the representative of the Hidden Imam, and the representative of 
the people were one and the same. He could not develop his view, because 
of his assassination 80 days after the Revolution (1979). 
Although Muthahhari should undoubtedly be regarded as a supporter of the 
doctrine of Welayat-I Faqih, nevertheless his interpretation concerning the 
origin, also the type, of the authority of the Fuqaha, seems inconsistent. In 
his earlier writing, Mutahhari supports Khomeini's interpretation of the 
vilaya as an appointed Faqih. However, in his later writings and 
interviews on the theory of Islamic rule, Mutahhari presented an 
interpretation which can be regarded as a combination of the third and the 
fourth theories listed above, which were later explained in detail by Baqir 
Sadr and Muntazari. 
5.8 Leadership and clergy 
According to Mutahhari, in an Islamic society, leadership belongs to the 
clergymen. He argues that Islamic society in its very nature is in need of a 
leadership who have knowledge of Islam, its moral, social and political 
philosophy. 
24 Ibid., P 154 
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He maintained: "It is evident that only those who have been brought up and 
are steeped in an Islamic culture and who are thoroughly familiar with the 
Qur'an, the Sunnah, Fiqh, and ma'arif-I Islami, can occupy the position of 
leadership and thus it is only the Ruhaniyat (clergy) who can lead such an 
Islamic movement". 25 
Mutahhari criticises the view of intellectual leadership and states that 
because clergymen are more familiar with the main culture of the country 
and Islam, they are more eligible for leadership than the intellectuals who 
are not familiar with the Islamic culture and Islamic people. Therefore he 
denies any kind of non-clergy leadership: "Those honourable intellectuals 
have unfortunately woken up a bit late, since the old guardians and 
custodians of this huge reservoir of energy and force (Islam) have already 
demonstrated (during the Revolution) that they are well aware of how to tap 
and make use of this source". He went on to conclude that that "the 
Ruhaniyat (clergymen) will not allow anyone else to expropriate it. These 
dear intellectuals, who wake up with the hope of the shift of power every 
morning, and who (sleep with the) dream of expropriating [it] every night, 
would be better thinking of another job and another service to humanity. It 
is better that they let Islam and Islamic culture, and the sources of the 
mental force generated by Islam, remain under the authority of the same 
custodians who have been trained in the same environment, and whose 
words and intentions are better known by the people". 26 
25 Mutahhari, Al. Barrasi yi Ijmali yi Nahzat-ha, P 71 
26 Mutahhari, Al. Barrasi-yi Ijmali yi Nahzat-ha, P 83 
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There are some important points to be made concerning Mutahhari's view. 
The first point relates to his understanding of the Islamic laws. It seems 
that the principles of Islamic societies are in the Qu'ran and Islamic 
Constitution, therefore ratification laws by the Islamic Parliament need 
more information on the current issues, because the principles of Islam are 
clearly indicated in the Qur'an and constitutional laws. On this point 
Mutahhari's analysis is relatively close to the traditionalists' idea. 
The second important point is the question of the clergy. The question is 
why did Mutahhari prefer clergymen to intellectuals? If the reason was 
their qualification, it is possible for anybody to get that qualification. If 
there were some intellectuals who had weak understanding of Islamic 
society and Islamic laws, it was clear that there were some clergymen who 
were in the same position. 
The third point is that popularity is not necessarily a reason for legitimacy, 
because there were (and are) some governments who were/are supported by 
their people but which were/are neither Islamic nor democratic. 
Mutahhari's understanding of Islamic laws and Islamic society was not 
tested by the experience of being in government, and although he presented 
some useful principles for understanding Islamic laws, he had not clearly 
envisaged the new problems regarding the fulfilling of traditional Fiqh that 
occurred after the revolution, although he did acknowledge the necessity for 
the evolution of Fiqh. 
5.9 No contradiction between being Islamic and republican 
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Muttahhari saw no contradiction between "Islamic" and "Republic". He 
argues that the term "republic" means the political framework or the 
structure of a society, but the term " Islamic" explains its content. In other 
words, according to Mutahhari's analysis, the term "Islamic" indicates that 
the country must be ruled by Islamic laws. He argues that the principles of 
democratic society do not mean that it must be free from any kind of 
ideology or religion. He maintains that the people choose their own 
religion or ideology. Their choice is based on the democratic principles 
that acknowledge the rights of the people to choose. 27 
It can be concluded that according to Mutahhari', the legitimacy of power 
in Islam depends on two factors: a) implementation of the Islamic Laws, b) 
vote of the majority of the people. It is in b) that Mutahhari differs from 
other traditionalists who emphasise the implementation of Islamic laws 
without considering the opinion of the people. 
The second issue is the interpretation of Islamic principles. According to 
Mutahhari, Muslims need to reconsider all their Islamic principles 
according to time and place. He maintained that; "The exactitude of Islam 
does not exist in our minds and hearts. It is rather a conviction to a concept 
that has been undergoing constant transformation and modifications. Our 
understanding of Monotheism and prophethood and leadership (Welayat) 
are not excluded from such modifications". 28 
As mentioned before, Mutahhari presented some important criteria for re- 
thinking Islamic issues, but in practice he could not go so far as to employ 
27 Mutahhari, M. Piramon Inqilab Islami, PP 80-83 
28 Mutahhari, M. 1990, P 144 
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these new interpretations to suggest new ideas for new questions. 
Mutahhari finally concluded: "We are now in need of a revival of our 
"Islam" and a reconstruction of our religious beliefs so as to bring about a 
whole new movement of "Islamic rational thinking". 
5.10 Mutahhari after Revolution 
Mutahhari's view about the legitimacy of power underwent some evolution 
before and after the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979). For instance, in an 
interview after the revolution he discussed a provisional government which 
could be changed by the people. According to what he said, " This 
government (The Islamic Republic of Iran) is a temporary one; it means that 
the government must change every few years. People can change the 
government for the second or third and fourth time, as it is allowed by the 
Iranian constitutional laws". 29 
Mutahhari, in this interview, did not discuss the absolute power of the 
Faqih and the sole right of clergymen to rule the Islamic country (as he 
believed before). Also, he discussed the right of people to choose their 
government: " Fundamentally (the) Faqih is elected by the people, and 
therefore it is an original democracy". 30 
Meanwhile, he discussed the contradiction between Islamic government and 
the governments of the West: " Islamic democracy is just the opposite to the 
western democracy, because western democracy is based on the will and 
wishes of the majority of people, but in Islam a human being is human and 
29 Mutahhari, M. Piramon Inqilab Islami, P 62 
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can be an animal. Human beings have contradictory qualifications of being 
both human or animal. Therefore it depends on the human determination 
to choose good or bad action". 31 
It can be said that the contradiction between Islamic government and 
western government is not related to the sovereignty of the majority, 
because in any case, finally even Mutahhari accepted the role of the 
majority. If the majority of a country accept the Islamic laws, it is an 
Islamic country, but if the majority of a country does not believe in Islamic 
laws, nobody can force them to accepts Islam. Therefore, whichever is the 
case, the final choice will be in the hands of the people. It seems that the 
issue can be divided into two important sections; a) the principles or the 
religion of a nation and, b) the implementation of principles or religion. 
The discussion of the government is on the implementation of the laws, the 
government can not force people to believe any principle or religion. 
Therefore, finally, it is the right of the people to choose their own desirable 
principles or religion. A further subject of discourse is whether the support 
of the majority is the only reason for legitimacy of the power. But as far as 
such discussion is concerned, until now there has been no alternative 
option. 
Mutahhari's earlier view on the requisites for legitimacy of power can be 
summarised as follows: 
a: Implementation of the Islamic laws 
30 Ibid., P 86 
31 Mutahhari, M. Piramoun 1991, PP 100-102 
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b Leadership of the clergymen 
c: Consent of the majority of the people 
Mutahhari's later view on the legitimacy of power comprises the following 
a: Implementation of the Islamic laws 
b: Leadership of a ruler elected by the people 
c: Consent of the majority of the people 
d: Accountability of the ruler before the people 
e: Temporary government 
It is worth commenting that Mutahhari's interpretation of the Islamic laws 
differed from that of the traditionalists in such a way that he possessed the 
potential, had he lived long enough to experience the Islamic government in 
action, to promote further constructive progress in the development of 
Islamic thought on the issue of power. 
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Chapter 6 Ayatollah Muntazari. H 
6.1 Chapter introduction 
Ayatollah Hussein All Ayatollah Muntazari, was the chief of the first Iranian 
Islamic Assembly of Experts in 1980. He was as the successor to Ayatollah 
Khomeini, the leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran. He was deposed by 
Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989. Ayatollah Muntazari wrote an important book 
about Islamic Government. This was written in Arabic, and is in four volumes. 
In this discussion we draw from his book, and also from the deliberations of the 
Islamic Assembly of Experts, 1980. 
6.2 Necessity of government 
Ayatollah Muntazari, like Ayatollah Khomeini, first spoke in his book, of the need 
for the existence of "government". He referred to it as one of the most 
fundamental and urgent of people's needs and continued "Selfishness, greed, 
materialism and power seeking are inherent instincts of human beings and 
regulations and laws are needed to safeguard against such adversities This, he 
proclaims, is what we mean by a centralised power". Ayatollah Muntazari and 
Ayatollah Khomeini both quote the first Shi 'ah Imam (Ali) who said, "An 
oppressive government is better than continual chaos and disorder". 
Ayatollah Muntazari dismisses Marx's "classless government" as a mere claim 
and believes that all societies need to be governed. 
Ayatollah Muntazari goes on to compare and contrast different forms of 
government. He is critical of the concept of people's self rule arguing that 
"People are not always mature and aware of all issues and more often than not are 
affected by publicity. " 
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He goes on to say that on the other hand the people's support is the ultimate goal 
of every government but they themselves may not be committed to religious laws 
and moral behaviour. As for civilised nations, Ayatollah Muntazari argues, 
media, corporate interests and capitalism determine the outcome of elections, 
thereby resulting in domination of a particular class. 
6.3 Islamic rule 
Ayatollah Muntazari's view on the extent of Islamic rule is that "Islamic laws are 
not limited to prayer but encompass all that concerns humans in this world and the 
next". Examples of areas covered by Islamic laws are, he continues, politics, 
economics, and the internal and foreign affairs of Muslims. Islamic law, he 
concludes, forms a comprehensive and complete system which includes all 
dimensions. 
Ayatollah Muntazari's view here, is close to that of Ayatollah Khomeini and the 
other traditionalists as discussed in the previous chapters. Ayatollah Muntazari 
uses examples from The Prophet's life to illustrate that he, too, intended to 
establish an Islamic rule. 
At this juncture in his writing, Ayatollah Muntazari searches for the meaning of an 
Oath of Allegiance from the following definitions: 
A. Delegation of power from people to the ruler 
B. People's acknowledgement of the power of the ruler who already is in place. 
C. Is it an agreement between people and the ruler? 
The importance of establishing a clear definition stems from the fact that 
Ayatollah Khomeini and other Fuqaha believed that the power of an Islamic ruler 
is unquestionable as he has been appointed by God and the vote of people is 
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simply an acknowledgement of this fact, i. e., similar to the position of Marjae 
Taqlid (a Source of Emulation). 
Ayatollah Muntazari, however, argues that the (By'at) Oath of Allegiance is a 
logical and Islamic (Sharii) issue, and that rule is established by agreement. 
6.4 The election of the Leader by the people 
Ayatollah Muntazari explores in detail the importance of "reason or wisdom" as 
the most significant measure. Wisdom surely implies that chaos is unacceptable. 
On the contrary, measures of wisdom are; formation of a government, protection 
of public interests, encouraging the good and discouraging the bad, eliminating 
oppression and corruption from the society, and defending it from aggression. He 
continues that all this would not be achieved except under a just and competent 
government. On the other hand, a government will not be fully operational 
without the obedience of the people. This is only rational and all that is "rational" 
is "Islamic". Ayatollah Muntazari offers logical arguments based on divine law to 
demonstrate that the process of the people's electing a leader should not be exempt 
from the application of rational thinking and wisdom. In fact, he argues that this 
is the most rational and appropriate method for choosing a leader. He continues 
that the theory of appointment of a leader by God reflects an old established 
religious concept, which is that "religion only demands what is already deemed as 
rational". He continued that if God has appointed a government then it is surely 
superior to one that has been chosen by the people; however, there is no such a 
thing as appointment of a government by God. 
The second scenario, according to Muntazari's view, is when a government is in 
power by force. This is not only irrational but also contrary to an irrefutable 
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Islamic assertion, which states, "People are responsible for themselves and their 
wealth". 1 Ayatollah Muntazari concludes that the only valid way to establish a 
leader is by the vote of the people and it is for this very reason that many 
intellectuals throughout history have supported Islamic rule and have regarded it 
as the most suitable form of government for society. He continues that even 
Stone Age human communities would not have existed without an elected leader, 
to protect them and guide them in pursuance of their aims. 2 
He argues that God has given humans the "instinct to choose" and encourages 
everyone to use it. The words of God are, 
"So give thou tidings to my servants who give ear to the word and follow the 
fairest of it. They are they whom God has guided". Qur'an, 39: 17,18 
Ayatollah Muntazari continues that intelligent human beings unable to fulfil tasks 
have, in the past, allocated these tasks to those who are more able, especially when 
it comes to governing a society which (in modern times) involves diverse 
responsibilities ranging from defence to telecommunications. One person alone, 
surely, will not be able to deal with all issues. Ayatollah Muntazari states that 
designation and appropriation of tasks is a logical concept and has occurred 
throughout history. 
To prove the concept of "election of the leader by the people", Ayatollah 
Muntazari points to a very important religious article based on which "people are 
in charge of their wealth". This is a rational as well as a religious point, 
forbidding any interference in people's affairs. Ayatollah Muntazari, like Na'ini, 
1 Muntazari, H. Derasat. 1988, P 493 
7 Muntazari, H. Derasat. 1988, P 493 
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refers to the contractual agreement between government and people and reminds 
governments of God's expectation of all, to honour their contractual commitments: 
"0 Believers, fulfil your bonds. " (Qur'an: 5.1) 
As discussed in the previous chapter (Ayatollah Khomeini Before the Revolution), 
Ayatollah Khomeini believed that an Islamic ruler having got the necessary 
credentials has the right to rule, and that the people's vote is merely a 
confirmation of this right. Ayatollah Muntazari, however, emphasises the 
importance of the contractual agreement and that prior to formation of this 
contract there is no right to power. He therefore asks, "Bei'at" Is The Oath of 
Allegiance merely an acknowledgement of power? 3Or is it the beginnings of the 
formation of a contract? He favours the latter and quotes verses from the Qur'an 
to support his view. Ayatollah Muntazari's conclusions can be regarded as a fresh 
look at the question of legitimacy of power and the sources of legitimacy in 
Shi 'ah. 
6.5 Dismissal of a human being's Welayat (lordship guardianship) over 
(other) human beings. 
An important outcome of Ayatollah Muntazari's discussions is the dismissal of 
human's Welayat over humans. This issue, though not a new one in discussions 
of Tawhid (monotheism) is an important consideration in political debates on 
"people and government". Na'ini talked of "the oppression of infidelity". 
Together with Ayatollah Muntazari's view on Welayat, this forms the foundation 
for the discussion of the people's role in legitimacy of power in Islam. Ayatollah 
Muntazari continues "All human beings are created equal but independent and 
free to form their opinions and thus govern their affairs. Any intervention in this 
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process is therefore unjust". 4Ayatollah Muntazari further discusses the need to 
accept certain forms of sovereignty. These are explained in brief: 
a) Absolute sovereignty of God over all types of beings, as God is the creator and 
can intervene in all aspects of human life. Ayatollah Muntazari quotes the 
Qur'an to support this and states that human beings are made aware of divine laws 
through prophets and that obedience to prophets is only due to the fact that they 
are God's messengers. 5 
b) Obedience to those who guide us with good intentions: This is a logical 
argument which implies that once one's honesty and good intentions are 
established, others may follow one. Ayatollah Muntazari believed that people 
may be criticised for failing to do so. 6 
c) Appreciation of benefactor (Walieh Nei-mat): According to Ayatollah 
Muntazari, logic necessitates appreciation of, and gratitude to, those who aid and 
assist us. He uses the example of having obedience towards parents to 
demonstrate that the same obedience must be applied to spiritual leaders. This, 
he argues, is not only logical but also mandatory. 7 
d) The need for government; Ayatollah Muntazari reminds us of the social nature 
of human beings and argues the necessity for a social structure which would not 
be possible without a set of rules and without the existence of a system which 
limits abuse of social tolerances. He continues that this would not materialise 
without the obedience of people to the leader. He argues that if people had a say 
in electing their leader, following the chosen leader would only be honouring their 
3 Muntazari, H. Derasat. 1988, P 513 
4 Ibid., P 111 
s Muntazari, H. Derasat, 1988, P 112 
6 Ibid., P 114 
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choice. According to Ayatollah Muntazari, obedience to leaders who are fair and 
who do not infringe divine laws is analogous to obedience to God, and this is what 
makes it a duty. This view of Ayatollah Muntazari may be controversial in that 
such resemblance may result in the interpretation of a government being holy. 
The dangerous consequence of this would be the assumption that disagreement is 
a sin. This may happen despite Muntazari's own belief in freedom of expression. 
The argument here is that government affairs are not so clear-cut and, therefore, 
obedience to a government may not be analogous with obedience to God. This 
may call for a different way of justifying obedience to the moral and political 
stances of governments. Furthermore, the analogy may inadvertently bring about 
a situation where public dismay over government policies may result in 
resentment of divine belief. Ayatollah Muntazari's main emphasis in these 
discussions has been the contract between people and governments. This may be 
a more attractive platform on which to debate the question of obedience to leaders. 
6.6 Legitimate & illegitimate powers 
According to Ayatollah Muntazari, if a ruler loses his characteristics, he is no 
longer to be obeyed. He explains these characteristics as "being a Muslim", 
"knowledge of religious jurisprudence" , "sense of 
justice", and so on., and that 
absence of any of these annuls the agreement between the people and the ruler. 
8 
Ayatollah Muntazari quotes the Qur'an, 
"So fear you God, and obey you me, and obey not the commandment of the 
prodigal who do corruption in the earth, and set not things right". Qur'an, 26: 
151,152 
' Muntazari, H. Derasat. 1988, P. 115 
8Ibid., P 541 
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A question, however, remains and that is " What if people knowingly or 
unknowingly choose a leader who does not possess these characteristics? "Is such 
ruler's power legitimate or not? Can people dishonour the terms of the contract 
with such a leader"? 9 
Ayatollah Muntazari highlights two possible scenarios for this situation, a) that 
the leader may not possess the required characteristics from the Shi'ah viewpoint, 
and b) when a leader fully qualified according to Shi'ah, acts 
uncharacteristically. 10 
Ayatollah Muntazari says that there may be a justification for continuing to 
support a leader in both scenarios above, if lack of support means destabilising the 
society. This is when the leader is performing unsatisfactorily. With particular 
reference to scenario b), Ayatollah Muntazari states that "As indiscretion is 
inherent in all human beings, there may be cases where certain errors may not 
justify annulment of the contract as this will result in the instability of the system". 
In saying this, Ayatollah Muntazari bases his arguments on "stability" rather than 
on "the terms of contract" or "people's right to their destiny". He continues, "If 
people have chosen a leader without any regard to Islamic values there is no point 
in asking them to discontinue their support on religious grounds. Equally, if 
people see it as a religious duty to obey a given leader, the issue of continuing or 
discontinuing support becomes irrelevant as such people are more likely to once 
again base their subsequent decisions on religious grounds. 
Ayatollah Muntazari continued, again: "Government must exist" i. e., In the 
absence of a religiously qualified leader, following a less qualified ruler is 
9 Ibid., P 542 
10lbid., P 542 
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essential. This is because religion necessitates the existence of governments. 
Ayatollah Muntazari then raises the question "If there is no possibility of 
achieving an Islamic government, is there a choice but to accept the existing one? 
He quotes Imam Ali as a reference to the basis of discussions of legitimacy of 
power in Shi'ah: "The society needs a ruler, good or bad". ' 'He further quotes 
another infallible Shi'ah leader: "Oppressive rulers are preferred to continuing 
chaos". 12 
He continues "Closure of government business is not the answer in the absence of 
a qualified leader, a balancing act is required between other positive attributes 
such as logic, Islam, managerial abilities, and justice. This problem has existed 
for thinkers of all times". 
Ayatollah Muntazari also asks the question "In a leader, is religious belief a more 
important attribute, or his ability to govern the society? He suggests "It may be 
that the latter is more important". 
He goes on to say that in times of crisis the ability to manage is more significant, 
whereas in times of normality especially when laws are being devised, awareness 
of Islamic teachings may be more critical. 13 Such an approach to the issue of 
"Islamic leader" is a reflection of a shift in rationale in the stance of the Shi'ah 
thinkers. The discussions have moved from a purely theoretical platform to one 
that takes into account the practical issues facing a society. Ayatollah Muntazari 
makes the important point that one person should not be responsible and 
consequently accountable for all of society's problems. He continues that in a 
climate of freedom of expression everyone could and should contribute and only 
11 Muntazari, H. Derasat. 1988, P 497. Iman Ali Nahjol Belaqhah, Phazol Islam, p 125 
12 Ibid., P 547 
169 
in this way and through exchange of ideas, can thoughts be matured. Ayatollah 
Muntazari further questions the process of an Islamic leader assessing the validity 
of views expressed within the society, especially when such views are in contrast 
with those of the leader. Is there not the danger of some leaders, knowingly or 
otherwise, distorting or even suppressing such views? Furthermore, in such 
climates there can never exist a clear definition of "right" or "wrong" views. 
6.7 Majority and minority 
As discussed in the previous chapters, the main argument against the "majority 
rule" is that "people may not have the necessary religious or social knowledge, 
and hence their view is not considered in legitimacy of power discussions". It is 
further claimed that people are simple-minded, can easily be manipulated by 
adverse publicity, their judgement can be affected by greed, and finally that their 
votes may be bought through intimidation. 
Ayatollah Muntazari argues that even if such allegations are correct, the same 
would apply in the election of the Marjae Taghlid, i. e., as this involves the same 
people in three ways: 
A: An individual's awareness and maturity 
B: Reputation of the candidate amongst people 
C: The testimony of just and fair persons as to the integrity of the candidate. 
'4 
Ayatollah Muntazari also reasons that the power of an Islamic leader is by no 
means absolute, as he is expected to implement Islamic law. In conclusion, 
Ayatollah Muntazari understands the subjectivity of these discussions and accepts 
that both the leader and the people are not infallible. He, however, offers a 
13 Muntazari, H. Derasat. 1988, P 547 
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solution to the problem, which is to leave the selection of the leader to an expert 
committee, like the Khobregan (Experts) Committee in the Islamic Republic of 
Iran. Ayatollah Muntazari continues that manipulation of the majority's views is 
only possible in western democracies where there is a clear absence of an ideology 
and where views are often affected by materialistic inducements. 
He not only does not seem to have solved the problem, but also appears to be 
somewhat contradictory in that he does not acknowledge that the election of 
Khobregan or any other committee for that matter is not exempt from the same 
phenomena. The advantages of any decision arrived at by a group of people, as 
opposed to only one person, is clear. Nevertheless, where is the safeguard against 
such a committee assuming special powers for itself over time and thinking of 
their power as absolute? For this has often been the case with many single-party 
governments this century. To conclude, mistakes are inherent in the process of 
choosing but it is people who must decide in the end. 
The main focus of Ayatollah Muntazari's arguments seems to be based on the 
theory of choosing "one" person, be it by people or a committee, to rule the whole 
of the society. In so doing he does not display understanding of other existing 
theories and does not offer a logical explanation for why "one" person alone 
should assume total responsibility for the complex affairs of today's society. Can 
this ability be found in one person alone? If so, can that very person be free from 
all the negative instincts that allegedly exist in all the rest of us? 
This complex cul-de-sac of arguments seems to have nothing but the will of the 
people at its root. If this "will" were Islamic then the government is Islamic, if 
not then there isn't an Islamic rule. Ayatollah Muntazari's understanding of 
14 Muntazari, H. Derasat, 1988, P 551 
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democratic governments is also questionable. Firstly, it is not possible to have 
one single definition of all democratic systems around the world. Secondly, in 
some of these democracies (such as UK) there is also a strong emphasis on justice, 
freedom, social and political integrity, and managerial capabilities. People in 
such societies are also actively looking for candidates with all these qualities. 
6.7.1 Measures for choosing a leader 
Ayatollah Muntazari suggests several measures such as: 
A. Unanimous vote of people 
B. Majority vote of people 
C. Unanimous vote of an elite committee 
D. Majority vote of an elite committee 
E. The vote of people who live locally in relation to the capitally 
Ayatollah Muntazari dismisses the unanimous vote of the people as impossible. 
Majority vote of the people is a possibility as in the case of the Prophet who went 
to the war as a result of such a vote. 16 In the case of an elite committee and failing 
a unanimous vote, Ayatollah Muntazari offers a clear choice between the minority 
and the majority vote. He naturally favours the majority vote, as not only is there 
an obligation to secure the lawful rights of the majority, but also because the 
majority is often closer to reality. He then quotes The Prophet "Corruption will 
never be the basis for my Islamic Community, the hand of God is always with the 
people ". 17 
13 Muntazari, H. Derasat. 1988, P. 553 
16 Ibid., P 553 
"Ibid., P 554 
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Majority rule, however, does not mean overlooking the rights of the minority. In 
fact, a healthy society should allow for the "minority" to become a "majority". 
'8 
Ayatollah Muntazari does not address this issue. He continues in support of 
majority rule that "Human beings are social animals and any social system is 
bound to be in conflict with certain individual limitations. Those who embark on 
social living must accept its consequences". He continues "When faced with a 
choice between a social and a personal issue, one must give priority to the 
former". ' 9 
He argues that minorities should understand that the majority view might often 
mean the opposite of their opinion even if they disagree with it but they would 
have to accept it. Ayatollah Muntazari sees this as a consequence of social life. 
He offers a few examples, such as when someone accepts new citizenship or when 
someone gets married, i. e., that person may have to agree to the rules of that 
country or may have to adopt a new life style in a marriage. 
20This, however, does 
not justify imposing restrictions on the minority by the majority. For example, to 
limit a minority's political or religious rights is not an extension of Ayatollah 
Muntazarfs views on the compromises that the minority would have to make. 
This, he believes, is a totally different issue involving basic human rights, as 
discussed in the International Declaration of Human Rights, article one of which 
states: 
"All humans are born free and equal in their rights, all have consciousness and 
wisdom and must therefore behave in a brotherly way towards one another". 
'ß Guglielmo, F. 1991, P 221 
19 Muntazari, H. Derasat. 1988, P 562 
20 Ibid., 1988, P 564 
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The second article of the same declaration states "All may benefit from freedoms 
expressed in this declaration irrespective of race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other views, nationality, social position, wealth, etc. ". 
Therefore, the majority does not have the right to treat minorities unequally. This 
is an important issue, which will be addressed, in later chapters, within the 
framework of the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
6.7.2 The Islamic debate on legitimacy of majority vote 
Ayatollah Muntazari highlights a potential misunderstanding in the majority rule 
view. He argues that the statement in The Qur'an: (7,187) and Qur'an: 5,103, 
which says "Most men know not" and may (by some) be regarded as the Qur'an's 
disapproval of majority rule. He clears up this misunderstanding by explaining 
that the former statement refers to people's lack of knowledge of the "unknown" 
i. e. when Judgement Day or "the final hour" will be, and that this has no relation 
to social matters. In the cases he has described, he argues that there is no option 
but to accept majority rule. He further supports his argument by saying that the 
intellectuals of a society are, statistically speaking, distributed uniformly across 
majority and minority groups and therefore majority groups are likely to have 
more intellectuals in them, hence the superiority of majority rule. 
21 Ayatollah 
Muntazari's reasoning is here also open to criticism, as the fact that there may be 
bigger numbers of intellectuals in a majority group does not necessarily reflect 
their approval of majority rule. It may be that they are fearful of expressing their 
true views. It is however, fair to say that Ayatollah Muntazari has initiated a 
21 Muntazari 
, 
H. Derasat. 1988, P. 566 
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fresh and interesting approach to the discussion of majority rule that challenges 
the traditional Muslim dismissal of majority rule. 
6.8 The election of the ruler by the Khobregan (Islamic Experts) 
Ayatollah Muntazari strongly favours the idea of electing the Khobregan 
(Committee of Islamic Experts), which in turn elects the leader. 22 He uses ravayat 
(narratives) to prove that this is a desirable option. These ravayat (narratives) 
however, are dismissive of the people's vote but Ayatollah Muntazari emphasises 
the importance of amalgamating the views of the people with the Khobregan. He 
then offers a new theory which is "If people had the knowledge and political 
insight, they alone could elect the leader". 
6.9 Is elected government Islamic (shar'ee)? 
Ayatollah Muntazari previously believed that rulers are representing the people, 
and therefore people are not obliged to obey their representatives and can even 
dismiss them at will. Public elections, he wrote, do not mean that justice has 
prevailed and no one should feel forced to conform. This, however, may result in 
society's disintegration which only goes to show the importance of having a leader 
whom people would willingly follow even if this is against their personal interests, 
i. e., an informed decision. This would be a divine rule. Ayatollah Muntazari 
admits his departure from his earlier views. He now believes in election by the 
people, even in the absence of religious elements. 23 
6.10 Uprising against illegitimate rule 
Ayatollah Muntazari discusses in detail and criticises the traditionalists' view that 
uprising against illegitimate powers is "unnecessary". His views on this matter 
zz Ibid., p 561 23 Munrct'-ari, 
H. Derasat. 1988, P 574 quoted in Muntazaº"i, H. Al Badro Al Zahra, P 55 
175 
can be divided into two parts, a) should an oppressive leader be obeyed? And b) is 
uprising against such a leader permitted? 
24 
6.10.1 Should an oppressive leader be obeyed? 
Ayatollah Muntazari argues that it is not necessary to follow an oppressive leader 
and quotes the Qur'an to support this view: 
"And follow not the bidding of those who are extravagant, who make mischief in 
the land, and mend not (their ways)". Qur'an: 26,151-152 
Also, 
" The day that their faces will be turned upside down in the fire, they will say: " 
Woe to us! Would that we had obeyed God and obeyed the Apostle! " And they 
would say: "Our Lord! We obeyed our chiefs and our great ones, and they misled 
us as to the (right) path. " Qur'an, 33.66,67 
Ayatollah Muntazari concludes "The encouragement of all to follow the leader, 
only applies to fair and just leaders". 25 
6.10.2 Is uprising against such a leader permitted? 
Ayatollah Muntazari asks, "If a ruler commits a significant or insignificant crime, 
does he become illegitimate? And if so, does this apply to all who hold posts? " 
He is of the view that because all human beings are fallible, they cannot be easily 
dismissed or the society will enter a chaotic state. 
He continues "A just person is one who possesses a just personality and just 
manners and such a person does not become unjust with one mistake or one sin. 
However, he continues, there are sins and sins. If there is a major sin such as 
oppression, abuse of people's wealth or becoming puppets of foreign powers, even 
za., . .. -,.,. Lola., F DYU It 
" Munlazari, H. Derasat. 1988, P 596 
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an armed rebellion against the ruler may be justified; however, one must try and 
minimise the adverse effects on the society of any action. 26 Ayatollah Muntazari 
continues, Qur'anic Verses and narratives (ayat & ravayat) seem to indicate that 
bringing about a just government and removing an unjust one are both in line with 
Islamic teachings and recommendations. He quotes the Qur'an, 
"And incline not to those who do wrong, or the fire will seize you; and ye have no 
protectors other than God, nor shall ye be helped". Qur'an. 11.115 
Ayatollah Muntazari believes that God, according to the Qur'an, resents 
corruption and likes good people to search for competent rulers. Ayatollah 
Muntazari warns, as did Na'ini, that it is possible that certain incompetent or 
corrupt persons may try to abuse religion and use it to their evil ends. He says 
that there should be stages in a struggle against unjust rulers, graduating from 
dialogue to armed rebellion. 27 
6.11 Criticisms of Montazari's Views 
At this stage, a few analytical comments may be made about Ayatollah 
Muntazari's views on the dismissal of the ruler. Firstly, if his understanding of 
the ruling system is that of rule by an individual, according to the concept of 
appropriation of responsibility and accountability which is now widely accepted in 
the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, punishing the wrongdoers can 
only increase people's trust, thereby strengthening the political system. 
Secondly, if he is referring to a ruling system, control and monitoring of such a 
system should take place both "internally" as well as "externally"; internally, 
26 Ibid., P 619 
27 Ibid., P 595 
177 
meaning self-regulation by all components of a government, and externally, 
meaning scrutiny of such components by the media and political and cultural 
groups. This will also result in the strengthening of the political system. 
Thirdly, when considering legitimacy and illegitimacy, the question of the 
continuing existence of the current ruler or system becomes inevitable. However, 
in the presence of alternative schools of thought or political parties there need not 
be talk of collapse of the system, but rather a shift in power from one party to 
another. In such a climate, punishment of individuals holding power will not 
result in chaos in the society. Furthermore, such persons will no longer be able to 
cover up their transgressions. 
Fourthly, social development is the result of complex factors, one of which is a 
just ruler. Too much emphasis on this one factor alone not only results in 
overlooking the rest of the parameters, but also results in a situation where the 
existence of a "system" is viewed as being dependent on one person alone. This 
may bring about abuse of power, to which Ayatollah Muntazari himself is 
opposed. It seems that the arguments here are analogous to the two sides of a 
coin. One side is giving too much emphasis to individuals in power, and the 
other is assuming that the integrity of the ruler results in the integrity of the 
society. 
Fifthly, let us consider the discussion from the viewpoint of people who happen to 
have been regarded as at the bottom of the command chain, so far. Can anyone 
rule over people without their consent? The Prophet and the Qur'an have both 
emphasised the importance of the will of the people. "The prophet has a greater 
claim on the faithful than they have on themselves". 
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"The prophet is closer to the believers than their own selves" Qur'an 33,6 
Sixthly, Ayatollah Muntazari assumes that the entire nation of Iran believes in 
Islamic laws, and goes on to regard legitimacy of power to be dependent on the 
degree of execution of Islamic laws by the ruler. A great misunderstanding so far 
has been in the distinction between "nation" and "Ornat" (the Islamic 
community)". Anyone born in a country is a member of that nation, regardless of 
his/her religious belief. Therefore, "Nation" is not a religious concept. 
Incorporating this distinction in all relevant discussions of "government", 
"people" and "legitimacy of power" may be regarded as a challenge to all Shi'ah 
thinkers, as all discussions so far have revolved around an Islamic society or 
"Ornat". 
Seventhly, Ayatollah Muntazari also talks of the "comprehensiveness" of Islam. 
This is to say that Islam has an answer to all problems, thereby dismissing the role 
of "science", "time", and "place". This has resulted in a lot of criticism recently. 
Eighthly, it seems that Ayatollah Muntazari's theory assumes that government can 
sway the society in any direction that it chooses, despite the people's 
disagreement. In this assumption, people's opinion is either crushed, i. e., the 
government is a dictatorship or "totalitarian", or they (the people) have been 
assumed to be insignificant. Either way, the result has been great emphasis on 
"the ruler" and that a just ruler alone can bring about a healthy society. The 
author is of the view that Ayatollah Muntazari does not intentionally want this to 
be the outcome of his arguments, though it seems that is where they lead. Such 
an outcome has inevitable consequences. Finally, it can be said that Muntazar's 
views, like Ayatollah Khomeini's, are centred on "government" with special 
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emphasis on an individual leader. This is not to demean Ayatollah Muntazari's's 
significant efforts to address all the associated issues. 
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Chapter 7 Assembly of Islamic Experts (1980) 
7.1 Chapter Introduction 
In this chapter as in previous chapters we will deal with the central issues of this 
study, as explored and defined by the "Islamic Experts". The Islamic Experts 
were those men in charge of writing the Iranian Constitutional Law after the 
Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979). It was thus the views of the majority of these 
Islamic Experts that were promulgated in the Iranian Constitutional Laws (1980). 
In this chapter we will discuss the ambiguities and contradictions in the views 
presented by the Islamic Experts. These became apparent during discussions 
between the Islamic Experts as they prepared the constitutional law. During the 
three months session of their Assembly in 1980, more than 30 hours of discussion 
were devoted to the contradiction between the rights of the people and the power 
of the leader. The Assembly spent more time on this issue than any other. The 
Iranian Constitutional Law has 177 Articles. This would allow an average of 6 
hours debate on each article, but 30 hours were spent debating about the 
sovereignty of the people and the Fuqaha. 
The following can be seen as the main issues in this chapter: 
a: At the time of the Assembly of Islamic Experts(AIE), there were no 
theories of Islamic government, legitimacy of power and the rights of the people 
in Shi'ah Islam, except for those of Na'ini and Khomeini. 
b: Greater awareness of the people's experience and greater familiarity 
with the contemporary ideas of scholars from other Western countries led to 
greater understanding of the practical issues of government and provided new 
solutions as to how to deal with these issues that arose after the revolution. 
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c: The traditional clergymen's understanding of government and state was 
almost entirely subjective and unrealistic, and this affected both their criticism of 
other governments and their solutions to their own problems. 
d: At the time of the Assembly of Islamic Experts 1980, there was little 
space given for views other than that of traditional Fiqh, thus it is clear that in the 
Assembly it was the traditionalists who held sway. 
As further introduction to this chapter it is necessary to sketch briefly the political 
and social background and environment in Iran in 1980: 
a: The Assembly of Islamic Experts was established in 1980, about six 
months after the Iranian Islamic Revolution(1979). 
b: 72 members of the Assembly of Islamic Experts were elected directly by 
the people from all around the country, the majority were from the high-level 
clergy in their regions. 
c: Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of the Iranian Islamic Revolution, was 
considered to be the supreme Ayatollah (Religious leader) and also a powerful and 
popular political leader without rival . 
d: Just four months before the formation of the AIE, and just about two 
months after the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Mutahhari, one of the most 
eminent clergymen, was assassinated in Tehran. He was one of the most loyal 
supporters of Ayatollah Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution. (Chapter 5 of this 
thesis is devoted to his work). 
e: The victory of the clergymen in the AIE and the powerful and successful 
leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini created an environment in which the victory of 
the Islamic Revolution was in the hands of the people loyal to the clergymen. 
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"l}icsc were mainly the traditionalists, who were regarded as the purest interpreters 
of Islam. Thus it was that the traditionalists had control of the AIE. 
f: "There were some other assassinations between the Islamic Revolution of 
Iran (1979) and the formation of the AIE (1980). The importance of these events 
to our study is in the impression the assassinations made on the clergymen's 
analysis of the situation. After these events and of course before that too, they 
believed that their Islam is the pure Islam, and it followed therefore that the 
assassins and those they may have represented were at the opposite pole from pure 
Islam. They analysed those assassinations as coming from Muslims who were 
inclined to Western or Eastern civilisation and not towards Islamic culture. 
g: hie victory of the Iranian Islamic Revolution had ended the reign of the 
Iranian Monarchy. The Shah was famous as a Western ally in the region. 
Russia, Iran's northern neighbour, was perceived to be a threat, or at the least 
unfriendly, as it was regarded throughout the world as the motherland of 
Socialism. Meanwhile. Ayatollah Khomeini presented the famous slogan "Not 
West nor East but Islamic Republic". In his message delivered at the 
inauguration of the Assembly of Islamic Experts in 1980, Ayatollah Khomeini 
warned the Experts' to be influenced by neither the Western nor Eastern schools 
(Capitalism and Socialism) and urged them to bear in mind Islam in its pure form. 
The Islamic Experts were searching to find a new way, but the ideas of West or 
Fast had to be ignored. Because there were no new Islamic ideas addressing 
social. political and economic issues, the Islamic Experts referred to the traditional 
Fi yh alone. 
' I7c11hcration5 of AsscmMp of Islamic Experts (DAtE)(1980), Volume 1,1982. P4 
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7.2 National sovereignty or divine sovereignty 
The question of national or divine sovereignty was prominent in the Assembly's 
debates. The issue arose frequently, even before and after the designated 
discussion about Article 56, which directly concerns national sovereignty. The 
main question, the key question, was if people choose their government, then 
sovereignty belongs to them. However, if God is legislator and Islam possesses 
all laws required for human society, there is no need for the vote and the people's 
agreement. This was and is the question of the past and of today, as we 
mentioned in the preceding chapters. 2 
The Islamic Experts, on the one hand, presented the Iranian government as 
"Republican", and on the other hand, they were looking to preserve its "divine 
laws and Islamic sense". They were also attempting to find a reconciliation 
between these two concepts. Some were emphasising the contradiction and 
ambiguity and others believed it possible to achieve a compromise between the 
two concepts. 
7.3 Reconciliation between national and divine sovereignty 
A clergy member of the Assembly , 
Sheikh Mohammad Yazdi, discussed the issue 
and divided it into three sections. 
a: National sovereignty 
h: Divine sovereignty 
c: The relation between the two concepts. 
Fm instance, luddy. Iranian magazines and ncwspapcrs arc discussing the issue, magazines such 
at% Aire ma. Kian. Karhon, /S ¬'la'at . Siasi, and so on. 
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According to his analysis, national sovereignty means: "God created the human 
being free, and nobody has the right to limit this right, except God, who has the 
real and concrete possession. God limited the human being's liberty, according to 
Ia di"s view, " by creating divine laws, and the human being, by observing his 
rational option. accepts this limitation. Therefore when a society accepts Islam, it 
means that people limit their absolute liberty, and this was their free choice". 3 
According to Ya di, people should accept the Islamic will, because it was their 
choice. In a republic, he says, people have the right to choose their preferred 
government and after that, they should obey the government. If we accept his 
c iew, it means that there would be no republican government if there were no 
room for continued supervision by the people. 
Another important issue is that Ya di assumed the Islamic laws to be fixed and 
unchangeable but as mentioned before in this study, this is not the view of all 
Muslims. "lucre may even be clergymen and traditionalists amongst those people 
who are opposed to Ia_di, and therefore the real question is not the choice 
between Islamic government and a non-Islamic one but for Muslims the choice is 
between different interpretations of Islamic texts. 
I'a_c%i continued his discussion on the right of God and the Prophet saying: "Then 
there is a divine right for fulfilling the laws and orders of the religion; this right is 
passed through from God to the position of Prophet and then to the position of 
infallible I»mm, and then it is fixed in the hand of the Welgtvat Fayih. Then when 
we discuss the role of the p3 'layat Fayih, this refers to the right to fulfil the divine 
laws". 'f'a: di went on to discuss the right of the people to oppose in some areas. 
' D. I. F. A. IMO, fi. 422 
ý Idid. E'. "122 
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In his vicw ." 
People who choose Islam have the right to oppose some things, for 
instancy, the construction of a new street or a new school. There are general 
Islamic laws which cannot be offended, but with the limitation that in general 
laws, in all areas, there is room for people's opinion via councils and Islamic 
assembly". 
It seems that in }a: di's view there are three main concepts: 
a: The position of the Welayat Faqih is verified by the will of God and the 
Prophet, and he is responsible for recognising and fulfilling " general Islamic 
laws" 
h: People have the right to express their point of view within the 
framework of the "general Islamic laws" 
c: Pic limitations on the people are the result of their choice in that they 
accepted Islani as their religion 
Yti_ili s view can he seen as a middle way between traditionalist and new 
traditionalists, such as :ft alollah Khomeini. On the one hand, he believed that the 
li C tai at Fadih is responsible for fulfilling the Islamic Laws, and on the other hand 
, 
like Va'ini. he reserved "general Islamic laws" as the framework of limitation in 
which the people, in certain circumstances, could state their views. In this he 
differs from Nu-i', as discussed earlier in this study (see chapter 2). 
7.4 Divine laws and Centralisation of Power 
Centralisation tit' power was a cause of major concern to some members of the 
Assemhly. One AIL; n ember. Dr Nurhakh. stated his fear of power becoming 
centralised in the hands of one particular class or particular groups. lie believed 
q Ibid. Y. 422 
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that this centralisation could cause corruption, and questioned how a society could 
be sure that the holder of power would not be involved in corruption in the future. 
lie suggested that the power should be only for God and then for the people. He 
said: "In the Constitutional law there must be an attempt to give responsibility to 
the people. People must be aware of their Islamic and national duties, and we 
should not rely on any class or group or any power except God and then the 
people. History shows that centralisation of power ultimately leads to corruption. 
In the case of centralisation there is no guarantee that the truthfulness and sincerity 
of our current Fugaha might not have been superseded in say, twenty years' time. 
(We should take care that) the opportunists who are always looking for power and 
for their own benefits do not take on the guise of clergymen, and do not lead Islam 
in the wrong way". " 
. 
Vur"hukh's view clearly illustrates that those, like himself, who had knowledge of 
other countries' experience, can see problems from a more sophisticated 
perspective than others. 
1)r Rini Bade' also expressed his anxiety about the centralisation of power. He 
said that it could be possible after twenty years for somebody to seize the power of 
leadership through electoral corruption. He therefore suggested that, to prevent 
this serious risk, the leader can use his sovereignty by the executive and legislature 
and judiciary powers which arc predicted in the Constitutional law. He pointed 
out that if they were to appoint individuals to implement the laws, they would be 
in the same position they were in with the imperial system of the Shah, which they 
had 
. lust overthrown. 
The Shah was the source of hope and fear, his words were 
athid T. aay 
F'hc first Iranian president after the Revolution (1979). 
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law, he was landlord of the entire country and whatever he wanted doing had to be 
(lone. Thus ßuni Saclr illustrated the risk of allowing one individual to implement 
and administer the laws. 8 
. lakal . 
Alin Farsi discussed the ambiguity and uncertainty in the definition of 
sovereignty. He analysed several different kinds of sovereignty as they were 
presented by other members of AIE . 
He said According to the Qur'an 
"Sovereignty belongs only to God" ( Qur'an 40/12) , therefore 
if sovereignty 
belongs only to God, then what is your claimed sovereignty ? Is it the same as 
God's sovereignty which is to be transferred to the nation? On the one hand, you 
arc discussing the sovereignty of Fugaha and make for them the right of IVelayat, 
vet on the other hand, the nation by electing qualified individuals, transfers its 
right of sovereignty to the three authorities(Judiciary, Executive, Legislature) of 
governors ? Thereibre there are four partners in the sovereignty: 
a: (iod 
h: Fu1joha 
c: nation 
d: governors 
"Then make clear every one's share". 
Farsi's" analysis clearly shows how some of the AIE viewed the ambiguity and 
contradiction regarding legitimacy of power and sovereignty, but in spite of the 
serious and prolonged discussions which took place in order to resolve the issue, 
there remain some contradictions in the Iranian Constitutional Law which we will 
deal with in a later section of this chapter. 
5 DA 1 F. 1992,1'. 424 
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7.5 flight of sovereignty: Acknowledgement of and acceptance of the 
if'eluval Fuqaha 
Some other members of the AIE believed that sovereignty does not imply 
legislation or succession for legislation, but rather requires acknowledgement of 
the leader and legislator. 
This was the view of a prominent and respected clergyman of the AIE, Ayatolah 
J, vohh' : fmoli. 1te stated that : "The right of national sovereignty is not 
legislation, not succession of legislation, nor does it mean the transmission of the 
right of legislation, but national sovereignty means the leader's knowledge of the 
law 
, and the people's 
knowledge of the leader. It is the right of the people to 
know and acknowledge the law maker, and to know qualified individuals for 
legislation". I Jere God's right is not transmitted to anybody, Amoli said, and here 
Goat makes nobody his successor. This sovereignty, "sovereignty belongs only to 
(io d"(Qur'an 40/12) is not transferable to anybody. " 9 
. 4moli denied ambiguity in the 
definition of sovereignty, but it seems he denied the 
concept of national sovereignty, and limited this sovereignty to acknowledging 
and knowing the governors. It seems that his analysis is in contradiction with the 
Iranian t('L, because according to Article 3 of the 1CL, " The government of the 
' Ibid., Y 428 
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Islamic Republic of Iran has the duty of directing all its resources to the following 
goals: 
1. The creation of a favourable environment for the growth of moral virtues based 
on faith and piety and struggle against all forms of vice and corruption; 
2. raising the level of public awareness in all areas, through the proper use of the 
press, mass media, and other means; 
9. -1-he participation of the entire people in determining their political, 
economic, social, and cultural destiny". 
Another important point is that, according to article 959 of the Iranian Civil Law, 
nobody can take away a person's civil rights". 
M.. P'ui_i discussed the rights of the nation. According to him, sovereignty of the 
qualified Fugih does not rest on election, by the nation, but on the Fagih's 
qualifications; thcrcfbrc, the duty of the nation is to recognise the qualified 
individual as leader. In this way he would fulfil the national sovereignty. Fouzi 
said ;" In fact the nation does not elect the qualified Faqih, but they recognise 
him". Then he continue. " The fulfillment of the national sovereignty is in the 
hand of the ! "agih. not the nation, because the nation has no right to administer 
divine laws". 10 Fouzi s view is similar to that of Ayatollah Khomeini, as 
discussed in the previous chapter. 
Nevertheless, his views were not shared by some other clergymen. For instance, 
. 4.7ehrani believed that the right of the nation should 
be considered the basis of 
sovereignty. Ile argued "the Islamic leader is he who is elected by the majority 
of the nation. Thcrefore the choice of the religion, the choice of leader and the 
choice of sovereignty is in the hands of the nation. It is the nation who chooses 
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the right or the wrong option, therefore the establishment of national sovereignty 
is the right of the nation". ' There was discussion about national sovereignty or 
the sovereignty of Fugaha on five different occasions, and still it continued to be a 
matter of dehatc. '2 Several reasons for this uncertainty are apparent: firstly, there 
was no clear understanding of what sovereignty meant; secondly, there was a fear 
of "political despotism"; thirdly: the Islamic majority of the Islamic Experts were 
intended to write the law according to Fiqh, in which there was no provision for 
such discussions. 
'llte vice-president of AIE, Dr Beheshti, analysed the above issue. He 
distinguished between main and secondary problems. He said: " We are faced 
with one main and another secondary problem. If we can cope with our main 
problem. we can solve our secondary one. Our main problem is the confrontation 
between the authority of the nation and the other authority". 
13 
This main problem remained in the Iranian Constitution, and will be dealt with in 
the next chapter. 
7.6 Ambiguity in the definition of "national sovereignty" 
It seems that, as mentioned before, there was no clear definition of national 
sovereignty and this created a crucial problem. For instance, we refer to one 
Islamic Expert's definition of national sovereignty. : tlousavi Tabrizi said: "If the 
definition of national sovereignty means, independent view, look to this nation, 
Ibid. PP, 416-17 
tbid. 1,418 
1bid. P, 4? 9 
" Ibid. P, 4 ;9 
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they are saying , "Surely there 
is no party but God's party" 14, there is no leader but 
Khomeini". that is what they believed. We made the acceptance of the people a 
support for leadership. Of course it is the will of God, therefore Welayat Faqih is 
the origin of national sovereignty". "' 
However. as mentioned before, 7abrizi's definition of national sovereignty was 
not accepted by some of the AIE, and this clearly shows that there was no real 
understanding of the central and essential issues about state and power and 
sovereignty. According to 7abrizi's view, the nation's vote for the Welayat Faqih 
means national sovereignty, but he did not consider that legitimacy of power 
depends on the national vote without reference to the will of God. The national 
vote is usually interpreted as the will of individuals. 
Dr Bani Sadr believed that national sovereignty means the nation's independence 
from other countries. He said: " The point is that national sovereignty belongs to 
this nation and it is not the right of other countries on the earth". 16 
! )r Behe. shti agreed with the Bari Sadr definition and said: "The national 
sovereignty means the independence of a country, and also it means other 
countries have no right of interference in another country's affairs". ' 7 
tt. ifcrrc{ýhc" ýý", an Alt; member who was a translator of some political books into 
f'ersian, 's when discussing the ambiguity and contradiction between the 
sovereignty of the nation and the U'elavat Faqih, stated: "There will always be a 
contradiction between national sovereignty and Welavat Faqih, and I predict from 
now that it will be a matter of confrontation. This problem will not be overcome 
F bis is it p: 1i't Ot :1 vcfic UI the Qur'an, sec Qur'an 5/56 
" 1)A1H, 1082.11974 
1)Att:, 1082. P 474 
' I)A11?, 1982,1' 426 
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until -' c find a solution to this question and I summon God for witness that it is 
not solved yet. The point is not clear, not only for the honourable gentlemen in 
the IAF:. but also for the Iranian people. We are passing a law in which there is 
ambiguity about this". '9 
. ltamllah Khademi believed that originally the original concept of "sovereignty of 
the nation over the nation" does not make sense, the sovereignty belongs only to 
God and then God transmitted it to the Fuqaha. He said: " The National 
Assembly Council is the consultative institution for the Faqih, and the nation does 
not have the duty of approving what is approved by the consultative Assembly. 
T1 hat which is the verdict of Faqih is obligatory on the people to obey. Every law 
which is passed by the parliament must be approved by the Faqih, then it will be 
obligatory on the people to obey it". 20 
Hc continued, "What is being discussed in public about the sovereignty of the 
nation over the nation is not incorrect; nobody gave sovereignty to the nation, 
because "There is no sovereignty but for God"21, not for the people". 
22 
. tfakarim Shira: i (clergyman) 
discussed the ambiguity between national and 
/ ugaha s sovereignty. lie said that national sovereignty was going to be like a 
lion without shoulder, tail or stomach. He argued, "In fact there will be no 
conflict between national sovereignty and Welayal Fagih, but if we fulfil it 
wrongly it will demolish the role of consultation, and it will not last long. It is in 
For instance : Alexis do 'focqueville, Democracy in America, and also Laski, H, Authority in the 
.f idern , State. 
DAIF.. 1992, Pß72 
ibid., P 743 
Qur'an, Joseph (12/40) 
1)AIE., 1»s7., P. 743 
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our and in our nation's interest not to centralise power in our own hands (those of 
the clergymen), as this can cause serious ambiguity". 23 
. 
11.. 1 faraghe'ee another member of AIE, presented a very clear argument and 
warned about the conflict and contradiction between the sovereignty of Fugaha 
and the sovereignty of the nation. According to kfaraghe'ee's view "The nation's 
rights of equality and the clergymen's privilege is one of the contradictions in the 
Iranian Constitutional Law. When we are discussing the sovereignty of Islam, it 
follows that no particular class can monopolise the power; if this were the case, 
Islam would he used as a means for power lovers (to gain control). It could then 
be concluded by the people that they struggled for the victory of the revolution, 
and then somebody wanted to exclude their fellow campaigners". 24 
tie predicted that the principle of national sovereignty was contradicted by the 
Fc: gih sovereignty. i faraghe'ee said : "The doctrine of Welayat Faqih was not in 
the first draft of the "Constitutional Law" and if we put the pillar of the 
government on the Faqih's sovereignty, then it will affect other articles in the 
constitutional law. It would follow that we should change all the articles". 25 
. llarclghe"'ee :s argument was not accepted 
by some other members, for instance Dr 
ie"he'shti. Vice-president of the AlE. Dr Beheshli argued that the Islamic 
government is an ideological one and not liberal, therefore there are some 
principles which Islamic government is obliged to fulfill. He said: "There are two 
kinds of government in the world, one is the societies in which the nation's votes 
are accepted without any conditions; these societies are called democratic or 
liberal states, but there are other societies which are called ideological or religious. 
' t)Attý., IyF2, P 885 
'c 1bic1., P 311 
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In these societies, the nation chooses the religion as their first priority, in fact 
people state that they want everything to be in the framework of religion. Nations 
choose the religion freely, then they limit themselves by their first choice. These 
are ideological or religious societies". 26 
Dr Beheshti concluded that because Iran is an ideological or religious society, the 
nation is looking for someone "who knows Islam who is a specialist, experienced, 
and just". 27 
Dr Beheshti's analysis is faced by an important criticism, and that is the 
accountability of the state on behalf of the nation. According to Beheshti's view, 
the responsibility of the people is to vote for qualified individuals in the elections, 
and he limited the political rights of the nation to the periodic elections. Also he 
closed the possibility of any criticism of state actions, because any criticism could 
be considered to be opposition to the divine decrees. This issue is very important 
in Islamic societies, because it can cause passivity and indifference in people, and 
it is contrary to the principle that requires people to participate in their destiny 
(Article 3 of ICL). 28 Another important point in Beheshti's view is his analysis of 
Islam. It seems that the people's affairs are, as mentioned before, usually the field 
of several specialised sciences which require specialists to understand them, for 
instance economics, politics, criminology, medicine, and so on. In other words, 
as Na'ini discussed, the Islamic scholars' duty is not to create new principles for 
the society, but it is to find new solutions for the people's problems and affairs. 
Beheshti's model fails to address the issue of the appointment and activity of 
25 Ibid., P 311 
26 Ibid., P 315 
27 Ibid. P. 1980, p. 313 
28 Article 3 of the ICL: "The participation of the entire people in determining their political, 
economic, social, and cultural destiny". 
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scientific experts, etc., who would not be Fuqaha. Again, Beheshti's view about 
national sovereignty clearly shows that there was no clear and common 
understanding of the concept of sovereignty. 
Similar questions and problems arose about the accountability of government. 
One AIE member, Dr Sheibani, asked about the accountability of the government. 
He maintained that, "In Islam there is responsibility. If the leader and supreme 
commander of all powers makes some mistakes, how we can punish him? He is 
Welayat Amre, and nothing can be done with him; there is no article in these 
constitutional laws which can address this". 29 
The answer to Sheibani's question, for some AIE members, was that the personal 
qualifications of the leader would guarantee no corruption. Ali Tehrani, a 
clergyman member of the AIE, stated that "The position of the leadership is close 
to "infallibility", close to a person who was never involved in any sin, never 
involved in any falsehood. Why? Because he is in charge, to counsel, and in 
charge of using the expertise provided by specialists in the people's affairs". 30 
Another AlE member stated that the difference between presidency and leadership 
is that the risk of a president becoming corrupt is greater than that of the leader 
becoming so, because the qualifications of justice and piety are not a requirement 
for the post of president. 3 'Several other members of the AIE reasoned in a similar 
manner. 32 According to a clergy member, M. Hoseini, in the Islamic government 
the nation's vote is not motivated by irresponsibility but by faith and, according to 
his view, that is the difference between Islamic and non-Islamic countries. He 
argued that "The Islamic Republic is not the rule of an individual, but the basis is 
29 DATE, 1982, P 898 
30 Ibid., P 895 
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religious, and the individual is obeyed because he is just, honest and a more 
learned man. Therefore there is a restriction in the concept of "republic" and that 
is the description "Islamic", just like "socialist" republic. Therefore the executive 
power is in charge of the fulfillment of Islam, and the citizens help each other to 
fulfil Islam. The basis of this society is not the frivolous votes of the nation, but 
the faith, and it is a religious republic". 33 
Hoseini saw Islam as a complete ideology which makes provision for an 
appropriate answer to any question. According to this view, Islamic laws have a 
distinguishing feature, and that is that they have no similarity to those of the 
Western or Eastern civilisations. 
It seems that this kind of interpretation of Islam was a theoretical cause of some 
Muslims thinking that the adoption or use of any aspect of the laws or civilisation 
of non-Muslim countries automatically meant a deviation from Islam. This was 
the experience in the Monarchy Revolution (1906), and again is repeated in the 
Islamic Republic Revolution (1979). Even now, according to one of the famous 
and important members of the Guardian Council and a member of the Islamic 
Experts, Ayatollah Khaz'ali, he does not recognise the word "nation", and the 
Islamic Community is the only means of the Islamic Republic of Iran. He stated: " 
The measure in the Islamic government is the right of God, we do not recognise 
the nation, but we say Islamic Community". 34 
Also he said: " We do not recognise, neither Arab nations, nor non-Arabs, nor 
Turk nor Persian. Our measure is the mind, to get divine concepts for developing 
the brain,... we do not recognise nationality. Religion is different from 
31 Ibid., P 901 
32 Ibid., P 911 
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nationality. Our nationality is Abraham's nationality, it means God's 
nationality". 35 
7.7 Legitimacy of legislation 
As mentioned in the previous chapters, the concept of legislation was one of the 
major topics of debate between Shi'ah Islamic scholars. The main question was 
the role of the people in the legislation. If laws are suggested by God, then there 
is no need for people to vote, and if Islam provides all the laws which human 
beings need, then there will be no room for new laws. In this section we will deal 
briefly with the views of the Assembly of Islamic Experts on this issue. 
First of all we discuss the Islamic Laws. Dr Beheshti, Vice-president of the AIE 
expatiated on the wealth and strength of the Fiqh. He said "I believe that Islamic 
Fiqh is rich; even recently, in a lawyers' congress it was announced and agreed 
that all pure bases of the laws, and what humans need, reside in the Islamic Fiqh. 
If it is not so, then it may be imagined that the Islamic Fiqh is deficient. "36 
According to MKhamenee, another AIE member, Islam has every law which man 
needs, therefore Muslims do not need to draw on the laws and experience of other 
countries. He stated: "I disagree with the draft of the Iranian Constitutional Laws, 
because it is affected by European thought. I believe that Islam has nothing less 
than they have, and there is no vacuum in Islam. Everybody thinks that there is a 
vacuum in Islam. I will prove that there is no vacuum in Islam". 37 
M. Khamenee's view was common in the period of the first Iranian monarchy 
revolution (1906), and it has been discussed in this study that the struggle of some 
33 Ibid. P. 49 
34 Hookumat-I Islami Dar Nah'jol Balaghah. 1987, P 113-115 
35 Hookumat-I Islami Dar Nah'jol Balaghah. 1987, P 116 
36 DAIE, 1982, P 749 
37 Ibid., P 43 
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of the honourable Islamic scholars like Na'ini was to look in a new fashion at this 
old and important question. Now, after more than seventy years, the same 
question and same answer arose. 
For instance, M Hoseini, a clergyman member of the AIE suggested that " The 
National Consultative Assembly should be as an assembly of the people who are 
"specialists on the subject", and the Supreme Consultation of the "Supreme 
Ayatollah" would be the source of verdicts". 38 
Then he explained that he means by the " specialists on the subject" those who are 
clear-sighted individuals, and who know the objects, but that it is the clergymen 
who have the right to pass the laws. Therefore the passing of laws is not in the 
hands of the ordinary people. 
In the same session, another AIE member suggested, " The position of Welayat in 
Islam is in the executive and legislative powers. It means he is the ruler and 
governor in Islam who sits in the seat of Welayat and Command". 39 Then he 
continued and argued that the executive assembly is necessary for the leader, and 
said: "Do we have legislative assembly or consultative assembly in Islam and in 
the Islamic Republic? Apparently we don't have the legislative assembly. The 
assembly is an assembly for consultation". 4° 
The difference between this idea and Nuri's view is that Hoseini accepted the need 
for specialists to be involved in legislation and Nuri did not. As an example, we 
refer to another member of the AIE, Ghoreishi, who believed that rule is for God, 
and that He delegated it to the Welayat. Ghoreishi said: "According to our 
38 DAIE, 1982, P 50 
" Ibid., P 51 
40 Ibid., P 51 
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Muslim faith, rule belongs to God, {Sovereignty belongs to God}41 command, 
rule, guardianship and Welayat belong to God, and it is transmitted to the Prophet, 
and from the Prophet to the Imams, and from the Imams to the Fugaha". 42 
Another member of the AIE discussed the "Assembly of Fuqaha", and believed 
that the duty of the consultative assembly is to write bye-laws, to have an 
executive role where they do not codify or pass state laws. He asserted that: "In 
the Islamic state we do not have a human institution for legislation, like the non- 
Islamic countries, but we have the Faqih or law-knower; therefore we must have 
an assembly of Fuqaha. These Fuqaha, without doubt, are not only law-knowers, 
but also pious, just and Mujahideen, "strugglers on behalf of Islam", and they are 
masters in religious knowledge and pious and just. This assembly certainly 
would be elective, as it has been until now, where every Muslim chose his own 
Faqih and Marjae. Besides the assembly of Fuqaha, there must be an assembly 
of specialists, which should be in charge of organising the ministries and electing 
the main executive and officially responsible individuals". 43 
It seems that the central base of Farsi's argument is that he believed Islam has 
special laws for everything that man needs and so it follows that Fuqaha are the 
individuals with designated responsibility for Islamic legislation. Farsi finally 
suggested an article to be passed by the AIE. According to his suggestion, " The 
public votes and councils are the base for scheduling and execution and 
management", but his suggestion was rejected by the AIE. The AIE recognised 
the right to legislate on behalf of the Nation, but with some ambiguity and 
contradictions which will be dealt with in the next chapter of this work. 
41 Qur'an , 
6/57 
42 DALE, 1982, p 59 
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Another important member of the AIE, Haieri Shirazi, believed that even the 
leader has no right to legislate: it is only God who has the right. He wrote in his 
book entitled "Welayati Fagih", 44 " Welayati Faqih is not a legislator, not at all; 
the only legislator in Islam is God. The Welayati Faqih is the exponent of God's 
will, but in a devil's government the will of the devil has no limitation, he does 
what he will". 
A prominent member of the AIE, Ayatolah Dastghyb Shirazi, reasoned that there 
is a principle which is acceptable to all wise men; this is that no human being has 
the right to legislate any role for others. If this principle is not followed, 
legislation would only be possible through dictatorship. His conclusion was that 
the Fuqaha have the right to legislate, because they are familiar with Islam, and 
the nation accepts their ideas. He maintained, " If there were no Faqih or 
Mujtahid in the parliament, the laws which were passed would have no legitimate 
role, and nobody would have a duty to obey them. It means that nobody at all, 
not even a philosopher or lawyer, has the right to legislate a role for others. If 
they do that, the result is dictatorship. Legislation is the right of God (alone), and 
that is how all people are equal and nobody has any sovereignty over others. 
Sovereignty will be legitimate only when it is changed to the Islamic order in 
which circumstance it will be the people's duty to fulfil it". 45 
As mentioned before, there are similarities between these debates and those that 
took place at the time of the first Iranian Monarchy Revolution (1906). It shows 
that during this long period, there was little evolution in the traditionalists' views 
on the legitimacy of power, and it clearly shows that Na'ini's theory was not 
43 Ibid., P 63 
44 Hairi Shirazi. 1981 PP 70,139 
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considered and perhaps was not grasped by them. In this regard, one AIE 
member, E. Sahabi, mentioned that the same discussion was again running as 
seventy years ago. He said, "The point was solved in the period of Mashrute 
(Constitutional Revolution, 1906). If we debate with the same discussion, it 
means that we are not going to learn from our experiences, and again we have 
returned to the first step and we are going to repeat our experience". 
46 
7.8 Islamic or republican 
The role of the people in the Islamic State was a recurring topic in the AIE 
deliberations. It was believed that in the Islamic state the will of God must be 
fulfilled, not the will of the people, but the AIE also addressed the issue of how 
the Islamic Laws could operate without the agreement of the nation, looking to 
find a solution to this problem. Some members of the AIE were looking to 
accommodate "Islamic" with "Republic". 
According to Mousavi Jazayri's view, " Republic means that the state's rule and 
responsibility is not in the hands of a particular individual or class or family, but is 
the rightful responsibility of all qualified individuals within the nation". He 
continued; "It is the majority of the nation who recognise the appropriate 
individual as ruler. It is true that Islamic Experts are in charge of governing, but 
it is also true that they are elected by the nation. They need public trust and the 
nation's agreement". 47 
Jazayeri recognised the rights of the nation, and believed that the legitimacy of the 
Fugaha is provided by the vote of the majority of the nation. In his argument, 
Jazayeri discussed the Islamic notion of "government". He maintained that; 
4s DAIE 1982 P 
75 
46 Ibid., P 72 
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"According to the "Welayat Faqih" which is an Islamic principle, the leader has 
the right of supervision and guardianship over the tripartite powers (Judiciary, 
Executive and Legislature). The leader suggests a general plan, for example the 
limitation of political relations with other countries, or the general plan for 
economic policy in the country, and then he delegates details to the parliament". 48 
According to Jazayeri's point of view, the nation and their representatives have 
the right to discuss the "details", but the general plan is the rightful responsibility 
of the leader. An important point in his perspective is the recognition of the 
nation having some rights. Although he did not refer to his Islamic sources, 
because of his position as a clergymen and a member of the AIE his view is 
important. In the next section we will discuss how his view ultimately and with 
minimal alteration became part of the Iranian Constitutional Laws. 
Other members enlarged upon the rights of the nation. They believed that the 
nation should be involved in national affairs as these were their concern. For 
instance, N. Makarem Shirazi (a clergyman) maintained, " We must emphasise the 
popular state as the Islamic one, because Islam ordered us to do so ; {their 
business being to counsel amongst themselves} . 
49 This is a specific Islamic 
precept". so 
Hashimy Nezhad51 believed that such "counsel" is valid only where there are no 
specific orders from God, because the Qur'an says :" It is not for the believer, 
man or woman, when God and His Messenger have decreed a matter, to have the 
47 Ibid., P 64 
48 Ibid., P 65 
49 Qur'an, 38/42 
so DAIE, 1982, P 273 
51 Ibid., P 275 
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choice in the affair; "Whosoever disobeys God and His Messenger has gone astray 
into manifest error". 52 
The AIE Vice-president, Beheshti, said that the state must be built on public trust, 
but that there are limitations as to how far the nation is allowed to exercise its will 
upon the state. According to his view, "The public votes must be accepted in 
agreed areas (of national life); the government should depend on public approval, 
and all levels of the management must be acceptable to the public". 53 
He concluded that the result of public agreement is a popular government and 
therefore such government cannot be a dictatorship. According to Beheshti's 
reasoning, " If the government has not received the support of the public, it cannot 
receive their co-operation, and then it maybe resorts to military action against the 
people, and it can not accomplish anything, and may be turned into an 
oppressor". 54 
For another AIE member, Rashidian, the reason for the public role in government 
is the necessity of their involvement in their own destinies. 55 But the AIE Vice- 
president believed that the public should have no direct involvement in decision 
making that might affect the nation as a whole, apart from their right to choose 
their representatives. He said, however, that it is essential that all decision 
makers be elected by the nation. 56 
Here Beheshti does not differ from the traditionalists . 
He finally stated that 
people have no right to legislate, not because they are unfamiliar with the 
practicalities of legislation, but because the right of legislation belongs to God, 
32 Qur'an 33/36 
33 DAIE, 1982, P 276 
SI DAIE, 1982, P 276 
ssIbid., P 278 
Ibid., P 300 
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and clergymen are the only individuals who know the will of God; therefore they, 
the clergymen, are not operating as the representatives of people's thoughts and 
desires, but as the individuals who know the will of God better than the people. 
Mousavi Isfahani, another AIE member, discussed the role of the nation. 
According to his view, the importance of the nation's vote depends on the 
importance of the council, and the basis of the society is the people's council. 
According to his outlook, the Council is not far from the national sovereignty. 57" 
The main reason for the Council is that any government which is looking to be 
independent from the "super powers" needs to be supported by its nation. And 
the only way for the government to receive national support is by maintaining the 
nation's co-operation with the government". He went on to warn, "If the people 
of the nation do not participate in their destiny, they will step aside from the 
revolution". 58 
It is clear that the basis of the above argument differs from the idea that the main 
reason for legitimacy of the government is the people's votes. In this regard, 
Ayatolah Muntazari maintained that, even if the entire nation voted for a 
president, he would have no legitimacy until a Mujtahid confirmed his 
legitimacy. 59Additionally, Ayatolah Safi, another important AIE member, stated 
that" The government would have no legitimacy, if there were no role for the 
leader in electing the president". 60 
As mentioned before, for the AIE, the reason for the legitimacy of power rests in 
the adoption and administration of divine laws by qualified individuals. It was 
57 Ibid., P 301 
S81bid., P 301 
59DAIE, 1982, P 922 
60 Ibid., P 921 
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and continues to be a foregone conclusion in the minds of the AIE that divine laws 
contain all laws necessary for the affairs of the people. Therefore, according to 
their view, it is the duty of the clergymen to find the will of God by examining the 
Qur'an and Traditions. 
Even when they were discussing the people's rights, they were using the same 
reasoning as seventy years previously(1906). According to the general consensus 
of the clergymen in the AIE, the roles of the communities must be appointed by 
God, and the only source for understanding and interpreting the divine laws is the 
clergy. Even the public councils cannot make decisions on any issue without the 
supervision of the Fugaha; the authority of the councils is limited by the Fuqaha's 
interpretations of Islam. 
It is apparent that old knowledge and failure to take living contemporary 
experience into account were a key reason for the ambiguity and contradiction in 
the definition of the legitimacy of power and people's participation in the ICL 
1980. In support of the this assessment, we will examine an interesting debate in 
the AIE about the rights of Zoroastrians, Jews and Christians as enshrined in the 
Iranian Constitutional Laws. Danesh Rad, the representative of the Jews in the 
AIE, pointed out the difference between the present day Jews and Christians and 
others (such as Zoroastrians), and those who were living at the time of the Holy 
Prophet of Islam (peace be upon Him). 
He maintained that " Quran's criticisms of Jews or Christians are aimed at people 
who existed at the time of the Prophet Mohammad (people such as Bani Ghorize, 
tribes and goldsmiths in Madinah the city now in Saudi Arabia where the Holy 
Prophet first set up an Islamic state). These criticism are not of today's Jews or 
Christians. 
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The Iranian Jews and Christians have been resident in Iran for more than two 
thousand seven hundred years, or from three thousand years ago (in the case of the 
Zoroastrians), and they are a different people who have no relation to those Jews 
or Christians (and others). Anyhow, the honourable gentlemen should not relate 
their views about Jews or Christians who are discussed in the Qur'an to the 
present ones, who have been living in this country for many centuries, and whose 
goodness or badness they have in common with the (rest of the) Iranian nation". 
He went on to urge the members of the AIE not to be hostile to the religious 
minorities who are "protected people". He said: " We should not look upon each 
other as (though we were living) one thousand four hundred years ago, when there 
was conflict between the tribes and (some of them) had private treaties with each 
other. Now we are living with each other and the Constitutional Law is our 
contract, and we will all obey it". 61 
This can be taken as an excellent example of how, when legislation is being 
formulated, awareness of the contemporary national situation has a vital role to 
play. The important point in this regard is that if the clergymen wished to 
implement the Fiqh, then they were duty-bound to consider the religious 
minorities as "protected people", who have special rights which differ from those 
of the Muslim population. 
But one of the clergymen replied to Rad that, according to the Iranian 
Constitutional Laws, monotheistic religious minorities had equal rights in 
common with other Iranian people. These rights are, however, different from 
what is set out in the Fiqh. 
61 DALE, 1982, P 401 
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This section has discussed the AIE debates on the role of the people, and why, 
according to the majority of the AIE, the Islamic State needs the people's votes. 
Their main conclusions as to why people should have the vote can be classified 
briefly as follows: 
a: To elect the qualified individuals who are to govern 
b: To ensure the independence of the country 
c: Because without the people's participation and hence their approval, the 
government is powerless to carry out its function. 
d: For the sake of the evolution of the people as individuals 
e: Because God decreed that consultation must take place 
It seems that in all the above views, legitimacy of power is dependent on two 
factors, namely a) interpreters of the Islamic texts, i. e., clergymen, and b) people's 
votes for electing these interpreters. 
It seems that there are two important implications arising from the debate as 
presented by the majority of the AIE. First, the people cannot assess the validity 
of the government's policies, because they are alleged to be unaware of the Islamic 
texts and therefore cannot understand the rationale of the laws. Secondly, 
because religious matters are usually seen to be imbued with holiness and sanctity, 
this creates a climate where it is difficult to question the laws or government in a 
rational and logical manner. There would also be the fear, for some, of 
committing blasphemy. For the believers in the Fuqaha's ideas, any potential 
disagreement would be presenting them with the option of choosing between 
God's will (Islam) and something which is not Islam. 
7.9 Islamic community and the nation 
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One of the interesting debates in the AIE is about the distinction between "the 
Islamic community" and "the Nation". The point is that Islam has a universal 
message to all human beings. This non-territorial understanding of the religion 
influences Muslims' minds when discussing national unity or sovereignty. A 
failure to recognise or make the distinction between the notion of "Islamic 
Community" (Ummat) and the notion of "Nation" created confusion and some 
contradictions in the Iranian Constitutional Laws. According to a common 
definition, "nation" means "a large group of people living in one area and usually 
having an independent government". 62 
But in the Islamic religious culture, "Islamic community" means the people who 
have a common Islamic faith, common leadership and institutions. 63 
According to the Qur'an, all believers are as a united community: 
"Surely this Community of yours is one community, and I am your Lord, so 
worship Me", 64 
Also according to the Qur'an, "Mel'lat" (community) means a people who follow 
and act according to the Prophet's path. 65 The difference between the two 
concepts is obvious, but in the AIE, there were some discussions around this 
subject, which are very important to this study. J. Farsi, an AIE member, 
suggested that it must be written into the Iranian Constitutional Laws that: 
" I. The Islamic Republic of Iran is the "believers' state" 
"2. The Iranian Islamic nation are the non-divided unity, and it is 
part of the unity of the (universal) Islamic Community. 
62 Longman Dictionary. 1987 
63 A. Gavahi A Concise edition of religious and mystical terms. 1995. 
64 Qur'an, 31/93 
65 Ragheb Esfahani, Mu'ajam M: fradat alfaz Qur'an ( Encyclopaedia of Qur'anic words), 1972, 
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"3. All believers around the world are the members of the Islamic 
Community, having common religion, God, divine book, prophet and 
equal rights and duties. 
"4. The Iranian territory is a unique non-divided one, and it is part 
of our territory, " the territory of Islam". 66 
The above definition shows that there was some ambiguity about the two concepts 
of "Islamic community" and "Nation". There are some people living in Iran who 
are not Muslims, and even between Muslims there is much debate about Farsi's 
proposal. So how is it possible to unite different people with different religions 
under the notion of "Islamic community"? It seems that what Farsi explained is 
the Qur'anic definition of Islamic Community, but it is not the concept of "State" 
and "Nation". 
The " Islamic community" (Ommat) needs its natural necessities. Also the 
"Nation" (in political terms) has its different set of necessities. For instance, in 
political terms, all members of a nation have equal rights, and a particular religion 
cannot allow differing rights for different groups of people. There is no common 
understanding of this issue amongst Muslim scholars. Furthermore there are 
different interpretations of the definition of Ummat between the Islamic scholars. 
7.10 Accountability 
After the victory of the Iranian Islamic Republican Revolution (1979) there was 
anxiety about the government being or becoming a dictatorship. Because of the 
common experience of the rule of the Shah, there was universal fear amongst the 
people on this issue. The same anxiety existed in the AIE. For instance, the 
66 DAIE, 1982, P 61 
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chief of the AIE, Ayatolah Muntazari, stated: " We must work hard not to give all 
power to one person"; he continued, " We must have a presidential council, which 
must comprise at least three members, and their status must be above that of the 
executive power, after the position of the leader". 67 
It is important to explain that there was great confidence in the position of the 
leader, perhaps because of the personality of Ayatolah Khomeini, as the president- 
leader of Iran, and also because it was believed that personal qualities can prevent 
the risk of corruption. But the accountability of the leader remained one of the 
important issues in the AIE. If the legitimacy of power depends on the people's 
vote, then it is their right to supervise and assess the leader's actions. But because 
of ambiguity in the concept of sovereignty, the majority of the AIE believed that 
there was no need for any accountability as far as the leader was concerned. They 
referred to the personal qualifications of the leader as a guarantee against any 
wrong doing. 
Dr Nourbakh, an AIE member, expressed his anxiety about the centralisation of 
power. He maintained that all positions in the republican government must have 
responsibility and accountability before the nation. He asked: " Is this 
government which is now being established a republican one or not? Do we 
respect Article One of this law, which states that 99.2 per cent of the people voted 
for the Islamic government? Because the difference between a republican 
government and a tyrannical or despotic one is that in a republican government 
there is no permanent job for anybody, but in this law the leadership position is a 
permanent one". 68 
67 DAIE, 1982, P 965 
69 Ibid., P 1014 
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Also another AIE member, Dr Sheibani, asked about the accountability of the 
leader: "In Islam there is responsibility; if the leader and supreme commander of 
all powers makes some mistakes, how can we punish him? He is Welayat Amre, 
and nothing can be done with him, there is no article in the constitutional laws by 
which this can be achieved". 69 
In reply to Sheibani's question, for some AIE members the personal qualifications 
of the leader would be a guarantee against any corruption. Ali Tehrani, a 
clergyman AIE member, said that " The position of the leadership is close to" 
infallibility", close to being a person who is never involved in any sin, never 
involved in any falsehood. Why? Because he is in charge to consult, and to 
draw on the expertise of the specialists in the affairs". 70 
Another AIE member said that, " The difference between the president and the 
leader is that the risk of corruption by the president is greater than that of the 
leader, because qualifications like honesty and piety are not stated requirements 
for their job". 71 
He also stated that the position of the leader is not comparable with that of the 
president in capitalist and socialist governments. The leader must obtain his 
qualifications over a significant number of years, and for the national interest must 
have a record of honesty, justice, piety and sincerity such that people can trust 
him. 72Other members of the AIE concurred with this reasoning. 73 
69 DAIE, 1982, P 898 
70 Ibid., P 895 
71 Ibid., P 901 
72 Ibid., P 901 
73 Ibid. P. 91 I 
212 
It seems that the AIE was originally influenced by the then Leader of the 
revolution (Ayatollah Khomeini), and also by the traditional views of the Shi'ah 
about the Infallible Imam. 
This led to certain privileges allocated to the position of Leader within the ICL, in 
turn leading to a lack of harmony between Leader's authorities and his 
accountability. According to the Article 111 of the ICL, " Whenever the Leader 
becomes incapable of fulfilling his constitutional duties, or loses one of the 
qualifications mentioned in Articles 5 and 109, he will be dismissed". This is 
more like a contingent plan, not a measure for making the leader accountable for 
his great duties. 
One of the important theoretical differences between the FIC (1906) and ICL 
(1980) is the duties or the authorities of the Shah (in the former) and the Leader 
(in the latter). According to the Article 44 of FIC: " The person of King is 
exempted from responsibility. The Ministries of State are responsible to both 
Chambers in all matters". In the ICL the leader, despite his significant duties, has 
disproportionate degree of accountability. This is one of the most important 
theoretical issues in the ICL. 
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Chanter 8 Evolution, Ambiguity and Contradiction 
8.1 Introduction 
An influential analysis of the First Iranian Revolution (1906) cites the absence of 
clerical leadership as the root cause of its failure and that of other campaigns 
within Iran. Specifically, this was the analysis shared by the traditionalist clergy 
at the beginning of the Iranian Islamic Revolution (1979). They saw their 
involvement in the victory of the revolution, which led to the establishment of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran as a powerful justification for their opinion, and not 
wholly without reason. 
It is written into the introduction of the Iranian Constitutional Laws that " The 
basic characteristic of this revolution, which distinguishes it from other 
movements that have taken place in Iran during the past hundred years, is its 
ideological and Islamic nature". 'To the majority of the clergymen in the AIE it 
therefore followed that traditional Fiqh could respond to and solve all questions 
concerning the affairs of the nation. But simultaneously, and again because of the 
nature of the revolution, which had the people's support, there was the other view 
that emphasised the role of the people and the role of democracy. This view was 
opposed to power being centralised or concentrated in any class or particular 
group. These two understandings of government were reflected in the Iranian 
Constitutional Laws, and made for some of the contradictions and ambiguities 
within them. In this chapter we will deal with the most outstanding and signal 
concepts related to these issues. The next significant issue was the new 
questions, which were arising after the revolution. Within a very few years, 
certain events brought into focus new questions, which caused the leadership 
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(Ayatollah Khomeini) and the clergymen to have to search for new and potentially 
unprecedented solutions. In this chapter, we will also examine the evolution of 
these new solutions and the consequent ambiguity and contradictions, which they 
presented. 
8.2 Islamic community or nation ? 
The difference between the concepts of "Islamic Community" and "Nation" was 
one of the issues, which created some confusion. Owing to the importance of this 
issue, it will be dealt with first. Initially, it is necessary to analyse aspects of the 
First Iranian Constitutional Laws (FICL, 1906). 
According to Article 8 of the FICL, " The people of the Persian Empire are to 
enjoy equal rights before the state's law". It is important to notice that the article 
said "state's law", not "law" in the full meaning (which would, in Iran, include " 
Islamic Laws". The question is why did they write "state's law"? It seems that 
the writers of the FICL did not want to discuss the issue of equal rights under 
"Islamic Laws", and so they found a form of words which would deliver 
themselves from problematic debates on the issue. 
Another point is that according to the article 8 of the FICL, not " All people have 
equal rights", but " Equal right before the law", and this may be seen as different, 
from the equality of rights. In other words, the FICL, the law would be applied 
equally to all, even if people have different legal rights. For instance, varying 
rights of women and men in the first Iranian Constitutional Laws (1906), did not 
suggest different treatment of those who act against the law. In other words, the 
law must be implemented equally across the board. There is therefore a clear 
distinction between "equality in the eyes of the law" and "equality of rights". 
'' Iranian Constitutional Laws (ICL), introduction 
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Edward Brown, the English writer of A History of the Iranian Constitutional 
Revolution" did not notice the difference between "state's law" and the "Islamic 
Laws", and translated the article as follows: " The people of Persian Empire are to 
enjoy equal rights before the law". 2 Now let us return to the ICL (1980). As we 
saw in the last chapter, there was no clear understanding about the difference 
between "Islamic community" and the concept of "nation" amongst the members 
of the AIE. Thus this uncertainty and ambiguity was reflected in the ICL. We 
shall refer to the ICL, which is officially translated by the Iranian Islamic 
Consultative Assembly. 3 It is important to point out that in some articles of the 
ICL (articles 19,20,84,56) there are two words translated with the same 
meaning. For instance the word " All people" in article 19, and the word " All 
citizens" in article 20. Article 19 of ICL says, " All people of Iran, whatever the 
ethnic group or tribe to which they belong, enjoy equal rights; and colour, race, 
language, and the like, do not bestow any privilege". 
Article 20 of ICL, "All Mellat (citizens) of the country, both men and women, 
enjoy the protection of the law and enjoy all human, political, economic, social, 
and cultural rights, in conformity with Islamic criteria". In this article "Mellat", 
means "all citizens of Iran". Consequently, according to the above article 
Muslims (or Shi'ah Muslims) and non-Muslim citizens of Iran would not have 
different rights. 
But attention to the other articles of the ICL, and also reading the discussions of 
the AIE (1980), make it clear that the expression "all citizens of Iran" was not 
used properly and specifically according to its true meaning. For instance, 
2 Browne, Edward G. 1910, P 374 
3 The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
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according to Article 12, the Shi'ah Athena Ashari, is the official religion of Iran. 
Article 12: "The official religion of Iran is Islam and the Twelver Ja'fari school (in 
usul al-Din and Fiqh), and this principle will remain eternally immutable. Other 
Islamic schools, including the Hanaft, Shafi'I, Maliki, Hanbali, and Zaydi, are to 
be accorded full respect, and their followers are free to act in accordance with 
their own jurisprudence in performing their religious rites. These schools enjoy 
official status in matters pertaining to religious education, affairs of personal 
status (marriage, divorce, inheritance, and wills) and related litigation in courts of 
law. In regions of the country, where Muslims following any one of these schools 
of Fiqh constitute the majority local regulations, within the bounds of the 
jurisdiction of local councils, are to be in accordance with the respective school of 
Fiqh, without infringing upon the rights of the followers of other schools". 
Therefore, there are not identical rights amongst all Iranian Muslims. 
Again, according to Article 13, the only recognized religious minorities are 
Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Christian. Therefore, according to the above articles, the 
ICL did not accept the equality of all religions. By comparing articles 12 and 19, 
it can be clearly seen that the meaning of the "people" or "citizens of Iran" in the 
ICL is ambiguous and it was referring to " Islamic Community" rather than 
"people" or "citizens of Iran". 
Another important point is the interpretation of the expression " and the like" in 
Article 19. Why it is not clearly written as "in all cases" which could include 
equality in religion, genders and so on? Here for more clarification of the roots of 
the issue, we refer to the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" (UDHR). 
Article 2 of the UDHR declares "Every one is entitled to equally enjoy all the 
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rights and freedoms stated in the declaration irrespective of their, race, colour, 
gender, language, religion, ideology, nationality, and social status". 
Here is list showing the difference between the two articles: 
UDHR 
Race 
language 
Colour 
Social status 
Gender 
Religion 
political status 
Ideology 
Nationality 
The question is 
ICL 
Race 
language 
Colour 
Ethnic groups 
why do not all the human rights, which are listed in the UDHR, 
appear in the ICL? It seems that the reason was those who wrote the constitution 
did not believe in the equality of rights for all the people and therefore they 
omitted items five to nine above. The expression "and the like", is poorly worded 
and vague, whereas the language of constitutional law must be clear and certain. 
The conclusion must be, that the ICL, on the one hand proclaimed equal rights, yet 
on the other hand, did not accept equality in some cases. 
8.3 Sovereignty of "nation" or "leader"? 
According to Article 56 of the ICL, "Man is master of his own destiny", yet in 
Article 57, "All powers function under the supervision of the absolute Welayat Al- 
Amr". 
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Two perceptions of sovereignty are evident here. According to one, the 
sovereignty belongs to God, and then the Prophet and then the infallible Imams, 
and then the Welayat Al-Amr. According to the second one, sovereignty belongs 
to God, and then the people, with the legitimacy of power resting on the votes and 
consensus of the people. 
Figure which is printed in the first page of this chapter, shows the model of the 
state structure, according to the ICL. This model is printed in the first page of the 
English text of the Iranian Constitutional Laws. 4 
Despite the above model, according to the traditionalists' view, the legitimacy of 
power rests with the Welayat Al Amr alone. 
It seems that this contradiction reflected the ambiguity about the legitimacy of 
power embedded in The ICL. There follows a brief discussion of this issue. 
First of all, we refer to Article 56 of the ICL. This states that sovereignty belongs 
to God, and He made man master of his own social destiny. 
Article 56 " Absolute sovereignty over the world and man belongs to God, and it 
is (He) Who has made man master of his own social destiny. No one can deprive 
man of this divine right, nor subordinate it to the vested interests of a particular 
individual or group. The people are to exercise this divine right in the manner 
specified in the following articles". 
Here the ICL recognised the sovereignty of the people, but this sovereignty, is 
given by God to the people. It seems that this is the most debatable part of the 
article. God gave the people their sovereignty. But because the ordinary people 
do not know the orders and will of God, and are also unfamiliar with the Prophet's 
traditions, it follows that somebody is needed to interpret God's will and orders. 
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That is the reason for the inclusion of the next article. According to the article 57 
of the ICL, "The powers of the government in the Islamic Republic are vested in 
the legislature, the judiciary, and the executive powers, functioning under the 
supervision of the absolute Welayat AI Amr and the leadership of the Ummah, in 
accordance with the forthcoming articles of this Constitution. These powers are 
independent of each other". 
There are some important points in article 57. First: What is the meaning of the 
"absolute Welayat Al-Amr and leadership of Ummah"? Does it mean that the 
leader has all rights to do anything he pleases, as an absolute monarch has? As 
mentioned before, this was and is the faith of some Shi'ah about the leader. But 
it seems that, according to a theoretical and constitutional laws debate, the rights 
of the leader are limited in the ICL, because: 
If the leader has absolute power, then there is no need for Constitutional Laws If 
the leader has absolute power, what is the meaning of this sentence in Article 56 
of the ICL "God made man master of his own destiny"? Again, if the leader has 
absolute power, what is the meaning of Article 6 of the ICL, which indicates that: 
" In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the affairs of the country must be administered 
on the basis of public opinion"? If the rights of the leader were unlimited, then 
the Iranian State cannot accurately be named a "Republic". Also Article 57, 
stated " in accordance with the forthcoming articles of this constitution". If the 
power of the leader has to be in accordance with the Islamic Constitutional Laws, 
it cannot therefore be accurately regarded as unlimited. In Article 110, the 
Constitution listed all the rights of the leader. This means that, the rights of the 
leader are limited to the list appearing in Article 110. 
° The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
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If the power of the leader were unlimited, then there are huge areas of the ICL that 
contradict the view that his powers are unlimited, for instance, the rights of the 
nation are enshrined in the ICL and as long as the people have any rights, the 
power of the ruler ipso facto has some limitation. 
But in spite this, it is stated in the Iranian Constitutional Laws that the leader has 
"Absolute supervision" over all powers. Therefore the important question 
remains, what is the meaning of "absolute supervision over all powers"? Why was 
this article which contradicts some other articles in the ICL written and 
promulgated? 
Even now these important questions inspire serious debate in Iran. For instance, 
an editorial about the absolute power of the leader appeared in "Keyhan", a daily 
newspaper widely read in Iran. 5 According to this editorial, "Islamic society needs 
Islamic government, and Islamic government needs Islamic Laws, and for 
fulfilling Islamic Laws, it is necessary to have the infallible Imam, and in the 
absence of the infallible Imam, the Welayat Faqih is the leader of the Islamic 
Society. The leader has all rights, which were in the hands of the infallible Imam. 
His power is not limited to laws". 
If the leader does not have absolute power, then what is the meaning of the 
absolute power of the Welayat Faqih in the Constitutional Laws? 6 The opposite 
opinion asked" If the leader has absolute power, what is the meaning of "Islamic 
Republic of Iran"? 7 Thus we see there were two diametrically opposed attitudes 
towards the interpretation of the "Absolute power of the leader", and these two 
views reflect the real contradiction in the Iranian Constitutional Laws. On the 
s Keyhan, 4.10.1375/ 25.12.1997. Tehran. Iran 
6 Keyhan, 4.10.1375/ 25.12.1997. Tehran. Iran 
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one hand the laws assert the rights of the people to be masters of their own 
destiny, and on the other hand, the leader has absolute power. Both views are 
found in the ICL. This contradiction is enshrined in the ICL, but it is important to 
analyse its roots, the reasons behind it. Here it will be dealt with briefly, and 
there will be discussion on the issue. 
8.4 Solution of the FICL (1906) to the disagreement between the two 
Houses of Parliament. 
According to article 94 of the ICL, "All legislation passed by the Islamic 
Consultative Assembly must be sent to the Guardian Council. The Guardian 
Council must review it within a maximum of ten days from its receipt with a view 
to ensuring its compatibility with the criteria of Islam and the Constitution". 
Thus, according to the ICL, it follows that the Guardian Council can reject any 
legislation, which according to their interpretation, is not compatible with Islam. 
In fact there were some occasions when the Guardian Council did reject the 
proposed legislation of The Islamic Consultative Assembly. 
In such a case, the ICA was to reconsider the legislation, and then return it to the 
GC(Article 94). A certain disagreement occurred between The Guardian Council 
and The Islamic Consultative Assembly, and it turned out that there was no article 
in the ICL which had predicted such a problem. Therefore this problem 
remained, without any legal solution. Because of the importance of the issue, it 
will be dealt with first. 
8.4.1 Historical context of this disagreement: 
7 Asr ma, No 61,19-10-75/ 9-1-1998 
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The First Iranian Constitutional Laws [hereafter FICL](1906) 
According to article 48 of the FICL, ( approved in 1948) in the case of 
disagreement between The National Consultative Assembly and the Senate, there 
would be a third Assembly composed of members of the senate and members of 
The National Consultative Assembly. 
Article 48 of the FICL (1906): " If any proposal, after undergoing criticism and 
revision in the Senate, be referred by a minister to The National Consultative 
Assembly, and be not accepted, such disputed proposal shall, in the case of its 
being of importance, be reconsidered by a third assembly composed of members 
of The Senate and members of The National Consultative Assembly elected in 
equal moieties by members of the two Assemblies. 
The decision of this [third] Assembly shall be read out in the National Council. If 
it were accepted, well and good. If not, a full account of the matter shall be 
submitted to the Royal Presence, and should the Royal judgement support the 
view of the National Consultative Assembly, it shall become effective; but if not, 
orders will be issued for a fresh discussion and investigation". 
There is a rational and legal observation to be made about the above solution. 
This concerns the fact that according to Article 46 of the FICL, all proposals had 
to be passed by both houses of parliament, namely The Consultative Assembly 
Council and The Senate. The Senate comprised sixty members, thirty of them 
nominated by the Shah, and thirty by the nation. All its proposals were to be 
approved by the Shah. The following shows the FICL solution in brief: 
In the case of agreement between the two Houses of Parliament, the legislation 
was to be passed to the Shah, and on the Shah's approval, it would become law. 
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In the case of disagreement between the two Houses of Parliament, if the Shah 
supported the view of the National Consultative Assembly, it could be passed as 
law. 
In the case of disagreement between the two parliaments, if the Shah supported the 
view of the Senate, then the proposal should be left in abeyance for six months. 
The result of the above solution is that, because half of the Senate members were 
chosen by the Shah, in fact should he agree with the Senate, and be opposed to the 
National Consultative Assembly, it follows that there would be no agreement 
between the two Houses. But when the Shah agreed with the National 
Consultative Assembly, it was considered that his view could be regarded as the 
views of the Senate as well. In fact, according to the Article 48 of the FICL, the 
view of the Shah was considered to be the same as the view of the Senate, because 
he chose half of them. 
8.5 Lack of solution in the ICL for possible disagreement between ICA and 
GC 
8.5.1 Context of ICA and GC 
After The Iranian Revolution (1979), the issue of "land reform" was a source of 
widespread contention. The debate was about the fact that the justice which was 
promised by the revolution was seen to be one of the essential tasks of the 
revolutionary government. People were complaining about class distinctions, and 
some were expecting houses, employment and so on. 
In April 1980, The Revolutionary Council approved a law. According to this law, 
there was to be some limitation to ownership. Excess to this limitation was to be 
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shared out amongst people who were in need. 8 After the passing of this law, land 
seizure increased. Some landowners and clergymen complained. Supreme 
Ayatollah Golpaygani announced that the land reform law contravened Islamic 
Laws. 
The majority of the Guardian Council, were opposed to the law. Ayatollah 
Khomeini, in November 1980, ordered a postponement of the ratification of the 
law. But the problem remained unsolved. The Speaker of the Islamic 
Consultative Assembly stated that, if social justice were not pursued, the Islamic 
goals regarding justice would not be achieved. The speaker of the Islamic 
Consultative Assembly asked Ayatollah Khomeini to find a solution to this 
problem, and said that land reform, the use of urban land, and the control of 
commodity prices in the markets were extremely pressing problems and needed to 
be addressed most urgently. 9 
Finally these issues were referred to Ayatollah Khomeini, as problems for which 
there was no legal solution. Ayatollah Khomeini responded to the problems by 
presenting new religious views. He indirectly acknowledged the need for 
Parliament, on occasion, to utilise "Secondary ruling" in order to resolve pressing 
social issues. According to his religious view, Parliament might better persuade 
the Guardian Council that a condition of overriding necessity existed and required 
legislation if it were to approve the relevant laws by a two-thirds majority rather 
than a simple majority. '0 
"Secondary ruling" means that in the case of emergencies, the Islamic Laws can 
remain unfulfilled, as for instance, if a person is hungry, and he cannot find 
s Keyhan, 20, Mehr 1360 (12 Oct 1981) 
9 Ibid. 
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anything to eat, and he is in danger of dying of hunger, then according to the 
"Secondary Ruling" of Islamic Laws, he can eat things which under normal 
circumstances are forbidden. 
The religious verdict of Ayatollah Khomeini brought about some progress but the 
problem was not resolved because the Guardian Council had been set up in such a 
way that it was expected to act in accordance with his opinions, and yet the 
members of the Guardian Council did not see social pressures as a justification for 
putting Islamic Laws to one side. The Guardian Council was in fact, in 
disagreement with Ayatollah Khomeini. 
In spite of Khomeini's new religious verdict, further new questions arose regarding 
the capacity of the Islamic Laws to resolve social problems. 
After the above event, Ayatollah Khomeini announced an important and new 
religious verdict, which was, for a supreme Ayatollah of Shi'ah, a major turning 
point in the perception of the concept of "state". 
According to this religious verdict: "Concerning the protection of the Islamic 
Government: any act which by not acting would cause disorder in the 
government, any necessary action which by not acting would lead to corruption, 
and every act which by not acting would lead to impediment, a majority of the 
members of the Islamic Consultative Assembly has the right to pass ( the relevant) 
law and put it into effect. ". 
The religious title of this verdict is "E'mal Velayat", which means using the force 
of Welayat for fulfilling Islamic Laws. 
According to the standpoint presented by Ayatollah Khomeini, a majority of the 
Islamic Consultative Assembly now had the right to pass laws, without the 
10 Khomeini, R. Sahif-hi Nur. Volume 15, P 188 
226 
supervision of the Guardian Council. This religious verdict was a milestone in 
the history of religion-political thought in Iran. It meant that Ayatollah Khomeini, 
a supreme Ayatollah in Shiah Islam and the Welayat Faqhih of the day, accepted 
that Islamic Laws, at least in some cases, could not resolve all the issues 
confronting an Islamic Government. It recognised that the Fiqh needed some 
new rulings regarding the people's affairs. In addition, according to this 
milestone verdict, the members of parliament, despite their tendency to have little 
knowledge of Islamic Laws or Fiqh, have the right to pass laws without the 
supervision of the Guardian Council. It was a new and exceptionally significant 
development in the way concepts of state and legislation were perceived. 
Despite the religious verdict, The Guardian Council was opposed to it, and in fact 
did not follow Khomeini's order, so again the problem remained unresolved. The 
Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly stated that " Milliards of wealth is 
in the hands of those who do not pay their religious taxes, namely Khoms and 
Zakat; they have even indulged in robbery and hoarding. This is unjust, and it is 
necessary to do something. (However) our Fiqh, our Ulama's religious verdicts, 
and our Prophet's words are very rich. Our religious sources are so very rich that 
we do not need to refer to other sources, yet they (i. e. the religious sources) do not 
enable us to fulfil these laws". ' 1 
This was a new challenge to Ayatollah Khomeini himself, because, as mentioned 
in the previous chapter, he had previously upheld the traditional belief that the 
Islamic Taxes of Khoms and Zakat were sufficient for the running of Islamic 
economic affairs, but now according to the Speaker of the Consultative Assembly 
the religious sources, despite their "richness" did not provide the means by which 
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the Islamic taxes could be extracted from the coffers of those people who should 
have been paying them but were failing to do so. It followed therefore that it was 
now necessary to approve new economic laws and taxes. Also, attention was 
drawn to the fact that, despite the views on Fiqh that Khomeini had presented 
prior to the revolution, he was now prepared to accept the view that traditional 
Fiqh was inadequate for the management of the people's affairs. All these 
debates led to the new religious verdict by Khomeini, which must be seen as 
evidence of considerable evolution in traditional thought on the Islamic State and 
also on Fiqh. This will be dealt with in the next part of the study. 
8.6 Absolute supervision of leader 
8.6.1 The government expediency council 
In this part we will deal with two issues: Ayatollah Khomeini's religious verdict on 
The Government Expediency Council, and Article 112 of the ICL which refers to 
The Government Expediency Council. 
8.6.2 Religious Verdict 
In April 1980, Ayatollah Khomeini, as the leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
asked for a revision of the Iranian Constitutional Laws. This was, he said, to 
establish an Islamic assembly that was to consider the revision of the ICL. One of 
his proposals was for an assembly whose role was to determine in which 
circumstances the government could act with its priority being expediency, rather 
than adherence to Traditional Fiqh. 
The question had arisen as to who should solve the theoretical problems of Fiqh 
which, were now becoming apparent. The role of this assembly was on the one 
hand, to solve theoretical problems in the traditionalist Fiqh, and on the other 
" Keyhan (Newspaper), 5-11-1361 (25 Jan 1983) 
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hand it was (and is) to be a new source for legislation. This dual role carried with 
it certain ambiguities and contradictions about the new assembly's power and 
limitation. Additionally it must be reiterated that, according to the Fuqaha's long 
held views, the legitimacy of power rested solely on the implementing of Islamic 
Laws, and for them Islamic Laws meant Fiqh. But after the revolution and within 
a couple of years or they realised that in order to deal effectively with the new 
affairs of the nation they did indeed need new solutions, and this was considered 
to be a justification for establishing the Expediency Council. 
8.6.3 The term "Expediency" in Islam. 
Now it is necessary to examine the Islamic definition of "Expediency". 
According to one of the most revered scholars, Mohammad Ghazzali, " 
Expediency means to supply the aims of the Divine legislator (Shar'aa), and the 
aim of the Shar'aa is the care of religion, life, wisdom, generation and the 
property of the man" (i. e, to establish the means by which the aims can be 
accomplished. ) 12 
In other words, in Islam, what is for the benefit of the individual and society can 
be defined as "Expediency". 
When, according to the Fuqaha's analysis, it was proved that society needs 
government, and that the existence of a sinner government is better than a society 
with no government at all, then, 13 if the expediency and benefits of a government 
required it, it would be permitted not to fulfil the Islamic laws. "Expediency" was 
under discussion after The Iranian Revolution (1979) for two reasons. One 
reason was that no solution had been found to the case of disagreement between 
12 Ghazzali, Abu Hamed Mohammad, Almustasfay, Beirut, Daru- alfekr. P 276. Quoted in, 
Sarrami. Saifullah. Rahbord 4 Autumn 73 (Autumn 1994) p. 66. 
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the Guardian Council and The Islamic Consultative Assembly and the necessity to 
find a new modus operandi to get out of this difficulty. The other reason was that 
the new questions that had arisen, could not be dealt with through the established 
Islamic laws. The establishment of the government's authority to employ the 
principle of expediency was a new and vital solution to the problems. 
According to the new religious decrees of Ayatollah Khomeini, the Islamic 
Government was to be regarded as a part of The Prophet's fully authorised 
government. Also the authority of the Islamic Government was to take 
precedence over all secondary ordinances (ahkam-I far'iyi)14 such as prayer, 
fasting and Hajj (Pilgrimage to Mecca). Because of the importance of this religious 
verdict, here is a translation of Khomeini's entire message on this issue. This 
verdict was issued to the Friday prayer Imam, Ayatollah Khamenei, who was at 
the time the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
8.6.4 Ayatollah Khomeini's religious verdict on the authority of the Islamic 
government: 
Here is the Ayatollah Khomeini's religious verdict: 
"It seems that you are not agreed about the absolute power (full authority) of the 
Islamic Government, which is submitted from God to the most honourable 
Prophet (peace be upon him), and which has most important divine laws, and has 
priority over all primary ordinances. Your interpretation of my words, is 
completely contrary to what I said. 
As discussed in previous chapters 
14 For Khomeini Islamic government is most important divine law, and has priority over all primary 
ordinances. 
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It is not true that I believe the authority of the government is limited to the 
secondary ordinances of Islam. If the authority of the government were limited to 
the secondary ordinances then the Divine Government and the absolute power 
(full authority) submitted to the Prophet (peace be upon him) would be senseless. 
I draw your attention to what the consequences are when nobody accepts this. 
For instance, the building of a street when it is necessary to take possession of a 
house and its demesne is not within the framework of the secondary ordinances. 
"Compulsory military service, compulsory dispatch to war, the control of import 
and export currency, the prevention of the import and export of any kinds of 
goods, the prevention of hoarding except in two or three sets of circumstances, 
customs and taxes and the prevention of overcharging, putting prices on goods, 
the prevention of drug trafficking, and the prohibition of addiction except as 
regards alcohol, 15 the carrying of any kind of weapons, and hundreds of the like. 
These (all) come within the aegis of the government, but according to your 
interpretation they are outside the government's authority. 
The issue of government, which is regarded as a part of the people's full-authority, 
is one of the primary ordinances (ahkam-1 avvaliya) which has to be considered as 
taking precedence over all secondary ordinances (ahkam-1 far'iya) such as prayer, 
fasting and hajj. The Islamic government is authorised to cancel unilaterally all 
legal contracts held with the people, when these contracts are shown to oppose 
Islam and the interests of the country. The Islamic government can prevent the 
practice of any affair related to worship or non-worship as long as it is considered 
to oppose the interests of Islam. 
15 Alcohol was an exception because it was already banned under Islamic Law 
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I say explicitly that all that has been rumoured, that some Islamic economic 
agreements such as muzaraba and muzara'a would be removed according to the 
view of the full authority of the Islamic government, is not true. Had it been so, 
they would be among those issues placed under the discretion of the government. 
These are some other issues about which I do not like to disturb you". 16 
This religious verdict must be considered as a novel, unparalleled and most 
important development in Shi'ah thought on government and state. 17 Some 
consequences of this religious verdict of Ayatollah Khomeini are: 
a) The possibility of getting out of a deadlock, because according to the Fiqh 
traditionalists there had been no new solutions for new problems. 
b) Legitimacy of power does not rest only on implementation of Islamic Laws 
(Fiqh), but rests on the "National interest" and "government interest". This is a 
vital, indeed crucial, result of the verdict. 
c) The "Islamic government" has absolute power and it can suspend Islamic Laws 
in the interests of the "Islamic Community". "Islamic Government" can also 
even cancel personal religious duties such as prayer, fasting and hajj. 
d) It is the "Islamic Government" rather than any particular individual that has 
"supreme power". In fact Ayatollah Khomeini had submitted the supreme power 
(full-authority) of the Faqih to the "Islamic Government" 
e) Determination of "Expediency" was to rest with a majority of a council, 
composed of Fuqaha, specialists, ministers and high level executives of the state. 
f) Thus, determination of " Expediency" is not a matter of Fiqh which needs the 
services of the specialists in "Islamic Texts", but a matter of being conversant 
16 Khomeini, R. Sahifa-yi Nur, vol. 20,1369/1990-91, p/ 170 
17 Muntazari, 1988, p. 58 
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with national and international affairs, and with methods for implementing actions 
regarded as in the "national interest. 
8.7 Government expediency council in the Iranian constitutional laws 
The Islamic Experts, after considering Ayatollah Khomeini's religious verdict, 
approved it in Article 112 of the ICL in 1990. 
According to Article 112 of the ICL: 
" Upon the order of the leader, the Government Expediency Council shall meet at 
any time (when) the Guardian Council shall have judged a proposed bill of the 
Islamic Consultative Assembly to be contrary to the principles of Shari'ah 
(Islamic Laws) or the Constitution, and the Assembly is unable to meet the 
expectations of the Guardian Council. 
Also, the Council shall meet for consideration of any issue forwarded to it by the 
leader and shall carry out any other responsibility as mentioned in this 
Constitution. The leader shall appoint both the permanent and changeable 
members of the Council. The rules for the Council shall be formulated and 
approved by the Council members subject to confirmation by the Leader". 
According to Article 112, the Government Expediency Council has responsibility 
for the following cases: 
a: Disagreement between The Guardian Council and The Islamic 
Consultative Assembly 
b: Consultation with the Leader for delineation of the general policies of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
c: To be consultants to the Leader 
The general policies of the country are especially Expediency duties. Some 
consequences of the establishment of these duties are: 
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1) In fact by ratifying the responsibility, there would be two assemblies 
established in the Iranian Constitutional Laws; firstly the Islamic Consultative 
Assembly which, according to Article 71, is responsible for establishing laws on 
all matters and secondly, the Government Expediency Council, which is in charge 
of delineating the general policies of the country. 
2) An important issue is that there is no exact and certain definition of'general 
policies". 
3) It seems that the power of the Government Expediency Council shows the 
authority of the Faqih. Thus two major powers for legislation and supervision of 
the laws are in the hand of the leader : 
a) The Guardian Council without whose approval no laws can be passed and b) 
The Government Expediency Council. 
As mentioned before, the leader directly appoints both the GC and GEC. 
As far as this study is concerned, the enormous power of the Leader as delineated 
in the ICL, shows that, for the traditionalists, the legitimacy of power rests with 
the Leader in that ultimately almost all real power is in his hands. 
As mentioned before, the " Government Expediency Council" is a rational 
approach enabling the Islamic scholar to find answers to new questions, as a result 
of Ayatollah Khomeini realising that he could not solve some of the people's 
affairs by using the traditional Fiqh. From this point of view, it was a great step 
forward, and made the Iranian government more competent to find the right laws. 
But from another point of view, it was a new institution, which can be seen as a 
new parliament alongside the Islamic Consultative Assembly, and therefore to a 
greater or lesser extent a challenge to its power. So there was now added the 
potential for cumbersome bureaucracy or added conflict. 
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Now because of the importance of Ayatollah Khomeini's verdict we will go into 
greater detail in explaining it and its consequences. 
8.8 Absolute power of the government or the Faqih 
According to Ayatollah Khomeini's religious verdict, the power of the "Islamic 
Government" over-rides all other powers, but according to Article 57 of the ICL, 
this over-riding power belongs to the Faqih. Here Article 57 of the ICL: "The 
powers of government in the Islamic Republic are vested in the legislature, the 
Judiciary, and executive powers, functioning under the supervision of the absolute 
Welayat-i Al Amr and the leadership of the Ummah, in accordance with the 
forthcoming articles of this Constitution. These powers are independent of each 
other". 
It seems that Ayatollah Khomeini's views were based on a Fiqh text, in which the 
over-riding power belongs to the Faqih, (as discussed in the previous chapters), 
perhaps because in the past the power usually was in the hand of a Shah or single 
ruler. Nevertheless Ayatollah Khomeini pronounced his new verdict in order to 
respond to a new problem in a new situation that differed from the circumstances 
prevailing when he expressed his previous views. This indicates that he 
recognized the important and vital difference between the two times and places, 
and so, in contravention of what he said before, he pronounced that the greatest 
power belonged to the government. 
All the examples to which he referred in his verdict are in the area of what a 
government decisions, such as, determination about taxes, customs, drugs, and so 
on. Such issues arise every day and there are hundreds and hundreds of such 
issues arising for every government around the world. It would seem that the 
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practical experience of running the Islamic government created a more thorough 
understanding of what is involved in issues of state, power and government. 
Nevertheless, the difference between the definition of "Absolute power of 
government" in the Iranian Constitutional Laws and that in the text of the religious 
verdict of Ayatollah Khomeini, created a number of discussions and debates. 
According to the traditionalists' interpretation, all power belongs to the Welayat- 
Faqih; he is above the law and even above The Islamic Republic Constitution but 
according to a legal and constitutional perspective, absolute power belongs to the 
"Islamic Government", not to an individual. For instance here are the views of a 
lawyer on this issue. 
Dr Hashimi, believed that, " According to a merely legal debate, it can be 
concluded that, the absolute power" of the Welayat Faqih is a subjective aspect 
not an individual one, that is to say that, generally "Islamic Government" has the 
right to intervene in all aspects of the government's affairs, but this absolute 
power cannot prevent the rational division of power between different powers 
(executive, judiciary and legislature)". '8 
It seems that constitutional law is as an official contract between the nation and 
government and therefore it is the measure for the relationship between them; the 
interpretation of any individual or group is not as fundamental as the 
constitutional laws and therefore there is no choice except to acknowledge the 
validity and credibility of the constitutional law. 
The traditionalists however, did not agree with this point of view. For the 
traditionalists, the real and legitimate power belongs to the Leader who is the 
successor of the infallible Imam. For them, all power should be centralised in the 
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hand of the Leader, directly or indirectly. For more detail, it will be valuable to 
mention the recent interpretation of the Government Expediency Council. This 
quotation clearly shows the depth and importance of the issue. Recently the 
secretary of the Government Expediency Council gave an interview about the 
authority and rights of the GEC. 
According to his view, the GEC has the right to supervise and control all three 
main authorities; he means the executive, the judiciary and the legislature. He 
stated: 
" In fact the GEC is the centre of the country's leadership. The GEC ensures the 
country remains Islamic, on the path of the Imam (Ayatollah Khomeini). The 
leader needs experts' foundation, which plays as the eye and the intelligent mind 
of the government. The responsibility of the GEC, is not limited to the executive 
power, but includes the judiciary, the legislature, mass media, the military, and all 
spheres (concerning) the people. The leader of the government is also the leader 
of the people and the leader of the state and the leader of all state institutions. On 
this base the GEC, as the clear eyes of the government, supervises and controls 
each individual in the country, all the private and state sectors". 19 
Such an interpretation of the role of The GEC, gives it enormous power parallel 
to, and in fact in opposition to the other official and legal powers. It can also be 
seen as reverting to an "Islamic Government" as distinguished from an "Islamic 
Republican Government". 
'e Dr, Hashimi, S. M. 1993, PP 80,81 
19 Keyhan, ( daily Newspaper), 30/6/76 ( 21/9/1997) 
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After this interview, as might be expected, there was criticism of the views of the 
GEC secretary. For instance, in a magazine20 the writer makes it clear that such 
an interpretation of GEC authority is a cause for anxiety. The Speaker of the 
Iranian Parliament declared that the legitimacy of all powers and government 
institutions rests with the Welayat-I Faqih. He stated " Legitimacy of all the 
powers, inclusively - The Islamic Consultative Assembly, the Judiciary, rests with 
the Welayat-I Faqih. The Welayat-I Faqih can take back all powers which, he 
had (previously) submitted. He can also add any authority to anyone to whom he 
had previously submitted powers". 21 
It seems that the roots of such ambiguity and contradiction are to be found in the 
Iranian Constitutional Laws, because as mentioned before, the Leader has vast 
power assigned to him, and it is this that led to such an interpretation. Rational 
analysis shows that the real problem lies in the theory of legitimacy in that it has 
not as yet been clearly and commonly agreed upon or declared. 
8.9 Authority of determination 
The Fuqaha were wrestling with a novel situation which was difficult for them to 
accept. As mentioned before, they saw themselves as the only authority entitled 
to interpret Islamic texts because according to their point of view, they were the 
people who were familiar with them, yet in the Expediency Council, there were 
not only Fuqaha, but also specialists in the different branches of science and also 
highly placed administrative officers who were involved in the affairs of the 
nation. 
20 Asr-I ma, Number 80,16/7/1367 (8/10/1997) 
21 Dr, Hashimi, S, M. 1993, p. 80-81 
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For the traditionalist Shi'ah it requires a great step forward to accept that the 
affairs of the people are the field of a hundred different sciences and that 
legislation needs up-to-date knowledge in every branch of science. Yet common 
sense required that all this new knowledge was necessary in order to bring about 
legislation competent to deal with the times and circumstances in which everyone 
was now living. 
8.10 Legitimacy of power 
We have seen in the last chapter that Ayatollah Khomeini had discussed in detail 
how Islam had all the rules necessary for human beings. Even in the Assembly of 
Experts, it was accepted that Islamic Laws are so rich that there was no need to 
learn from the experiences and knowledge of other countries. We also discussed 
the idea that legitimacy of power rests on the implementation of the Fiqh, the 
Islamic Laws. But now, Ayatollah Khomeini as both a great Ayatollah, and the 
religious leader of the Islamic Revolution, had explicitly stated that, the "interest 
and expediency" of the "Islamic society and government" should be considered as 
the major criterion for the interpretation and implementation (or non- 
implementation) of any Islamic Law. This is a great step forward with 
monumental repercussions. 
The example Ayatollah Khomeini cited in his religious verdict refers to the type of 
day to day common or garden matter that concerns all governments around the 
world. But it had repercussions for the role of traditional Fiqh, because the 
background of the Fiqh referred to the Muslim affairs of the past, when there were 
no complicated industrial societies like we have today. What Ayatollah Khomeini 
accepted was not as a response for every problem. What he in fact did, was to lay 
the foundation for a new criterion to be employed when interpreting or using the 
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traditional Fiqh. It was important, too, that what he presented was within the 
framework of traditional Fiqh, despite the fact that any Islamic Law could, if 
expediency required it, be put aside for the greater good. Because he had 
presented this verdict within the framework of Fiqh itself, it was difficult if not 
impossible for the Traditionalists to oppose it. 
8.11 Contradictions in the ICL 
Although Ayatollah Khomeini's verdict made some progress regarding the Islamic 
(Shi'ah) Fiqh, it also created some contradictions. These contradictions reflected 
into the Iranian Constitutional Laws. Here some of these contradictions will be 
discussed. 
8.11.1 Contradiction between national and state sovereignty 
According to the Ayatollah Khomeini's verdict, the Islamic Government has the 
right to intervene even in the personal and private religious worship of the people, 
such as prayer, fasting and hajj. This kind of absolute power can be seen to be 
very dangerous for a society, particularly if we pay attention to a missing point in 
his view, and that point is the right of the people to supervise and control Islamic 
Government. 
Another important point is that, the interpretation of the "National and 
government Expediency" is so wide and open-ended. Every government can 
make a model for itself, just as every critic of a government's action can be 
considered as a threat to the expediency of government. 
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Another vital criticism of Ayatollah Khomeini's verdict is his vision of the 
"Holiness" of the "Islamic Government". He defined the Islamic Government as 
"The Government of the Prophet" (Peace be upon him)". It is clear that such a 
picture of Islamic Government can create an irrational and unrealistic conception 
of Islamic Government. In a government viewed in this way, the government 
may see itself as infallible and holy, as may the people. The outcome could well 
be that nobody would dare to oppose it. Such a vision damages and could 
perhaps destroy the rational relationship between government and nation, and also 
render people indifferent to their social affairs and destiny. 
As mentioned before, according to Article 56 of the ICL, "Sovereignty over the 
world and man belongs to God, and it is He Who has made man master of his own 
social destiny". But in Article 57, The Iranian Constitutional Laws expatiate on 
the absolute power of the Welayat-I Al Amr, although this clearly contradicts 
Article 56. 
Now, after the above discussion about the absolute power of the "Islamic 
Government" according to the view presented by Ayatollah Khomeini, the roots of 
this contradiction can be clarified. 
8.11.2 Contradiction between Absolute Power and Constitution 
Can Islamic Government undermine the Constitution? According to Article 9 of 
the ICL, the Islamic Government has no authority to abrogate legitimate freedoms 
even by enacting laws and regulations. 
Article 9 of the ICL: " In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the freedom, independence, 
unity, and territorial integrity of the country are inseparable from one another, and 
their preservation is the duty of the government and all individual citizens. No 
individual, group or authority, has the right to infringe in the slightest way upon 
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the political, cultural, economic, and military independence or the territorial 
integrity of Iran under the pretext of exercising freedom. Similarly, no authority 
has the right to abrogate legitimate freedoms, not even by enacting laws and 
regulations for the independence and territorial integrity of the country". 
Also there are other articles in the ICL, which clearly oppose the absolute power 
of the government. Here we will discuss some of these articles. According to 
the introduction of the ICL, the Constitution rejects all forms of tyranny and 
economic monopoly. Here is part of the introduction to the ICL on "form of 
Government": 
"With due attention to the essential character of this great movement, the 
Constitution guarantees the rejection of all forms of intellectual and social tyranny 
and economic monopoly, and aims at entrusting the destinies of the people to the 
people themselves in order to break completely with the system of oppression. 
(This is in accordance with the Qur'anic verse " He removes from them their 
burdens and the fetters that were upon them". (Qur'an, 7.157) 
Then the introduction continues "This goal cannot be obtained without the active 
and broad participation of all segments of society in the process of social 
development". 
Furthermore it states " In this way, during the course of human development 
towards perfection, each individual will himself be involved in, and responsible 
for the growth, advancement, and leadership of society". 
According to Article 6 of the ICL, "The affairs of the country must be 
administered on the basis of public opinion". 
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Therefore, if public opinion is the basis of an administration, what is the role of 
the Leader? And if full authority belongs to the leader, what is the role of the 
public? 
By attention to Article 6 of The ICL, this contradiction can be further illustrated. 
Article 6 of the ICL: 
"In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the affairs of the country must be administered on 
the basis of public opinion expressed by the means of elections, including the 
election of the president, the representatives of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, 
and the members of councils, or by means of referenda in matters specified in 
other article of this Constitution". 
According to Article 7 of the ICL, "The councils are the decision-making and 
administrative organs of the country". 
Thus there is a major question as to how on the one hand, the people are: 
a: The individuals (who) will themselves be involved in, and responsible 
for the growth, advancement, and leadership of society ( introduction of the ICL) 
b: The masters of their destiny (article 56 of ICL) 
c: The affairs of the country must be administered according to public 
opinion( Article 6 of ICL) 
d: The councils are the decision-making organs of the country (article 7 of 
ICL) yet on the other the absolute power belongs to the Leader and the Islamic 
Jurists 
It is reasonable to conclude that the Islamic Experts who were responsible for 
writing the Iranian Constitutional Laws in 1989, did not recognise these 
contradictions, and without attention to the whole of the Constitution, inserted the 
phrase " Absolute power" in the Article 57. Also it can be concluded that the 
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power of the leader is limited by the Constitution, and his power is not, as 
traditionalists believed, unlimited. This conclusion is based on the Iranian 
Constitutional Laws, also on the religious verdict of the Ayatollah Khomeini, 
which was presented to resolve a theoretical problem. Finally the Iranian 
Constitutional Law contained some contradictions which came from the nature 
and the result of Ayatollah Khomeini's theory of government. 
8.11.3 Contradiction between Islamic jurists and "nation" opinion 
As a result of the duality in the ICL, there are different authorities and different 
decision-makers, with the potential to pull against each other in a 
counterproductive way which might not be for the national good. For instance, 
while according to the article 6 and 7 of the ICL, public opinion is the basis of the 
country's affairs, the Guardian Council, according to the article 4, has right to 
reject any laws which, according their belief, contravene Islamic laws (Fiqh). 
Article 4 of the ICL states that: " All civil, penal, financial, economic, 
administrative, cultural, military, political and other laws and regulations must be 
based on Islamic criteria. This principle applies absolutely and generally to all 
articles of Constitution as well as to all other laws and regulations, and the 
Fuqaha of the Guardian Council are judges in this matter. 
As mentioned before, Islamic Laws can be interpreted in many different ways and 
to solve the potential problem, the constitution allows for the perception of the 
majority (four out of six members) of the Guardian Council to be the decisive 
factor. Thus it can be argued with considerable justification that it is a majority in 
the six man Guardian Council that governs all the affairs of the country and not 
the opinions of the public. 
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8.11.4 Stability of the Constitution and the authority of the GC 
The authority of the Guardian Council is so wide and so ambiguous that it can be 
said that the whole of The ICL is in their hands. This study has already discussed 
the reason for this authority. Now it seems that the Islamic Experts who had been 
responsible for the writing of The ICL, had found themselves in an extremely 
challenging situation. On the one hand they believed that legislation is the right 
of the Fuqaha, and on the other hand the Islamic Revolution was in large part the 
result of the people's struggle and sacrifice. They knew that without the people's 
support and without supplying the people's needs they could have no right to 
govern the country. The Islamic Experts had been looking to find a mid way 
between two theories, the idea of democracy, and the idea of Islamic legislation. 
It was for these reasons and in these circumstances, that they gave the right of 
election to the people, and then reserved the right for the Fuqaha (GC) to decide 
about the compatibility of the laws with the Islamic criteria. 
Here follows one of the most contentious articles of the ICL, about the authority 
of The Guardian Council. According to Article 4 of The ICL, The Guardian 
Council has the responsibility of assessing the compatibility of the Constitution 
with the Islamic criteria. In fact a simple majority (four out of the six members of 
The GC) has the right to pass judgement, even about the Constitution itself. In 
another words about seventy Islamic Experts gathered to write the Iranian 
Constitutional Laws in 1980. They were given the responsibility of writing a 
Constitution that was in accordance with "Islamic Criteria". Meanwhile they 
inserted an article stating that a majority of the Guardian Council has the 
responsibility of judging whether the Constitution is written according to Islamic 
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criteria or not. This creates a vicious circle, and a clear paradox, or ambiguity, or 
contradiction. 
It is clear that the constitution is regarded as an official contract between nation 
and government, and it must be both strong and stable. But Article 4 of the ICL 
rendered the Constitution weak and unstable, because such a small number of 
people and those people nominated by the Leader (viz. four out of the six 
members of the Guardian Council) can reject any articles of the Constitution. 
The duality, which is in the text of the ICL, became apparent on various 
occasions, and Article 4 is one of the most important examples of this duality. 
Some lawyers believed that the authority of the Guardian Council regarding 
accepting or rejecting any aspect of the Constitution is limited and only referred to 
the time when the Constitution was being written. Dr Hashimi, discussed the 
consequences of Article 4. He believed that according to a logic of discussion, 
the right of the Guardian Council could not be interpreted as referring to laws that 
had already been ratified. Hence after the Constitution itself had been approved 
by the Guardian Council, the council could not later disapprove of it and change 
it. If this were not the case, according to his analysis, the situation could lead to 
disaster for the legal organ of the country, and there would be great risk to the 
stability of the laws and the society. 
22 
8.11.5 Vicious circle: appointed to be elected 
The Guardian Council is directly appointed by the Leader and they are responsible 
for supervising the election of the Leadership Experts and the Leadership Experts 
are responsible for the supervision of the Leadership. Clearly this creates a 
22 Hashimi, S, M. 1993. P 326-328 
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vicious circle. According to the Article 99 of the ICL, " The Guardian Council 
has responsibility for supervising the elections of the Assembly for Leadership the 
President of the Republic, the Islamic Consultative Assembly, and the direct 
recourse to popular opinion and referenda". 
The Leadership's Experts, according to Article 111, have the responsibility of: 
a: electing the Leader 
b: dismissing the Leader in the case of his losing his qualifications 
c: Dismissing the Leader in the case of his becoming incapable of fulfilling his 
duties 
d: Electing a Leader in the case of the death or resignation of the Leader. 
The Leadership Experts then, have responsibility for supervising the Leadership 
although of course, not completely. But it is important to be aware that the 
Guardian Council, which is directly appointed by the leader, supervises the 
election of the Leadership Experts. 
Even more tellingly, according to Article 108 of the ICL, the Guardian Council 
has the legal responsibility of establishing the required qualifications and number 
of Leadership Experts. 
Article 108 of the ICL: " The law setting out the number and qualifications of the 
experts [mentioned in the preceding article], the mode of their election, and the 
code of procedure regulating the session during the first term must be drawn up by 
the Fuqaha in the first Guardian Council, passed by a majority of votes and then 
finally approved by the Leader of Revolution. The power to make any 
subsequent change or approval of all provisions concerning the duties of the 
experts is vested in themselves". 
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8.11.6 Paradox: sovereignty of the people and approval of the ICL 
candidates by GC 
According to the articles 6 and 7 of the ICL, the people's affairs must be 
administered by public opinion. Also, article 56 states that people must be the 
masters of their own destiny. These articles form a basis for all decision-making 
processes. According to article 6, elections are the means of materialising the 
aims of popular opinions, but according to article 99 of the ICL, "the Guardian 
Council has responsibility of supervising the elections of the Assembly of Experts 
for Leadership the Islamic Consultative Assembly, and the direct recourse to 
popular opinion and referenda". 
The lawful interpretation of the word "supervision" in article 99 is that the 
"Guardian Council" has the duty to ensure that the elections are conducted 
lawfully and free from fraud and corruption. A second interpretation may 
additionally include the right of the GC to challenge candidates' political and 
ideological credentials. The latter may be regarded as a subjective and somewhat 
biased process resulting in undesirable consequences. This has been the case 
since the revolution, the latest example being the parliament's by-elections in 
1998, where the GC rejected two thirds of the candidates, some of whom had been 
members of the Islamic Consultative Assembly previously. 
According to article 98 of the ICL, however, the interpretation of the Iranian 
Constitution Laws is also vested in the Guardian Council. This article states that 
"The authority of the interpretation of the Constitution is vested with the Guardian 
Council, which is to be done with the consent of three-fourths of its members". 
The GC, as the appointed interpreter of the ICL, consequently claims that it has 
the right to challenge the political and ideological credentials of all candidates. In 
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other words, it claims that the second interpretation of the term "supervision" is 
valid. This claim is in clear contrast with articles 6,7 and 56 of the ICL, as it 
excludes public opinion and the people's role in determining their destiny, and 
places huge authority in the hands of a few Islamic jurists. 
This paradox and all other paradoxes in the ICL which were explained earlier stem 
from a fundamental duality in the foundations of the beliefs of those who wrote 
the Iranian Constitution. As mentioned before the two contrary foundations of 
the ICL are : 
a: Implementation of the Fiqh with the right of interpretation of the ICL 
by Islamic Jurists (GC) 
b: Administration of the public affairs according to public opinion 
It is the view of the author here that the first interpretation of GC's supervisory 
role is a more logical and more lawful interpretation, which does not include the 
right to assess candidate's political and ideological credentials. It must be said 
that the above mentioned paradoxes are not criticism of the members of the GC. 
They merely highlight shortcomings within the ICL, itself. 
8.12 Conclusion 
One of the major topics of debate among Muslims is the question of whether 
within Islam there is a place for both timeless laws and changeable laws. This 
debate has proved to be central to the issue of whether or not there are 
contradictions in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and if so, the 
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reasons for the contradictions. In Iran religious and political theories are 
inextricably linked and must be discussed together. 
The original religio-political standpoint regarding all religio-political aspects of 
government was that of the traditionalist Ulama who believed that Islamic Laws 
must be implemented under any conditions and in all circumstances. Subsequent 
to the ensuing debate amongst the Ulama and other interested parties, three 
differing conclusions were reached; 
1): The view of the Traditionalists, that Islamic Laws must be fulfilled come what 
may. 
2): The view of the neo-Traditionalists, that Islamic Laws could evolve within the 
framework of Fiqh. 
3): The view of the Revivalists (like Dr. Shariati), that evolution of Islamic laws is 
permissible and should be based on the main principals of Islam, viz,. The Holy 
Qur'an and Sunnah. 
In this work we have focussed on the first two of these views. 
As a result of our investigations, it can be concluded that two major factors 
influenced the evolution in Shi'ah thought. The first was access, however limited 
it may have been, to the knowledge, experiences and practice in other countries. 
The second was the Ulamas' increasing awareness of the changes in the social and 
economic circumstances of the nation. These changes included industrial and 
technological development and of course, the emergence of the mass media (of 
which more later). 
Na'ini provided an example of an Ulim (learned man) who was familiar with 
western ideas of constitutional government and whose contribution to the debate 
thus contained some new perspectives on the issue.. Khomeini before the 
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revolution (1979) took the same view as the Traditionalists, but after the 
revolution, and with experience of government, he was able to suggest some new 
views which were very telling and, indeed, vital for the evolution of Islamic 
thought. 
Between the first Iranian Revolution (1906) and the Islamic Revolution of 1979, 
there was a long period of stagnation with very little evolution in Shi'ah thought. 
The Traditional Shi'ah Ulama continued to adhere to their long held views about 
the legitimacy of power and the role of the people, in which the people had 
effectively no role except to obey. 
8.12.1 Evolution, in the theories of the Shi'ah thought 
There was however a certain amount of limited development in Shi'ah scholarly 
thought during the intervening 70 odd years and much more after the 1979 
revolution. There were changes in Shiah scholarly views on three topics of major 
relevance to this study: 
A: The divine laws 
B: The divine ruler 
C: The role of the people 
Divine laws: Before the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, almost all Shi'ah 
scholars believed that the legitimacy of the Islamic government rested on the 
implementation of the Islamic Laws, by which they meant the Fiqh. Fiqh had 
been built up over the centuries to respond to the Muslims' need to know how to 
behave in the Islamically correct manner in matters that were, in the main, of a 
personal nature . We found that after the Islamic Revolution the conception of 
Fiqh, the areas in which it could successfully be employed and also the power of 
the interpreter (Faqih) went through far-reaching changes. 
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Within the Fuqaha, Ayatollah Khomeini was in the forefront of this ideological 
revolution. He once stated that a Faqih who does not know his time and place is 
not a Faqih. This view was diametrically opposed to the classic conception of 
Fiqh and Faqih. According to the classical conception, the study of the old books 
in the Islamic Academies was the only way to become conversant with Islamic 
laws, and anything other than such sources and methods of learning were 
innovation (bidat) and hence deviation from Islam. 
Khomeini's theory of the Ea'mal Welayat (implementation of Welayat), which 
resulted in the decree that a two-thirds majority in parliament gave parliament the 
right to pass a law without the supervision of the Guardian Council, brought about 
a revolutionary change by limiting the role of traditional Fiqh. More importantly, 
his verdict regarding "Expediency" provided the potential for a complete 
metamorphosis in Shiah scholastic thought and practice. The creation of the 
"Government Expediency Council" created a completely new body with the power 
and authority to unravel the deadlock created when there was a mismatch between 
the provisions of traditional Fiqh and the reality of contemporary questions and 
problems. Today the legitimacy of power rests not only on the implementation of 
the Islamic Laws, but also and more importantly on what is expeditious for the 
country and Islam at a given time or in given and possibly novel circumstances. 
Attitudes towards such issues as women's rights, women's sports, the right of 
women to be judges, the Islamically correct attitude to music, the rights of non- 
Muslims within the society, etc, are changing and these issues are being 
approached in new ways. There is as yet some ground to be made up before the 
level of international understanding of human rights is reached, but compared with 
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the classical thought of the Shi'ah Fuqaha, outstanding steps forward are being 
taken. 
Today the Iranian newspapers and magazines explicitly discuss issues concerning 
the sovereignty of the people and even the limitation of the power of the 
leadership Ayatollah Muntazari, who has written several books defending the 
Welayat- Faqih, has now explicitly stated that nobody is above the law and that 
the Constitution must be considered as the basis of the contract between people 
and government. 23 
The impact upon the government of the complexity and novelty of national affairs 
and its need to find a practicable modus operandi for dealing with them was a 
major cause of these developments. Before the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the 
Fuqaha were a minority in that they lacked real power and were not involved with 
the practical reality of society's needs. Because of this, their Islamic verdicts had 
been found mainly as solutions to questions arising from the individual Muslim's 
need to find the religiously correct way of conducting his or her life. After the 
1979 Islamic Revolution the Fuqaha had the responsibility of running the country. 
They had power but lacked the appropriate range of regulations or skills to 
administer the state competently. At the same time, the sciences had developed 
to the point where they could provide practicable, new and better approaches to 
many national issues. There was therefore found to be no option but to accept the 
findings of science and employ them in government 
23 Ayatollah Muntazari, in his Congratulatory message to the new President of Iran, Mr, 
Khatami. 5-3-1376 ( 1997/5/26) 
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8.12.2 Ambiguities and contradictions in the Constitution 
The constitution created several bodies as sources for legislation. In spite of 
some provisions designed to prevent the overlap or duplication of responsibilities 
between them, overlap between these bodies is in effect written into the 
Constitution. This overlap of responsibilities has resulted in the different 
legislative bodies setting up some parallel institutions in the country, whose 
responsibilities duplicate each other. This has caused some confrontations 
between different bodies and institutions and also creates financial waste. The 
official sources of legislation in the Constitution are: 
1. The Leadership 
2. The Government Expediency Council 
3. The Islamic Consultative Assembly 
4. The Supreme Council for National Security 
It can be said that the evolution in religio-political theory has itself produced some 
ambiguities and that new solutions for resolving these ambiguities have been 
found. The main reason for the ambiguities lies in a key paradox or 
contradiction. The problem is the reference to the right of the citizens to elect 
their own government going hand in hand with the insistence that the Islamic 
Jurists are to supervise all national affairs. There could be no compromise 
between the two contradictory views, i. e,. the insistence on public power and the 
requirement for the sovereignty of the Islamic jurists. The Iranian Constitutional 
Laws reflect this fundamental contradiction. Even now, twenty years after the 
Islamic Revolution this contradiction inspires heated debate. 
There were five Islamic Jurists in the first national assembly in Iran (1906) who 
were to assess the Islamic validity of proposed laws and supervise the passing of 
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the laws by parliament. This provision was the solution found to accommodate 
the two above mentioned approaches of the legislation. In practice, however, it 
did not happen. The five jurists stayed away. 
The 1907 constitution also found a way of solving the contentious issue of the 
divine right of the sovereign, (the Shah). According to its definition, the sovereign 
was not the representative of God, but sovereignty was a trust conferred (as a 
divine gift) by the people to the person of the Shah (Article 35 of the 
Supplementary of the Constitutional Laws)(1907). The sovereignty was a Divine 
gift, but having conferred the divine gift, the people submitted to the sovereign. 
In the 1979 Iranian Constitutional Laws too, the Leader, as a Welayat amr, is 
considered to be the representative of the Hidden Imam, but is (indirectly) elected 
by the people. This state of affairs created new ambiguities, and hence more 
problems. The main cause of this is again the duality in the approach of the ICL. 
On the one hand the Constitution accepted certain new ideas such as the franchise, 
the people's sovereignty, the presidency, separation of powers, etc., but on the 
other hand there was the requirement to recognise classical and traditional 
concepts such as the absolute power of the leader, the sovereignty of the Islamic 
jurists, and the necessity to implement Islamic Fiqh, etc. 
Contention arose according to which articles in the constitution people chose to 
refer to. By reference to some of the articles people can assert the sovereignty of 
the people while by reference to other articles, people can conclude that the Leader 
or the Islamic jurists have absolute power. An illustration of this dichotomy 
follows. According to what is printed on the first page of the ICL, officially 
printed by the government, the centre and the main power belongs to the people. 
An examination of the constitution, however, makes it clear that the main power 
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and sources of the power are in the hands of the Leader and the Islamic Jurists. 
The rights of the Leader in Article 110 of the ICL are listed thus: 
The following are the duties and powers of the Leadership: 
1. Delineation of the general policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran after 
consultation with the Nation's Expediency Council. 
2. Supervision over the proper execution of the general policies of the system. 
3. Issuing decrees for national referenda. 
4. Assuming supreme command of armed forces. 
5. Declaration of war and peace, and the mobilization of armed forces. 
6. Appointment, dismissal, and acceptance of resignation of: 
7. The Fuqaha on the Guardian Council. 
8. The supreme judicial authority of the country. 
9. The head of the radio and television network of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
10. The chief of the joint staff. 
11. The chief commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps. 
12. The supreme commanders of the armed forces. 
13. Resolving differences between the three wings of the armed forces and 
regulation of their relations. 
14. Resolving problems, which cannot be solved by conventional methods, through 
the Nation's Expediency Council. 
15. Signing the decree formalizing the election of the President of the Republic by 
the people. 
16. The suitability of candidates for the Presidency of the Republic, with respect to 
the qualifications specified in the Constitution, must be confirmed before elections 
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take place by the Guardian Council, and, in the case of the first term [of the 
Presidency], by the Leadership; 
17. Dismissal of the President of the Republic, with due regard for the interests of 
the country, after the Supreme Court hold him guilty of the violation of his 
constitutional duties, or after a vote of the Islamic Consultative Assembly 
testifying to his incompetence on the basis of Article 89 of the Constitution. 
18. Pardoning or reducing the sentences of convicts, within the framework of 
Islamic criteria, on a recommendation [to that effect] from the Head of judiciary 
power. 
The Leader may delegate part of his duties and powers to another person. " 
Thus it can be concluded that the main sources of many theoretical and practical 
confrontations in Iran lie within the Constitution itself. Additionally it seems that 
the main reason for the contradiction in the Constitution is to be found in 
Ayatollah Khomeini's theory of the Islamic State. 
Several Sources for Legislation 
The ICL establishes several bodies with responsibility regarding legislation. 
Despite certain provisions designed to prevent interference between and 
duplication of the responsibilities of different bodies, there remains some overlap. 
This overlap has resulted in the setting up of parallel institutions by the different 
bodies and some confrontations between them have ensued. A waste of financial 
resources has also been one of the results. The official sources for legislation are: 
1) The Leader: delineation of the general policies. 
2) The Islamic Consultative Assembly: Establishing laws on all matters, within 
the limits of its competence as laid down in the Constitution (Article 71). 
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3) The Government Expediency Council: 
4) The Supreme Council for National Security: Determining the defence and 
national security policies within the framework of general policies determined by 
the Leader (Article 176). 
The determination of the general policies on defence and national security are seen 
to be in the hands of the Leader. 
All the above sources of legislation employ the services of different institutions, 
specialists and consulates resulting in there being different institutions in the 
country, with the same responsibilities. A crucial issue is that there is no clear 
definition of "general policies", nor of "national security", or of issues related to 
"defence". Therefore, it would seem that a great deal of energy might be 
expended by government members worrying about the interpretation of the above 
concepts. There would also appear to be a problem of potential conflict between 
the short term interests of the government and the long term interests of the 
country, which could to some extent be resolved if clear definitions of "general 
policies", "national security" and "defence" were written in clear and unambiguous 
language into the constitution. 
It seems that the centralization of power in the hand of the Leader and the Islamic 
Jurists is a reflection of the view that they do not believe in legislation by the 
people. The Constitution provides for no continual supervision by the people over 
the three main and vital sources of power viz., the Leader, the Government 
Expediency Council and the Supreme Council for National Security. It follows 
that there are in Iran two pyramids of power and this causes much theoretical 
contention and many practical problems. 
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8.12.3 Different financial policies in the country 
According to Article 53 of the ICL, all sums collected by the government will be 
deposited in the government accounts at the central treasury, but there are some 
large companies and institutions that are under the direct supervision of the 
Leader, and their financial affairs are independent of the central treasury. Also 
according to Article 55, the National Accounting Agency inspects in the manner 
prescribed by law, all the ministries, government institutions that draw moneys 
from the central treasury, in any way. The Leader can, however, spend financial 
resources without any supervision. The result is two treasuries, the government 
treasury and the Leader's treasury. 
8.12.4 Interference between the authority of the Leader and the President. 
According to Article 113, the President of Iran has responsibility for implementing 
the Constitution and acting as the head of the executive. The responsibility for 
implementing the Constitution is a great and important job, and the President can 
be a powerful and vital resource for securing all people's affairs. This 
responsibility, however, overlaps some aspects of the authority of the Leader; for 
instance, freedom of speech and the press is enshrined in the Constitution as one 
of the rights of the people and it is the responsibility of the President to implement 
the relevant articles but there are some conditions which seriously restrict and 
render ambiguous the rights of the President. 
A: Determination of the general policies is in the hands of the Leader. 
g: The appointment of the head of the radio and television networks is the right of 
the Leader. 
C. According to Article 175, freedom of speech on radio and television of the IRI 
must be guaranteed, in keeping with "Islamic criteria" and the best interests of the 
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country. But when by enquiring as to who is to define "Islamic criteria" it can be 
concluded that this is the right of the Leader and not the President. 
There is here a clear example of how the authority of the President to implement 
his role in the constitution is beset by ambiguities and contradictions. It is 
important to mention that all radio and television networks are under government 
control. There is no private radio or television station in Iran. 
8.12.5 Authority without responsibility 
The enormous power of the Leader is without serious supervision. The 
theoretical debate is clear. According to the Traditionalists, the Leader has some 
personal and internal qualifications that protect him from any kind of deviation. 
Only in the case of his becoming incapable of fulfilling his duties or losing one of 
the qualifications that he must have held on appointment, can the Islamic Experts 
have the right to dismiss him. No one else has any right to dismiss him. It is 
clear that such rights as the Islamic Experts have for dismissal is no real control 
over the Leader and cannot be described as continual supervision and control. 
Attention to the Islamic Experts' deliberations in 1980 and 1989 makes it clear 
that their conception of the Leadership was infused with the charismatic power of 
Ayatollah Khomeini's personality. It appears that there was an insuperable 
difficulty for the Islamic Experts in extricating their response to the personality of 
their then leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, from the consideration of the objective 
reality of the role of Leader which would continue to be a part of the constitution 
into the future when Khomeini would no longer be with them and when someone 
possibly proving to be less trustworthy or able might be appointed. 
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The authority granted to Khomeini himself, (and hence to future Leaders) was far 
more than any one person could reasonably be expected to handle. 
The Leader has been given the responsibility and authority to determine the 
"general policy" of the country. The "general policy" covers an enormous area 
which can include all long term programs for all national affairs such as 
economic, political, cultural, agricultural, military, and even industrial schedules. 
Proper management of such a vast range of issues would involve the mastery of a 
hundred branches of science. At the same time submitting determination of the 
general policies to the hand of the Leader takes them out of the control of public 
supervision. Apart from the limited control granted to the Islamic Experts the 
position of the Leader is unassailable. There is no right enshrined in law for the 
public or parliament to criticise the Leader. 
Thus at present, there is a critical problem; one individual has enormous authority 
over public affairs and the people have no real control over him. They have a 
franchise and a parliament that might reasonably be expected to deal with issues 
that can be included in the "general policy" but that is, in theory at least, in the 
hands of one individual, the Leader. 
8.13 Recommendations 
According to the limitation of the principals of the Islamic texts, and according to 
what has been discussed in this study, some suggestions can be made: 
1) According to the Traditionalists' point of view, the representative of the Hidden 
Imam and the Islamic divine laws were the essential sources of the legitimacy of 
power. It can be suggested that the legitimacy of power can be based on the 
social principles of Islam. In other words, as examples, social justice, freedom 
and security can be presented as the measures for legitimacy of a government as 
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all three are original Islamic principles. Thus there would be no place for the 
traditionalists' interpretation of the legitimacy of government, and legitimacy 
would have some measurable criteria. Fair distribution of wealth, income and 
opportunities in a country can be considered as a vital measure for legitimacy of 
the power. 
2) Different interpretations of the Islamic texts are inevitable. A problem has 
been that the recognition and official acceptance of an interpretation can cause 
another interpretation to be considered contrary to Islam and/or a deviation from 
and innovation upon the original text. Any government which sets itself up as 
Islamic can be tempted to affirm its own particular interpretation as a measure for 
truth and falsehood and decree any disagreement as un-Islamic and hence evil. A 
better scenario would be where the Islamic government accepts and recognises 
other interpretations, not as a favour towards those in disagreement, but because 
all scholars have the right to state their views. 
3) There are no Islamic texts about what form Islamic government should take. 
24 
Thus, any claim to holiness made by an Islamic government is not based on the 
Islamic texts. The Islamic government and all its institutions are changeable 
forms. Islamic government is a form which must be moulded to some extent at 
least, by the time and place in which it appears. Reference to the form of 
government of the Prophet (peace be upon him), or of the infallible Imams, should 
be made taking into account their context in time and place. If anybody does not 
take these considerations into account, and tries to reconstruct or construct an 
Islamic government based solely on what existed in distant times and places, then 
24 Lambton, Ann, K. S. 1995. PP. 21-26 & Khadurri, M. 1957 
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he will find himself with a government ill adapted to its environment. It will be 
unrealistic, unsuitable and unworkable. For instance, Imam All (the first infallible 
Imam of the Shi 'ah and nephew of the Prophet) was as the Leader. At one and 
the same time he was as the equivalent of the chancellor of the exchequer, the 
minister of culture and the minister of trade. It is clear that Imam Ali's 
responsibilities were carried out in a much smaller society in a far less complex 
world than we have today where such responsibilities would, in practice, have to 
be the duties of several ministries employing perhaps hundreds of people. 
4) The reason for the establishment of the GEC was the theory of Expediency. 
Expediency of the Islamic government and Islam has been established as a 
principle of Islamic rule. It can be suggested that this principle can be considered 
as a main aspect of the theoretical basis of Islamic government. In other words, 
the Islamic principles of justice, freedom and security, etc,. must be the political 
and social priority for the Islamic government while the ways in which they are 
addressed will depend on other Expediency considerations. All other aspects of 
the people's affairs are the field of different branches of science, which can be 
determined by the specialists and experienced individuals in those areas of 
knowledge. Observation of the IRI, reveals that the specialists are going to have 
greater input and play a larger role in legislation, and also in providing 
information and judgements regarding decisions made about the overall policies 
of the government. 
5) The Government Expediency Council has become similar to a parliament 
alongside the Islamic Consultative Assembly. The GEC needs separate 
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organisations and consultants and also involves much expense. The membership 
of the GEC is composed of the Guardian Council and some specialists from 
different branches of sciences and some other experienced individuals. It seems 
that, in view of the composition of the GEC, it would be useful to establish it as a 
second parliament, perhaps an "upper house" or "senate". This single upper 
house or senate could carry out the functions of both The Guardian Council and 
the GEC. 
It is pertinent here to mention that the members of the Guardian Council can hold 
two Islamic views on the same issue. For instance, when they are in the Guardian 
Council, they have on occasion rejected the laws passed by the parliament 
because, according to their view, they were against Islamic laws. Meanwhile, 
when they are in the GEC, they agree with the same laws because of the 
Expediency ruling. Such convolutions in thought would be avoided by creating a 
single upper house on the lines described above. 
6) One of the paradoxical theories in Shi'ah thought has been the sovereignty of 
the Islamic jurists. According to the Traditionalist views, the Fuqaha are the only 
source for interpretation of the Islamic Laws. On the other hand the Fiqh 
comprised the Islamic scholars' interpretation from the Islamic texts, and had been 
collected over the centuries. Therefore it should follow that in our time Islamic 
societies need new inferences from the Islamic texts, adapted to present 
circumstances. Thus it can be reasonably argued that in addition to the Fuqaha's 
points of view, which are based on the past, it is necessary to consider the 
scientific and experiential points of view based in the present, as a condition for 
passing laws. In other words, just as responsibility for establishing the 
compatibility of the laws with Islam is with the Guardian Council, so the 
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assessment of the compatibility of any laws with scientific knowledge and 
practicability should be the responsibility of the specialists in those fields. 
7) Divine laws: 
One of the theoretical bases of the Shi'ah scholars' verdicts has been the 
implementation of the divine laws. According to their view, the divine laws are 
to be found in the Qur'an, and the Fiqh. It can be suggested that in an Islamic 
analysis, God created the whole of existence. Thus the rules of existence or "the 
laws of nature" etc., are the laws of God. All that exists is by the decree of God. 
Therefore divine laws are not limited to the Islamic texts. All scientific laws 
which have so far been discovered in the exact sciences for instance, Chemistry, 
Biology and Physics, in theoretical terms are as the verses of God. Thus a 
specialist in a branch of science is an individual who knows God's decree in his 
particular field, or at least uses God-given capacities to interpret the universe. 
Thus it can be argued that following scientific laws is concomitant with following 
God's will and establishing his order. Meanwhile, according to the Traditionalist 
view, implementation of the Islamic classical laws is the only acceptable condition 
for the legitimacy of power. But based on a monotheistic view, it can be argued 
that, for instance, that following ecological practice is following God's order and 
will. 
There need be no conflict between the will of God and the well-being of the 
people and planet. There is, of course, a contradiction between God's will, as for 
instance, justice, freedom and security, with injustice, tyrannical government and 
oppression, but not with the welfare of the people. In another words, the will of 
God is reflected in the highest principles of the human being. Implementation of 
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the principles of human rights is therefore the implementation of divine laws, and 
this can be considered as a condition for the legitimacy of power. 
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Figure 2: Nun's view on the legitimacy of power 
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Figure 3: Na'ini's view about Islamic law 
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Figure 4: Nai'ni's view on the Legitimacy Of Power 
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Figure 5: Paradox in the Nai'ni's view 
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Figure 6: Khomeini's view on the legitimacy of power 
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Figure 7: Traditionalists views on Islamic legislative power 
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Figure 11: Paradox in the I. C. L 
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The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
With latest amendments 
Published by: 
Islamic Consultative Assembly 
International Department 
FOREWORD 
The Islamic Revolution of Iran, led by Imam Khumayni' (may Allah be 
pleased with him), after a long struggle of 15 years, finally became victorious and the 
base of the American colonialism which had got strengthened and become 
impenetrable through the despotic Pahlavi regime eventually crushed. 
For the first time, a purely Islamic government independent from both the East 
and the West was formed in the Islamic land of Iran and the way was opened for a 
general, deep and all embracing Islamic awakening which spread from the farthest 
comers of the East to the Horn of Africa. 
After the establishment of the Islamic government, one of the foremost 
requirements was the codification of a comprehensive Islamic constitutional law 
which could serve as the basis for the functioning of the officials of the Islamic 
government. This work was obviously to be completed by the experts and 'ulama' of 
Islam and the jurists elected by the people. 
On 3rd August 1979 (12.5.1358 of Solar Hijrah), the election for 
Majlis-i-Khubragan (Assembly of Experts) was held by the Muslim revolutionary 
nation of Iran and the best experts were elected for the codification of the 
constitutional law. Immediately, after the formation of the Assembly of Experts, the 
work of codification of the constitutional law started and on 15th November, 1979 
(24.8.1358 SH), it received the final ratification and was presented to the great leader 
of the Revolution, Imam Khumayni (Khomeini) for his approval. With the signatures 
of the great leader, the direction for the functioning of the Islamic Republic was fixed 
and set ready. 
Therefore, the constitutional law of the Islamic Republic of Iran was the 
fruition of the sacred blood of thousands of martyrs of the Islamic Revolution and was 
finalised on the basis of the Book (the Holy Qur'an) and the Sunnah by the Assembly 
of Experts whose members were well versed in the issues of Islam and of the world 
and was also confirmed by the exalted leader of the Revolution. 
After a decade of sweet and bitter experiences of the Revolution, the great 
leader and the authorities of the Islamic Republic felt it necessary to incorporate 
certain amendments in it. So, on 24th April 1989 (4.2.1368 SH), on the orders of 
Imam Khumayni, a number of experts were appointed to amend it and on 8th July 
1989 (17.4.1368 SH), its amendment and supplement received final ratification. On 
28th July 1989 (6.5.1368 SH), it was put to referendum and was ratified by the nation; 
and the new leader, Ayatullah Sayyid Ali Khamene'i signed it. 
It is hoped that it would benefit the interested persons. 
1 Ayatollah Khomeini 
302 
CONTENTS 
PREAMBLE 
CHAPTER I: 
General Principles 
CHAPTER II: The Official Language, Script, Calendar, and Flag of the Country 
CHAPTER III: 
The Rights of the People 
CHAPTER IV: 
Economy and Financial Affairs 
CHAPTER V: 
The Right of National Sovereignty and the 
Powers Deriving Therefrom 
CHAPTER VI: 
The Legislative Power 
CHAPTER VII: 
Councils 
CHAPTER VIII: 
The Leader or Leadership Council 
CHAPTER IX: 
The Executive Power 
CHAPTER X: 
Foreign Policy 
CHAPIER XI: 
The Judiciary 
CHAPTER XII: 
Radio and Television 
CHAPTER XIII: 
Supreme Council for National Security 
CHAPTER XIV: 
The Revision of the Constitution 
Some Islamic Sources of the Constitution 
303 
In the Name of Allah, the Compassionate, the Merciful 
We sent a fore time our apostles with clear signs, and sent down with them the Book 
and the Balance that men may uphold justice. (57: 25) 
PREAMBLE 
The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran sets forth the cultural, social, 
political, and economic institutions of Iranian society on the basis of Islamic 
principles and norms, which represent the earnest aspiration of the Islamic Ummah. 
This basic aspiration was made explicit by the very nature of the great Islamic 
Revolution of Iran, as well as the course of the Muslim people's struggle, from its 
beginning until victory, as reflected in the decisive and forceful slogans raised by all 
segments of the populations. Now, at the threshold of this great victory, our nation, 
with all its being, seeks its fulfilment. 
The basic characteristic of this revolution, which distinguishes it from other 
movements that have taken place in Iran during the past hundred years, is its 
ideological and Islamic nature. After experiencing the antidespotic constitutional 
movement and the anti colonialist movement centred on the nationalization of the oil 
industry, the Muslim people of Iran learned from this costly experience that the 
obvious and fundamental reason for the failure of those movements was their lack of 
an ideological basis. Although the Islamic line of thought and the direction provided 
by militant religious leaders played an essential role in the recent movements, 
nonetheless, the struggles waged in the course of those movements quickly fell into 
stagnation due to departure from genuine Islamic positions. Thus it was that the 
awakened conscience of the nation, under the leadership of the eminent maria 
altaglld, Ayatullah al Uzma Imam Khumayni, came to perceive the necessity of 
pursuing an authentically Islamic and ideological line in its struggles. And this time, 
the militant 'ulama' of the country, who had always been in the fore front of popular 
movements, together with the committed writers and intellectuals, found new impetus 
by following his leadership. (The beginning of the most recent movement of the 
Iranian people is to be put at 1382 of the lunar Islamic calendar, corresponding to 
1341 of the solar 
Islamic calendar [1962 of the Christian calendar]). 
The Dawn of the Movement 
The devastating protest of Imam Khumayni against the American conspiracy 
known as the "White Revolution", which was a step intended to stabilize the 
foundations of despotic rule and to reinforce the political, cultural, and economic 
dependence of Iran on world imperialism, brought into being a united movement of 
the people and, immediately afterwards, a momentous revolution of the Muslim 
nation in the month of Khurdad, 1342 [June 1963]. Although this revolution was 
drowned in blood, in reality it heralded the beginning of the blossoming of a glorious 
and massive uprising, which confirmed the central role of Imam Khumayni as an 
Islamic leader. Despite his exile from Iran after his protest against the humiliating law 
of capitulation (which provided legal immunity for American advisers), the firm bond 
between the Imam and the people endured, and the Muslim nation, particularly 
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committed intellectuals and militant 'ulama, continued their struggle in the face of 
banishment and imprisonment, torture and execution. 
Throughout this time, the conscious and responsible segment of society was 
bringing enlightenment to the people from the strongholds of the mosques, centres of 
religious teaching, and universities. Drawing inspiration from the revolutionary and 
fertile teachings of Islam, they began the unrelenting yet fruitful struggle of raising the 
level of ideological awareness and revolutionary consciousness of the Muslim people. 
The despotic regime which had begun the suppression of the Islamic movement with 
barbaric attacks on the Faydiyyah Madrasah, Tehran University, and all other active 
centres of revolution, in an effort to evade the revolutionary anger of the people, 
resorted to the most savage and brutal measures. And in these circumstances, 
execution by firing squads, endurance of medieval tortures, and long terms of 
imprisonment were the price our Muslim nation had to pay to prove its firm resolve to 
continue the struggle. The Islamic Revolution of Iran was nurtured by the blood of 
hundreds of young men and women, infused with faith, who raised their cries of 
"Allahu Akbar" at daybreak in execution yards, or were gunned down by the enemy in 
streets and marketplaces. Meanwhile, the continuing declarations and messages of the 
Imam that were issued on various occasions, extended and deepened the 
consciousness and determination of the Muslim nation to the utmost. 
Islamic Government 
The plan of the Islamic government based upon wilayat al faglh, as proposed 
by Imam Khumayni at the height of the period of repression and strangulation 
practised by the despotic regime, produced a new specific, and streamlined motive for 
the Muslim people, opening up before them the true path of Islamic ideological 
struggle, and giving greater intensity to the struggle of militant and committed 
Muslims both within the country and abroad. 
The movement continued on this course until finally popular dissatisfaction 
and intense rage of the public caused by the constantly increasing repression at home, 
and the projection of the struggle at the international level after exposure of the 
regime by the 'ulama' and militant students, shook the foundations of the regime 
violently. The regime and its sponsors were compelled to decrease the intensity of 
repression and to "liberalise" the political atmosphere of the country. This, they 
imagined, will serve as a safety valve, which would prevent their eventual downfall. 
But the people, aroused, conscious, and resolute under the decisive and unfaltering 
leadership of the Imam, embarked on a triumphant, unified, comprehensive, and 
countrywide uprising. 
The Wrath of the People 
The publication of an outrageous article meant to malign the revered 'ulama' 
and in particular Imam Khumayni on 15 Day, 1356 [January 7,1978] by the ruling 
regime accelerated the revolutionary movement and caused an outburst of popular 
outrage across the country. The regime attempted to quell the volcano of the people's 
anger by drowning the protest and uprising in blood, but the bloodshed only 
quickened the pulse rate of the Revolution. The seventh day and fortieth day 
commemorations of the martyrs of the Revolution, like a series of steady heartbeats, 
gave greater vitality, intensity, vigour, and solidarity to this movement all over the 
2 Religious Academy at Qum( A city in Iran) 
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country. In the course of this popular movement, the employees of all government 
establishments took an active part in the effort to overthrow the tyrannical regime by 
calling a general strike and participating in street demonstrations. The widespread 
solidarity of men and women of all segments of society and of all political and 
religious factions, played a clearly determining role in the struggle. Especially the 
women were actively and massively present in a most conspicuous manner at all 
stages of this great struggle. The common sight of mothers with infants in their arms 
rushing towards the scene of battle and in front of the barrels of machine guns 
indicated the essential and decisive role played by this major segment of society in the 
struggle. 
The Price the Nation Paid 
After slightly more than a year of continuous and unrelenting struggle, the 
sapling of the Revolution, watered by the blood of more than 60 000 martyrs and 100 
000 wounded and disabled, not to mention billions of tumans'3 worth of property 
damage, came to bear fruit amidst the cries of "Independence! Freedom! Islamic 
government! " This great movement, which attained victory through reliance upon 
faith, unity, and the decisiveness of its leadership at every critical and sensitive 
juncture, as well as the self sacrificing spirit of the people, succeeded in upsetting all 
the calculations of imperialism and destroying all its connections and institutions, 
thereby opening a new chapter in the history of all embracing popular revolutions of 
the world. 
Bahman4 21 and 22,1357 ['February 12 and 13,1979] witnessed the collapse 
of the monarchical regime; domestic tyranny and foreign domination both of which 
were based upon it, were' shattered. This great success proved to be the vanguard of 
Islamic government a long cherished desire; of the Muslim people and brought with it 
the glad tidings of final victory. 
Unanimously, and with the participation of the Margi' al-tagl'id, the llama' of 
Islam, and the leadership, the Iranian people declared their final and firm decision, in 
the referendum on the Islamic Republic, to bring about a new political system, that of 
the Islamic Republic. A 98.2% majority of the people voted for this system. The 
Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, setting forth as it does the political, 
social, cultural, and economic institutions and their relations that are to exist in 
society, must now provide for the consolidation of the foundations of Islamic 
government, and propose the plan of a new system of government to be erected on the 
ruins of the previous taghut'is order. 
The Form of Government in Islam 
In the view of Islam, government does not derive from the interests of a class, 
nor does it serve the domination of an individual or a group. It represents rather the 
crystallisation of the political ideal of a people who bear a common faith and common 
outlook, taking an organised form in order to initiate the process of intellectual and 
ideological evolution towards the final goal, i. e., movement towards Allah. Our 
nation, in the course of its revolutionary developments, has cleansed itself of the dust 
and impurities that accumulated during the taghuti past and purged itself of foreign 
3 The Iranian Current currency 
4 The eleventh month of the Iranian Calendar 
5 The evil or demonic order 
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ideological influences, returning to authentic intellectual standpoints and world-view 
of Islam. It now intends to establish an ideal and model society on the basis of Islamic 
norms. The mission of the Constitution is to realise the ideological objectives of the 
movement and to create conditions conducive to the development of man in 
accordance with the noble and universal values of Islam. 
With due attention to the Islamic content of the Iranian Revolution, which has 
been a movement aimed at the triumph of all the mustad'afun6 over the mustakbirun, 
the Constitution provides the necessary basis for ensuring the continuation of the 
Revolution at home and abroad. In particular, in the development of international 
relations, the Constitution will strive with other Islamic and popular movements to 
prepare the way for the formation of a single world community (in accordance with 
the Qur'anic verse: "This your community is a single community, and I am your Lord, 
so worship Me" [21: 92]), and to assure the continuation of the struggle for the 
liberation of all deprived and oppressed peoples in the world. 
With due attention to the essential character of this great movement, the 
Constitution guarantees the rejection of all forms of intellectual and social tyranny and 
economic monopoly, and aims at entrusting the destinies of the people to the people 
themselves in order to break completely with the system of oppression. (This is in 
accordance with the Qur'anic verse: "He removes from them their burdens and the 
fetters that were upon them " [7: 157]) 
In creating, on the basis of ideological outlook, the political infrastructures and 
institutions that are the foundation of society, the righteous will assume the 
responsibility of governing and administering the country (in accordance with the 
Qur'anic verse: "Verily My righteous servants shall inherit the earth" [21: 105]). 
Legislation setting forth regulations for the administration of society will revolve 
around the Qur'an and the Sunnah. Accordingly, the exercise of meticulous and 
earnest supervision by just, pious, and committed scholars of Islam (al-fuqaha' 
al-'udul) is an absolute necessity. In addition, the aim of government is to foster the 
growth of man in such a way that he progresses towards the establishment of a Divine 
order (in accordance with the Qur'anic phrase: "And toward God is the journeying" 
3: 281); and to create favourable conditions for the emergence and blossoming of 
man's innate capacities, so that the theomorphic dimensions of the human being are 
manifested (in accordance with the injunction of the Prophet (S) :" Mould yourselves 
according to the Divine morality"); this goal cannot be attained without the active and 
broad participation of all segments of society in the process of social development. 
With due attention to this goal, the Constitution provides the basis of such 
participation by all members of society at all stages of the political decision making 
process on which the destiny of the country depends. In this way, during the course of 
human development towards perfection, each individual will himself be involved in, 
and responsible for the growth, advancement, and leadership of society. Precisely in 
this lies the realisation of the government of the musta, d'atun upon the earth (in 
accordance with the Qur'anic versed Id ; Y- "And we Wish to show favour to those 
who have been oppressed upon earth, and to make them leaders and the inheritors" [ 
28: 5]). 
The Wilayah(Welayat) of the Just Faqih: 
6 Those who oppressed 
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In keeping with the principles of governance [wilayat al-'amr] and the 
perpetual necessity of leadership [imamah], the Constitution provides for the 
establishment of leadership by afaqih possessing the necessary qualifications [jami' 
al-shara'i, t] and recognized as leader by the people (this is in accordance with the 
hadith "The direction of [ public J affairs is in the hands of these who are learned 
concerning God and are trustworthy in matters pertaining to what He permits and 
forbids" [ Tu , 
haf al-'uqul, p. 176]). Such leadership will prevent any deviation by the 
various organs of State from their essential Islamic duties. 
The Economy is a Means, Not an End 
In strengthening the foundations of the economy, the fundamental 
consideration will be fulfilment of the material needs of man in the course of his 
overall growth and development. This principle contrasts with other economic 
systems, where the aim is concentration and accumulation of wealth and maximisation 
of profit. In materialist schools of thought, the economy represents an end in itself, so 
that it comes to be a subversive and corrupting factor in the course of man's 
development. In Islam, the economy is a means, and all that as required of a means is 
that it should be an efficient factor contributing to the attainment of the ultimate 
goal . 
From this viewpoint, the economic programme of Islam consists of providing 
the means needed for the emergence of the various creative capacities of the human 
being. Accordingly, it is the duty of the Islamic government to furnish all citizens with 
equal and appropriate opportunities, to provide them with work, and to satisfy their 
essential needs, so that the course of their progress may be assured. 
Woman in the Constitution 
Through the creation of Islamic social infrastructures, all the elements of 
humanity that hitherto served the multifaceted foreign exploitation shall regain their 
true identity and human rights. As a part of this process, it is only natural that women 
should benefit from a particularly large augmentation of their rights, because of the 
greater oppression that they suffered under the taghuti regime. 
The family is the fundamental unit of society and the main centre for the 
growth and edification of human being. Compatibility with respect to belief and ideal, 
which provides the primary basis for man's development and growth, is the main 
consideration in the establishment of a family. It is the duty of the Islamic government 
to provide the necessary facilities for the attainment of this goal. This view of the 
family unit delivers woman from being regarded as an object or as an instrument in 
the service of promoting consumerism and exploitation. Not only does woman recover 
thereby her momentous and precious function of motherhood, rearing of ideologically 
committed human beings, she also assumes a pioneering social role and becomes the 
fellow struggler of man in all vital areas of life. Given the weighty responsibilities that 
woman thus assumes, she is accorded in Islam great value and nobility. 
An Ideological Army 
In the formation and equipping of the country's defence forces, due attention 
must be paid to faith and ideology as the basic criteria. Accordingly, the Army of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps are to be 
organized in conformity with this goal, and they will be responsible not only for 
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guarding and preserving the frontiers of the country, but also for fulfilling the 
ideological mission of jihad in God's way; that is, extending the sovereignty of God's 
law throughout the world (this is in accordance with the Qur'anic verse 
"Prepare against them whatever force you are able to muster, and strings of horses, 
striking fear into the enemy of God and your enemy, and others besides them" 
[8: 60]). 
The Judiciary in the Constitution 
The judiciary is of vital importance in the context of safeguarding the rights of 
the people in accordance with the line followed by the Islamic movement, and the 
prevention of deviations within the Islamic nation. Provision has therefore been made 
for the creation of a judicial system based on Islamic justice and operated by just 
judges with meticulous knowledge of the Islamic laws. This system, because of its 
essentially sensitive nature and the need for full ideological conformity, must be free 
from every kind of unhealthy relation and connection (this is in accordance with the 
Qur'anic verse ... 
"When you judge among the people, judge with justice "[4: 58 ] ). 
Executive Power 
Considering the particular importance of the executive power in implementing 
the laws and ordinances of Islam for the sake of establishing the rule of just relations 
over society, and considering, too, its vital role in paving the way for the attainment of 
the ultimate goal of life, the executive power must work toward the creation of an 
Islamic society. Consequently, the confinement of the executive power within any 
kind of complex and inhibiting system that delays or impedes the attainment of this 
goal is rejected by Islam. Therefore, the system of bureaucracy, the result and product 
of taghutl forms of government, will be firmly cast away, so that an executive system 
that functions efficiently and swiftly in the fulfilment of its administrative 
commitments comes into existence. 
Mass-Communication Media 
The mass communication media, radio and television, must serve the diffusion 
of Islamic culture in pursuit of the evolutionary course of the Islamic Revolution. To 
this end, the media should be used as a forum for healthy encounter of different ideas, 
but they must strictly refrain from diffusion and propagation of destructive and anti 
Islamic practices 
It is incumbent on all to adhere to the principles of this Constitution, for it 
regards as its highest aim the freedom and dignity of the human race and provides for 
the growth and development of the human being. It is also necessary that the Muslim 
people should participate actively in the construction of Islamic society by selecting 
competent and believing [ mu'min ] officials and keeping close and constant watch on 
their performance. They may then hope for success in building an ideal Islamic society 
that can be a model for all people of the world and a witness to its perfection (in 
accordance with the Qur'anic verse "Thus we made you a median community, that 
you might be witnesses to men "[2: 143 J ). 
Representatives 
The Assembly of Experts, composed of representatives of the people, 
completed its task of framing the Constitution, on the basis of the raft proposed by the 
government as well as all the proposals received from different groups of the people, 
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in one hundred and seventy five articles arranged in twelve chapters, on the eve of the 
fifteenth century after the migration of the Holy Prophet (peace and blessings be upon 
him and his Family), the founder of the redeeming school of Islam; and in accordance 
with the aims and aspirations set out above, with the hope that this century will 
witness the establishment of a universal government of the mustad'afun and the 
downfall of all the mustaibirun. 
CHAPTER I: 
General Principles 
Article 1 
The form of government of Iran is that of an Islamic Republic, endorsed by the 
people of Iran on the basis of their longstanding belief in the sovereignty of truth and 
Qur'anic justice, in the referendum of Farwardin7 9 and 10 in the year 1358 of the 
solar Islamic calendar, corresponding to Jamadi al-'Awwal8 I and 2 in the year 1399 
of the lunar Islamic calendar [March 29 and 30,1979], through the affirmative vote of 
a majority of 98.2No of eligible voters, held after the victorious Islamic Revolution 
led by the eminent marji' al-tagl'id, Avatullah al-'Uzma Imam Khumayni. 
Article 2 
The Islamic Republic is a system based on belief in: 
1. the One God (as stated in the phrase ;" There is no god except Allah"), His 
exclusive sovereignty and the right to legislate, and the necessity of submission to His 
commands; 
2. Divine revelation and its fundamental role in setting forth the laws; 
3. the return to God in the Hereafter, and the constructive role of this belief in 
the course of man's ascent towards God; 
4. the justice of God in creation and legislation; 
5. continuous leadership (imarnah) and perpetual guidance, and its 
fundamental role in ensuring the uninterrupted process of the revolution of Islam; 
6. the exalted dignity and value of man, and his freedom coupled with 
responsibility before God; 
in which equity, justice, political, economic, social, and cultural independence, and 
national solidarity are secured by recourse to: 
a. continuous ijtEhad of the fuqaha' possessing necessary qualifications, 
exercised on the basis of the Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Ma'sumun, 9 upon all of 
whom be peace; 
b. sciences and arts and the most advanced results of human experience, 
together with the effort to advance them further; 
The first month of the Iranian Calendar 
s The fifth month of the Lunar Calendar 
9Infallible 
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c. negation of all forms of oppression, both the infliction of and the submission 
to it, and of dominance, both its imposition and its acceptance. 
Article 3 
In order to attain the objectives specified in 
Article 2, the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has the duty of directing all 
its resources to the following goals: 
1. the creation of a favourable environment for the growth of moral virtues 
based on faith and piety and the struggle against all forms of vice and corruption; 
2. raising the level of public awareness in all areas, through the proper use of 
the press, mass media, and other means; 
3. free education and physical training for everyone at all levels, and the 
facilitation and expansion of higher education; 
4. strengthening the spirit of inquiry, investigation, and innovation in all areas 
of science, technology, and culture, as well as Islamic studies, by establishing research 
centres and encouraging researchers; 
5. the complete elimination of imperialism and the prevention of foreign 
influence; 
6. the elimination of all forms of despotism and autocracy and all attempts to 
monopolise power; 
7. ensuring political and social freedoms within the framework of the law; 
8. the participation of the entire people in determining their political, 
economic, social, and cultural destiny; 
9. the abolition of all forms of undesirable discrimination and the provision of 
equitable opportunities for all, in both the material and intellectual spheres; 
10. the creation of a correct administrative system and elimination of 
superfluous government organisations; 
11. all round strengthening of the foundations of national defence to the 
utmost degree by means of universal military training for the sake of safeguarding the 
independence, territorial integrity, and the Islamic order of the country; 
12. the planning of a correct and just economic system, in accordance with 
Islamic criteria, in order to create welfare, eliminate poverty, and abolish all forms of 
deprivation with respect to food, housing, work, health care, and the provision of 
social insurance for all; 
13. the attainment of self sufficiency in scientific, technological, industrial, 
agricultural, and military domains, and other similar spheres; 
14. securing the multifarious rights of all citizens, both women and men, and 
providing legal protection for all, as well as the equality of all before the law; 
15. the expansion and strengthening of Islamic brotherhood and public 
cooperation among all the people; 
16. framing the foreign policy of the country on the basis of Islamic criteria, 
fraternal commitment to all Muslims, and unsparing support to the mustad'afun of the 
world. 
Article 4 
All civil, penal financial, economic, administrative, cultural, military, political, 
and other laws and regulations must be based on Islamic criteria. This principle 
applies absolutely and generally to all articles of the Constitution as well as to all 
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other laws and regulations, and the fugaha' of the Guardian Council are judges in this 
matter. 
Article 5 
During the Occultation of the Wali al-'Asr10 (may God hasten his 
reappearance), the wilayah and leadership of the Ummah devolve upon the just [adil] 
and pious [muttaqil] faqih, who is fully aware of the circumstances of his age; 
courageous, resourceful, and possessed of administrative ability, will assume the 
responsibilities of this office in accordance with Article 107. 
Article 6 
In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the affairs of the country must be administered 
on the basis of public opinion expressed by the means of elections, including the 
election of the President, the representatives of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, 
and the members of councils, or by means of referenda in matters specified in other 
articles of this Constitution. 
Article 7 
In accordance with the command of the Qur'an contained in the verse ('Their 
affairs are by consultations among them" [42: 38]) and 9 ("Consult them in affairs" 
[3: 159]), consultative bodies such as the Islamic Consultative Assembly, the 
Provincial Councils, and the City, Region, District, and Village Councils and the likes 
of them are the decision making and administrative organs of the country. 
The nature of each of these councils, together with the manner of their 
formation, their jurisdiction, and scope of their duties and functions, is determined by 
the Constitution and laws derived from it. 
Article 8 
In the Islamic Republic of Iran, al-'amr bilma'ruf 1 ma al-nahy 'an al-munkar12 
is a universal and reciprocal duty that must be fulfilled by the people with respect to 
one another, by the government with respect to the people, and by the people with 
respect to the government. The conditions, limits, and nature of this duty will be 
specified by law. (This is in accordance with the Qur'anic verse: 
"The believers, men and women, are guardians of one another; they enjoin the good 
and forbid the evil" [9: 71 ]). 
Article 9 
In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the freedom, independence, unity, and 
territorial integrity of the country are inseparable from one another, and their 
preservation is the duty of the government and all individual citizens. No individual, 
group, or authority, has the right to infringe in the slightest way upon the political, 
cultural, economic, and military independence or the territorial integrity of Iran under 
10 Infallible waited Imam 
11 Enjoying the good (right) conduct 
12 Forbidding the evil, preventing of evil doing 
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the pretext of exercising freedom. Similarly, no authority has the right to abrogate 
legitimate freedoms, not even by enacting laws and regulations for that purpose, under 
the pretext of preserving the independence and territorial integrity of the country. 
Article 10 
Since the family is the fundamental unit of Islamic society, all laws, 
regulations, and pertinent programmes must tend to facilitate the formation of a 
family, and to safeguard its sanctity and the stability of family relations on the basis of 
the law and the ethics of Islam. 
Article 11 
In accordance with the sacred verse of the Qur'an: ("This your community is a 
single community, and I am your Lord, so worship Me" [21: 92]), all Muslims form a 
single nation, and the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has the duty of 
formulating its general policies with a view to cultivating the friendship and unity of 
all Muslim peoples, and it must constantly strive to bring about the political, 
economic, and cultural unity of the Islamic world. 
Article 12 
The official religion of Iran is Islam and the Twelver Ja fari school [in usul 
al-Din'3 and figh], and this principle will remain eternally immutable. Other Islamic 
schools, including the Hanaf, Shafi'i, Miliki, Hanbal;, and Zaydi;, are to be accorded 
full respect, and their followers are free to act in accordance with their own 
jurisprudence in performing their religious rites. These schools enjoy official status in 
matters pertaining to religious education, affairs of personal status (marriage, divorce, 
inheritance, and wills) and related litigation in courts of law. In regions of the country 
where Muslims following any one of these schools of frgh constitute the majority, 
local regulations, within the bounds of the jurisdiction of local councils, are to be in 
accordance with the respective school offiqh, without infringing upon the rights of the 
followers of other schools. 
Article 13 
Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Christian Iranians are the only recognized religious 
minorities, who, within the limits of the law, are free to perform their religious rites 
and ceremonies, and to act according to their own canon in matters of personal affairs 
and religious education. 
Article 14 
In accordance with the sacred verse: ("God does not forbid you to deal kindly 
and justly with those who have not fought against you because of your religion and 
who have not expelled you from your homes" [60: 8]), the government of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran and all Muslims are duty bound to treat non-Muslims in conformity 
with ethical norms and the principles of Islamic justice and equity, and to respect their 
human rights. This principle applies to all who refrain from engaging in conspiracy or 
activity against Islam and the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
13 Fundamental doctrines of the faith 
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CHAPTER II: 
The Official Language, Script, 
Calendar, and Flag of 
the Country 
Article 15 
The official language and script of Iran, the lingua franca of its people, is 
Persian. Official documents, correspondence, and texts, as well as text-books, must be 
in this language and script. However, the use of regional and tribal languages in the 
press and mass media, as well as for teaching of their literature in schools, is allowed 
in addition to Persian. 
Article 16 
Since the language of the Qur'an and Islamic texts and teachings is Arabic, 
and since Persian literature is thoroughly permeated by this language, it must be 
taught after elementary level, in all classes of secondary school and in all areas of 
study. 
Article 17 
The official calendar of the country takes as its point of departure the 
migration of the Prophet of Islam God's peace and blessings upon him and his Family. 
Both the solar and lunar Islamic calendars are recognized, but government offices will 
function according to the solar calendar. The official weekly holiday is Friday. 
Article 18 
The official flag of Iran is composed of green, white and red colours with the 
special emblem of the Islamic Republic, together with the motto, "God is the 
greatest". 
CHAPTER III: 
The Rights of the People 
Article 19 
All people of Iran, whatever the ethnic group or tribe to which they belong, 
enjoy equal rights; and colour, race, language, and the like, do not bestow any 
privilege. 
Article 20 
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All citizens of the country, both men and women, equally enjoy the protection 
of the law and enjoy all human, political, economic, social, and cultural rights, in 
conformity with Islamic criteria. 
Article 21 
The government must ensure the rights of women in all respects, in conformity 
with Islamic criteria, and accomplish the following goals: 
1. create a favourable environment for the growth of woman's personality and 
the restoration of her rights, both the material and intellectual; 
2. the protection of mothers, particularly during pregnancy and childbearing, 
and the protection of children without guardians; 
3. establishing competent courts to protect and preserve the family; 
4. the provision of special insurance for widows, and aged women and women 
without support; 
5. the awarding of guardianship of children to worthy mothers, in order to 
protect the interests of the children, in the absence of a legal guardian. 
Article 22 
The dignity, life, property, rights, residence, and occupation of the individual 
are inviolate, except in cases sanctioned by law. 
Article 23 
The investigation of individuals' beliefs is forbidden, and no one may be 
molested or taken to task simply for holding a certain belief. 
Article 24 
Publications and the press have freedom of expression except when it is 
detrimental to the fundamental principles of Islam or the rights of the public. The 
details of this exception will be specified by law. 
Article 25 
The inspection of letters and the failure to deliver them, the recording and 
disclosure of telephone conversations, the disclosure of telegraphic and telex 
communications, censorship, or the wilful failure to transmit them, eavesdropping, 
and all forms of covert investigation are forbidden, except as provided by law. 
Article 26 
The formation of parties, societies, political or professional associations, as 
well as religious societies, whether Islamic or pertaining to one of the recognized 
religious minorities, is permitted provided they do not violate the principles of 
independence, freedom, national unity, the criteria of Islam, or the basis of the Islamic 
Republic. No one may be prevented from participating in the aforementioned groups, 
or be compelled to participate in them. 
Article 27 
Public gatherings and marches may be freely held, provided arms are not 
carried and that they are not detrimental to the fundamental principles of Islam. 
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Article 28 
Everyone has the right to choose any occupation he wishes, if it is not contrary 
to Islam and the public interests, and does not infringe the rights of others. 
The government has the duty, with due consideration of the need of society for 
different kinds of work, to provide every citizen with the opportunity to work, and to 
create equal conditions for obtaining it. 
Article 29 
To benefit from social security with respect to retirement, unemployment, old 
age, disability, absence of a guardian, and benefits relating to being stranded, 
accidents, health services, and medical care and treatment, provided through insurance 
or other means, is accepted as a universal right. 
The government must provide the foregoing services and financial support for 
every individual citizen by drawing, in accordance with the law, on the national 
revenues and funds obtained through public contributions. 
Article 30 
The government must provide all citizens with free education up to secondary 
school, and must expand free higher education to the extent required by the country 
for attaining self-sufficiency. 
Article 31 
It is the right of every Iranian individual and family to possess housing 
commensurate with his needs. The government must make land available for the 
implementation of this article, according priority to those whose need is greatest, in 
particular the rural population and the workers. 
Article 32 
No one may be arrested except by the order and in accordance with the 
procedure laid down by law. In case of arrest, charges with the reasons for accusation 
must, without delay, be communicated and explained to the accused in writing, and a 
provisional dossier must be forwarded to the competent judicial authorities within a 
maximum of twenty four hours so that the preliminaries to the trial can be completed 
as swiftly as possible. The violation of this article will be liable to punishment in 
accordance with the law. 
Article 33 
No one can be banished from his place of residence, prevented from residing 
in the place of his choice, or compelled to reside in a given locality, except in cases 
provided by law. 
Article 34 
It is the indisputable right of every citizen to seek justice by recourse to 
competent courts. All Citizens have right of access to such courts, and no one can be 
barred from courts to which he has a legal right of recourse. 
Article 35 
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Both parties to a lawsuit have the right in all courts of law to select an attorney 
and if they flare unable to do so, arrangements must be made to provide them with 
legal counsel. 
Article 36 
The passing and execution of a sentence must be only by a competent court 
and in accordance with law. 
Article 37 
Innocence is to be presumed, and no one is to be held guilty of a charge unless 
his or her guilt has been established by a competent court. 
Article 38 
All forms of torture for the purpose of extracting confession or acquiring 
information are forbidden. Compulsion of individuals to testify, confess, or take an 
oath is not permissible; and any testimony, confession, or oath obtained under duress 
is devoid of value and credence. Violation of this article is liable to punishment in 
accordance with the law. 
Article 39 
All affronts to the dignity and repute of persons arrested, detained, imprisoned, 
or banished in accordance with the law, whatever form they may take, are forbidden 
and liable to punishment. 
Article 40 
No one is entitled to exercise his rights in a way injurious to others or 
detrimental to public interest. 
Article 41 
Iranian citizenship is the indisputable right of every Iranian, and the 
government cannot withdraw citizenship from any Iranian unless he himself requests 
it or acquires the citizenship of another country. 
Article 42 
Foreign nationals may acquire Iranian citizenship within the framework of the 
laws Citizenship may be withdrawn from such persons if another State accepts them 
as its citizens or if they request it. 
CHAPTER IV: 
Economy and Financial Affairs 
Article 43 
The economy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, with its objectives of achieving 
the economic independence of the society, uprooting poverty and deprivation, and 
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fulfilling human needs in the process of development while preserving human liberty, 
is based on the following criteria: 
1. the provision of basic necessities for all citizens: housing, food, clothing, 
hygiene, medical treatment, education, and the necessary facilities for the 
establishment of a family; 
2. ensuring conditions and opportunities of employment for everyone, with a 
view to attaining full employment; placing the means of work at the disposal of 
everyone who is able to work but lacks the means, in the form of cooperatives, 
through granting interest free loans or recourse to any other legitimate means that 
neither result in the concentration or circulation of wealth in the hands of a few 
individuals or groups, nor turns the government into a major absolute employer. These 
steps must be taken with due regard for the requirements governing the general 
economic planning of the country at each stage of its growth; 
3. the plan for the national economy, must be structured in such a manner that 
the form, content, and Fours of work of every individual will allow him sufficient 
leisure and energy to engage, beyond his professional endeavour, in intellectual, 
political, and social activities leading to all round development of his self, to take 
active part in leading the affairs of the country, improve his skills, and to make full 
use of his creativity; 
4. respect for the right to choose freely one's occupation; refraining from 
compelling anyone to engage in a particular job; and preventing the exploitation of 
another's labour; 
5. the prohibition of infliction of harm and loss upon others, monopoly, 
hoarding, usury and other illegitimate and evil practices; 
6. the prohibition of extravagance and wastefulness in all matters related to the 
economy, including consumption, investment, production, distribution, and services; 
7. the utilization of science and technology, and the training of skilled 
personnel in accordance with the developmental needs of the country's economy; 
8. prevention of foreign economic domination over the country's economy: 
9. emphasis on increase of agricultural, live stock, and industrial production in 
order to satisfy public needs and to make the country self-sufficient and free from 
dependence. 
Article 44 
The economy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is to consist of three sectors: 
state, cooperative, and private, and is to be based on systematic and sound planning. 
The state sector is to include all large scale and mother industries, foreign 
trade, major minerals, banking, insurance, power generation, dams and large-scale 
irrigation networks, radio and television, post, telegraph and telephone services, 
aviation, shipping, roads, railroads and the like: all these will be publicly owned and 
administered by the State. 
The cooperative sector is to include cooperative companies and enterprises 
concerned with production and distribution, in urban and rural areas, in accordance 
with Islamic criteria. 
The private sector consists of those activities concerned with agriculture, 
animal husbandry. industry, trade, and services that supplement the economic 
activities of the state and cooperative sectors. 
Ownership in each of these three sectors is protected by the laws of the Islamic 
Republic, in so far as this ownership is in conformity with the other articles of this 
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chapter, does not go beyond the bounds of Islamic law, contributes to the economic 
growth and progress of the country and does not harm society. 
The [precise] scope of each of these sectors, as well as the regulations and 
conditions governing their operation, will be specified by law. 
Article 45 
Public wealth and property, such as uncultivated or abandoned land, mineral 
deposits, seas, lakes, rivers and other public water-ways, mountains, valleys, forests, 
marshland, natural forests, unenclosed pastureland, legacies without heirs, property of 
undetermined ownership, and public property recovered from usurpers, shall be at the 
disposal of the Islamic government for it to utilize in accordance with the public 
interest. Law will specify detailed procedures for the utilization of each of the 
foregoing items. 
Article 46 
Everyone is the owner of the fruits of his legitimate business and labour, and 
no one may deprive another of the opportunity of business and work under the pretext 
of his right to ownership. 
Article 47 
Private ownership, legitimately acquired, is to be respected. The relevant 
criteria are determined by law. 
Article 48 
There must be no discrimination among the various provinces with regard to 
the exploitation of natural resources, utilization of public revenues, and distribution of 
economic activities among the various provinces and regions of the country, thereby 
ensuring that every region has access to the necessary capital and facilities in 
accordance with its needs and capacity for growth. 
Article 49 
The government has the responsibility of confiscating all wealth accumulated 
through usury, usurpation, bribery, embezzlement, theft, gambling, misuse of 
endowments, misuse of government contracts and transactions, the sale of un- 
cultivated lands and other resources subject to public ownership, the operation of 
centres of corruption, and other illicit means and sources, and restoring it to its 
legitimate owner; and if no such owner can be identified, it must be entrusted to the 
public treasury. This rule must be executed by the government with due care, after 
investigation and furnishing necessary evidence in accordance with the law of Islam. 
Article 50 
The preservation of the environment, in which the present as well as the future 
generations have a right to flourishing social existence, is regarded as a public duty in 
the Islamic Republic. Economic and other activities that inevitably involve pollution 
of the environment or cause irreparable damage to it are therefore forbidden. 
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Article 51 
No form of taxation may be imposed except in accordance with the law. 
Provisions for tax exemption and reduction will be determined by law. 
Article 52 
The annual budget of the country will be drawn up by the government, in the 
manner specified by law, and submitted to the Islamic Consultative Assembly for 
discussion and approval. Any change in the figures contained in the budget will be in 
accordance with the procedures prescribed by law. 
Article 53 
All sums collected by the government will be deposited into the government 
accounts at the central treasury, and all disbursements, within the limits of allocations 
approved, shall be made in accordance with law. 
Article 54 
The National Accounting Agency is to be directly under the supervision of the 
Islamic Consultative Assembly. Its organization and mode of operation in Tehran and 
at the provincial capitals, are to be determined by law. 
Article 55 
The National Accounting Agency will inspect and audit, in the manner 
prescribed by law, all the accounts of ministries, government institutions and 
companies as well as other organizations that draw, in any way, on the general budget 
of the country, to ensure that no expenditure exceeds the allocations approved and that 
all sums are spent for the specified purpose. It will collect all relevant accounts, 
documents, and records, in accordance with law, and submit to the Islamic 
Consultative Assembly a report for the settlement of each year's budget together with 
its own comments. This report must be made available to the public. 
CHAPTER V: 
The Right of National 
Sovereignty and the Powers 
Deriving Therefrom 
Article 56 
Absolute sovereignty over the world and man belongs to God, and it is He 
Who has made man master of his own social destiny. No one can deprive man of this 
divine right, nor subordinate it to the vested interests of a particular individual or 
group. The people are to exercise this divine right in the manner specified in the 
following articles. 
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Article 57 
The powers of government in the Islamic Republic are vested in the 
legislature, the judiciary, and the executive powers, functioning under the supervision 
of the absolute wilayat al-'amr and the Leadership of the Ummah, in accordance with 
the forthcoming articles of this Constitution. These powers are independent of each 
other. 
Article 58 
The functions of the legislature are to be exercised through the Islamic 
Consultative Assembly, consisting of the elected representatives of the people. 
Legislation approved by this body, after going through the stages specified in the 
articles below, is communicated to the executive and the judiciary for implementation. 
Article 59 
In extremely important economic, political, social, and cultural matters, the 
functions of the legislature may be exercised through direct recourse to popular vote 
through a referendum. Any request for such direct recourse to public opinion must be 
approved by two thirds of the members of the Islamic Consultative Assembly. 
Article 60 
The functions of the executive, except in the matters that are directly placed 
under the jurisdiction of the Leadership by the Constitution, are to be exercised by the 
President and the ministers. 
Article 61 
The functions of the judiciary are to be performed by courts of justice, which 
are to be formed in accordance with the criteria of Islam, and are vested with the 
authority to examine and settle lawsuits, protect the rights of the public, dispense and 
enact justice, and implement the Divine limits [al-hudud al-'11ahEyyah]. 
CHAPTER VI: 
The Legislative Power 
SECTION ONE: 
The Islamic consultative Assembly 
Article 62 
The Islamic Consultative Assembly is constituted by the representatives of the 
people elected directly and by secret ballot. 
321 
The qualifications of voters and candidates, as well as the nature of election, 
will be specified by law. 
Article 63 
The term of membership in the Islamic Consultative Assembly is four years. 
Elections for each term must take place before the end of the preceding term, so that 
the country is never without an Assembly. 
Article 64 
There are to be two hundred seventy members of the Islamic Consultative 
Assembly which, keeping in view the human, political, geographic and other similar 
factors, may increase by not more than twenty for each ten year period from the date 
of the national referendum of the year 1368 of the solar Islamic calendar. 
The Zoroastrians and Jews will each elect one representative; Assyrian and 
Chaldean Christians will jointly elect one representative; and Armenian Christians in 
the north and those in the south of the country will each elect one representative. 
The limits of the election constituencies and the number of representatives will 
be determined by law. 
Article 65 
After the holding of elections, sessions of the Islamic Consultative Assembly 
are considered legally valid when two-thirds of the total number of members are 
present. Drafts and bills will be approved in accordance with the code of procedure 
approved by it, except in cases where the Constitution has specified a certain quorum. 
The consent of two-thirds of all members present is necessary for the approval 
of the code of procedure of the Assembly. 
Article 66 
The manner of election of the Speaker and the Presiding Board of the 
Assembly, the number of committees and their term of office, and matters related to 
conducting the discussions and maintaining the discipline of the Assembly will be 
determined by the code of procedure of the Assembly. 
Article 67 
Members of the Assembly must take the following oath at the first session of 
the Assembly and affix their signatures to its text: 
In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful. 
In the presence of the Glorious Qur'an, I swear by God, the Exalted and 
Almighty, and undertake, swearing by my own honour as a human being, to protect 
the sanctity of Islam and guard the accomplishments of the Islamic Revolution of the 
Iranian people and the foundations of the Islamic Republic; to protect, as a just 
trustee, the honour bestowed upon me by the people, to observe piety in fulfilling my 
duties as people's representative; to remain always committed to the independence and 
honour of the country; to fulfil my duties towards the nation and the service of the 
people; to defend the Constitution; and to bear in mind, both in speech and writing 
and in the expression of my views, the independence of the country, the freedom of 
the people, and the security of their interests. 
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Members belonging to the religious minorities will swear by their own sacred 
books while taking this oath. 
Members not attending the first session will perform the ceremony of taking 
the oath at the first session they attend. 
Article 68 
In time of war and the military occupation of the country, elections due to be 
held in occupied areas or countrywide may be delayed for a specified period if 
proposed by the President of the Republic, and approved by three fourths of the total 
members of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, with the endorsement of the Guardian 
Council. If a new Assembly is not formed, the previous one will continue to function. 
Article 69 
The deliberations of the Islamic Consultative Assembly must be open, and full 
minutes of them made available to the public by the radio and the official gazette. A 
closed session may be held in emergency conditions, if it is required for national 
security, upon the requisition of the President, one of the ministers, or ten members of 
the Assembly. Legislation passed at a closed session is valid only when approved lay 
three fourths of the members in the presence of the Guardian Council. After 
emergency conditions have ceased to exist, the minutes of such closed sessions, 
together with any legislation approved in them, must be made available to the public. 
Article 70 
The President, his deputies and the ministers have the right to participate in the 
open sessions of the Assembly either collectively or individually. They may also have 
their advisers accompany them. If the members of the Assembly deem it necessary, 
the ministers are obliged to attend. [Conversely], whenever the request it, their 
statements are to be heard. 
SECTION TWO: 
Powers and Authority of the Islamic 
Consultative Assembly 
Article 71 
The Islamic Consultative Assembly can establish laws on all matters, within 
the limits of its competence as laid down in the Constitution. 
Article 72 
The Islamic Consultative Assembly cannot enact laws contrary to the usul and 
ahkam14 of the official religion of the country or to the Constitution. It is the duty of 
14 Commandments, laws 
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the Guardian Council to determine whether a violation has occurred, in accordance 
with Article 96. 
Article 73 
The interpretation of ordinary laws falls within the competence of the Islamic 
Consultative Assembly. The intent of this Article does not prevent the interpretations 
that judges may make in the course of cassation. 
Article 74 
Government bills are presented to the Islamic Consultative Assembly after 
receiving the approval of the Council of Ministers. Members' bills may be introduced 
in the Islamic Consultative Assembly if sponsored by at least fifteen members. 
Article 75 
Members' bills and proposals and amendments to government bills proposed 
by members that entail the reduction of the public income or the increase of public 
expenditure may be introduced in the Assembly only if means for compensating for 
the decrease in income or for meeting the new expenditure are also specified. 
Article 76 
The Islamic Consultative Assembly has the right to investigate and examine all 
the affairs of the country. 
Article 77 
International treaties, protocols, contracts, and agreements must be approved 
by the Islamic Consultative Assembly. 
Article 78 
All changes in the boundaries of the country are forbidden, with the exception 
of minor amendments in keeping with the interests of the country on condition that 
they are not unilateral, do not encroach on the independence and territorial integrity of 
the country, and receive the approval of four fifths of the total members of the Islamic 
Consultative Assembly. 
Article 79 
The proclamation of martial law is forbidden. In case of war or emergency 
conditions akin to war, the government has the right to impose temporarily certain 
necessary restrictions, with the agreement of the Islamic Consultative Assembly. In no 
case can such restrictions last for more than thirty days; if the need for them persists 
beyond this limit, the government must obtain new authorization for them from the 
Assembly. 
Article 80 
The taking and giving of loans or grants in aid, domestic and foreign, by the 
government, must be approved by the Islamic Consultative Assembly. 
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Article 81 
The granting of concessions to foreigners for the formation of companies or 
institutions dealing with commerce, industry, agriculture, services or mineral 
extraction, is absolutely forbidden. 
Article 82 
The employment of foreign experts is forbidden, except in cases of necessity 
and with the approval of the Islamic Consultative Assembly. 
Article 83 
Government buildings and properties forming part of the national heritage 
cannot be transferred except with the approval of the Islamic Consultative Assembly; 
that, too, is not applicable in the case of irreplaceable treasures. 
Article 84 
Every representative is responsible to the entire nation and has the right to 
express his views on all internal and external affairs of the country. 
Article 85 
The right of membership is vested with the individual, and is not transferable 
to others. The Assembly cannot delegate the power of legislation to an individual or 
committee. But whenever necessary, it can delegate the power of legislating certain 
laws to its own committees, in accordance with Article 72. In such a case, the laws 
will be implemented on a tentative basis for a period specified by the Assembly, and 
their final approval will rest with the Assembly. 
Likewise, the Assembly may, in accordance with Article 72, delegate to the 
relevant committees the responsibility for permanent approval of articles of 
association of organizations, companies, government institutions, or organizations 
affiliated to the government and or invest the authority in the government. In such a 
case, the government approvals must not be inconsistent with the principles and 
commandments of the official religion in the country and or the Constitution which 
question shall be determined by the Guardian Council in accordance with what is 
stated in Article 96. In addition to this, the government approvals shall not be against 
the laws and other general rules of the country and, while calling for implementation, 
the same shall be brought to the knowledge of the Speaker of the Islamic Consultative 
Assembly for his study and indication that the approvals in question are not 
inconsistent with the aforesaid rules. 
Article 86 
Members of the Assembly are completely free in expressing their views and 
casting their votes in the course of performing their duties as representatives, and they 
cannot be prosecuted or arrested for opinions expressed in the Assembly or votes cast 
in the course of performing their duties as representatives. 
Article 87 
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The President must obtain, for the Council of Ministers, after being formed 
and before all other business, a vote of confidence from the Assembly. Inuring his 
incumbency, he can also seek a vote of confidence for the Council of Ministers from 
the Assembly on important and controversial issues. 
Article 88 
Whenever at least one fourth of the total members of the Islamic Consultative 
Assembly pose a question to the President, or any one member of the Assembly poses 
a question to a minister on a subject relating to their duties, the President or the 
minister is obliged to attend the Assembly and answer the question. This answer must 
not be delayed more than one month in the case of the President and ten days in the 
case of the minister, except with an excuse deemed reasonable by the Islamic 
Consultative Assembly. 
Article 89 
1. Members of the Islamic Consultative Assembles can interpellate the 
Council of Ministers or an individual minister in instances they deem necessary. 
Interpellations can be tabled if they bear the signatures of at least ten members. 
The Council of Ministers or interpellated minister must be present in the 
Assembly within ten days after the tabling of the interpellation in order to answer it 
and seek a vote of confidence. If the Council of Ministers or the minister concerned 
fails to attend the Assembly, the members who tabled the interpellation will explain 
their reasons, and the Assembly will declare a vote of no confidence if it deems it 
necessary. 
If the Assembly does not pronounce a vote of confidence, the Council of 
Ministers or the minister subject to interpellation is dismissed. In both cases, the 
ministers subject to interpellation cannot become members of the next Council of 
Ministers formed immediately afterwards. 
2. In the event at least one third of the members of the Islamic Consultative Assembly 
interpellate the President concerning his executive responsibilities in relation with the 
Executive Power and the executive affairs of the country, the President must be 
present in the Assembly within one month after the tabling of the interpellation in 
order to give adequate explanations in regard to the matters raised. In the event, after 
hearing the statements of the opposing and favouring members and the reply of the 
President, 
two thirds of the members of the Assembly declare a vote of no confidence, the same 
will be communicated to the Leadership for information and implementation of 
Section (10) of Article 110 of the Constitution. 
Article 90 
Whoever has a complaint concerning the work of the Assembly or the 
executive power, or the judicial power can forward his complaint in writing to the 
Assembly. The Assembly must investigate his complaint and give a satisfactory reply. 
In cases where the complaint relates to the executive or the judiciary the Assembly 
must demand proper investigation in the matter and an adequate explanation from 
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them, and announce the results within a reasonable time. In cases where the subject of 
the complaint is of public interest, the reply must be made public. 
Article 91 
With a view to safeguard the Islamic ordinances and the Constitution, in order 
to examine the compatibility of the legislations passed by the Islamic Consultative 
Assembly with Islam, a council to be known as the Guardian Council is to be 
constituted with the following composition: 
1. six 'adil fugaha , conscious of the present needs and the issues of the day, to 
be selected by the Leader, and 
2. six jurists, specializing in different areas 
of law, to be elected by the Islamic Consultative Assembly from among the Muslim 
jurists nominated by the Head of the Judicial Power. 
Article 92 
Members of the Guardian Council are elected to serve for a period of six years, 
but during the first term, after three years have passed, half of the members of each 
group will be changed by lot and new members will be elected in their place. 
Article 93 
The Islamic Consultative Assembly does not hold any legal status if there is no 
Guardian Council in existence, except for the purpose of approving the credentials of 
its members and the election of the six jurists on the Guardian Council. 
Article 94 
All legislation passed by the Islamic Consultative Assembly must be sent to 
the Guardian Council. The Guardian Council must review it within a maximum of ten 
days from its receipt with a view to ensuring its compatibility with the criteria of 
Islam and the Constitution. If it finds the legislation incompatible, it will return it to 
the Assembly for review. Otherwise the legislation will be deemed enforceable. 
Article 95 
In cases where the Guardian Council deems ten days inadequate for 
completing the process of review and delivering a definite opinions it can request the 
Islamic Consultative Assembly to grant an extension of the time limit not exceeding 
ten days. 
Article 96 
The determination of compatibility of the legislation passed by the Islamic 
Consultative Assembly with the laws of Islam rests with the majority vote of the 
faqaha' on the Guardian Council; and the determination of its compatibility with the 
Constitution rests with the majority of all the members of the Guardian Council. 
Article 97 
In order to expedite the work, the members of the Guardian Council may 
attend the Assembly and listen to its debates when a government bill or a members' 
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bill is under discussion. When an urgent government or members' bill is placed on the 
agenda of the Assembly, the members of the Guardian Council must attend the 
Assembly and make their views known. 
Article 98 
The authority of the interpretation of the Constitution is vested with the 
Guardian Council, which is to be done with the consent of three fourths of its 
members. 
Article 99 
The Guardian Council has the responsibility of supervising the elections of the 
Assembly of Experts for Leadership, the President of the Republic, the Islamic 
Consultative Assembly, and the direct recourse to popular opinion and referenda. 
CHAPTER VII: 
Councils 
Article 100 
In order to expedite social, economic, development, public health, cultural, 
and educational programmes and facilitate other affairs relating to public welfare with 
the cooperation of the people according to local needs, the administration of each 
village, division, city, municipality, and province will be supervised by a council to be 
named the Village, Division, City, Municipality, or Provincial Council. Members of 
each of these councils will be elected by the people of the locality in question. 
Qualifications for the eligibility of electors and candidates for these councils, 
as well as their functions and powers, the mode of election, the jurisdiction of these 
councils, the hierarchy of their authority, will be determined by law, in such a way as 
to preserve national unity, territorial integrity, the system of the Islamic Republic and 
the sovereignty of the central government. 
Article 101 
In order to prevent discrimination in the preparation of programmes for the 
development and welfare of the provinces, to secure the cooperation of the people, 
and to arrange for the supervision of coordinated implementation of such programmed 
a Supreme Council of the Provinces will be formed, composed of representatives of 
the Provincial Councils. 
Law w ill specify the manner in which this council is to be formed and the 
functions that it is to fulfil. 
Article 102 
The Supreme Council of the Provinces has the right within its jurisdiction, to 
draft bills and to submit them to the Islamic Consultative Assembly, either directly or 
through the government. These bills must be examined by the Assembly. 
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Article 103 
Provincial governors, city governors, divisional governors, and other officials 
appointed by the government must abide by all decisions taken by the councils within 
their jurisdiction. 
Article 104 
In order to ensure Islamic equity and cooperation in chalking out the 
programmes and to bring about the harmonious progress of all units of production, 
both industrial and agricultural, councils consisting of the representatives of the 
workers, peasants, other employees, and managers, will be formed in educational and 
administrative units, units of service industries, and other units of a like nature, 
similar councils will be formed, composed of representatives of the members of those 
units. 
The mode of the formation of these councils and the scope of their functions 
and powers, are to be specified by law. 
Article 105 
Decisions taken by the councils must not be contrary to the criteria of Islam 
and the laws of the country. 
Article 106 
The councils may not be dissolved unless they deviate from their legal duties. 
The body responsible for determining such deviation, as well as the manner for 
dissolving the councils and reforming them, will be specified by law. 
Should a council have any objection to its dissolution, it has the right to appeal 
to a competent court, and the court is duty bound to examine its complaint outside the 
docket sequence. 
CHAPTER VIII: 
The Leader or Leadership 
Council 
Article 107 
After the demise of the eminent margin al-taqlid and great leader of the 
universal Islamic revolution, and founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatullah al 
Uzma Imam Khumayni - quddisa sirrah al-shar/s-who was recognised and 
accepted as margi'16 and Leader by a decisive majority of the people, the task of 
s May his spirit be sanctified 
16 Marjaee Taglid: Source of emulation 
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appointing the Leader shall be vested with the experts elected by the people. The 
experts will review and consult among themselves concerning all the fuqaha' 
possessing the qualifications specified in Articles 5 and 109. In the event they find one 
of them better versed in Islamic regulations, the subjects of figh, or in political and 
social issues, or possessing general popularity or special prominence for any of the 
qualifications mentioned in Article 109, they shall elect him as the Leader. Otherwise, 
in the absence of such a superiority, they shall elect and declare one of them as the 
Leader. The Leader thus elected by the Assembly of Experts, shall assume all the 
powers of the wilayat al-amr and all the responsibilities arising therefrom. 
The Leader is equal with the rest of the people of the country in the eyes of 
law. 
Article 108 
The law setting out the number and qualifications of the experts [mentioned in 
the preceding article], the mode of their election, and the code of procedure regulating 
the sessions during the first term must be drawn up by the fuqaha' on the first 
Guardian Council, passed by a majority of votes and then finally approved by the 
Leader of the Revolution. The power to make any subsequent change or a review of 
this law, or approval of all the provisions concerning the duties of the experts is vested 
in themselves. 
Article 109 
Following are the essential qualifications and conditions for the Leader: 
a. scholarship, as required for performing the functions of mufti'? in different 
fields offiqh. 
b. Justice and piety, as required for the leadership of the Islamic Ummah. 
c. right political and social perspicacity, prudence, courage, administrative 
facilities and adequate capability for leadership. 
In case of multiplicity of persons fulfilling the above qualifications and 
conditions, the person possessing the better jurisprudential and political perspicacity 
will be given preference. 
Article 110 
Following are the duties and powers of the Leadership: 
1. Delineation of the general policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran after 
consultation with the Nation's Exigency Council. 
2. Supervision over the proper execution of the general policies of the system. 
3. Issuing decrees for national referenda. 
4. Assuming supreme command of the armed forces. 
5. Declaration of war and peace, and the mobilization of the armed forces. 
6. Appointment, dismissal, and acceptance of resignation of: 
a. the fugaha' on the Guardian Council. 
b. the supreme judicial authority of the country. 
c. the head of the radio and television network of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
17 Jurist consult, Jurist 
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d. the chief of the joint staff, 
e. the chief commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps. 
f. the supreme commanders of the armed forces. 
7. Resolving difference between the three wings of the armed forces and 
regulation of their relations. 
8. Resolving the problems, which cannot he solved by conventional methods, 
through the Nation's Exigency Council. 
9. Signing the decree formalizing the election of the President of the Republic 
by the people. The suitability of candidates for the Presidency of the Republic, with 
respect to the qualifications specified in the Constitution, must be confirmed before 
elections take place by the Guardian Council, and, in the case of the first term [of the 
Presidency], by the Leadership; 
10. Dismissal of the President of the Republic, with due regard for the interests 
of the country, after the Supreme Court holds him guilty of the violation of his 
constitutional duties, or after a vote of the Islamic Consultative Assembly testifying to 
his incompetence on the basis of Article 89 of the Constitution. 
11. Pardoning or reducing the sentences of convicts, within the framework of 
Islamic criteria, on a recommendation [to that effect] from the Head of judicial power. 
The Leader may delegate part of his duties and powers to another person. 
Article 111 
Whenever the Leader becomes incapable of fulfilling his constitutional duties, 
or loses one of the qualifications mentioned in Articles 5 and 109, or it becomes 
known that he did not possess some of the qualifications initially, he will be 
dismissed. The authority of determination in this matter is vested with the experts 
specified in Article 108. 
In the event of the death, or resignation or dismissal of the Leader, the experts shall 
take steps within the shortest possible time for the appointment of the new Leader. 
Till the appointment of the new Leader, a council consisting of the President, head of 
the judiciary power, and a fagih from the Guardian Council, upon the decision of the 
Nation's Exigency Council, shall temporarily take over all the duties of the Leader. In 
the event, during this period, any one of them is unable to fulfil his duties for 
whatsoever reason, another person, upon the decision of majority of fuqaha' in the 
Nation's Exigency Council shall be elected in his place. 
This council shall take action in respect of items 1,3,5, and 10, and sections d, 
e and f of item 6 of Article 110, upon the decision of three fourths of the members of 
the Nation's Exigency Council. 
Whenever the Leader becomes temporarily unable to perform the duties of 
leadership owing to his illness or any other incident, then during this period, the 
council mentioned in this Article shall assume his duties. 
Article 112 
1 Upon the order of the Leader, the Nation's Exigency Council shall meet at any 
time the Guardian Council judges a proposed bill of the Islamic Consultative 
Assembly to be against the principles of Shariah or the Constitution, and the 
Assembly is unable to meet the expectations of the Guardian Council. Also, the 
Council shall meet for consideration on any issue forwarded to it by the Leader and 
shall carry out any other responsibility as mentioned in this Constitution. 
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The permanent and changeable members of the Council shall be appointed by 
the Leader. The rules for the Council shall be formulated and approved by the Council 
members subject to the confirmation by the Leader. 
CHAPTER IX: 
The Executive Power 
SECTION ONE: 
The Presidency 
Article 113 
After the office of Leadership, the President is the highest official in the 
country. His is the responsibility for implementing the Constitution and acting as the 
head of the executive, except in matters directly concerned with (the office of) the 
Leadership. 
Article 114 
The President is elected for a four year term by the direct vote of the people. 
His re election for a successive term is permissible only once. 
Article 115 
The President must be elected from among religious and political personalities 
possessing the following qualifications: 
Iranian origin; Iranian nationality; administrative capacity and resourcefulness; 
a good past record; trustworthiness and piety; convinced belief in the fundamental 
principles of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the official madhhab'8 of the country. 
Article 116 
Candidates nominated for the post of President must declare their candidature 
officially. Law lays down the manner in which the President is to be elected. 
Article 117 
The President is elected by an absolute majority of votes polled by the voters. But if none of the candidates is able to win such a majority in the first round, voting 
will take place a second time on Friday of the following week. In the second round 
18 Religious school 
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only the two candidates who received greatest number of votes in the first round will 
participate. If, however, some of the candidates securing greatest votes in the first 
round withdraw from the elections, the final choice will be between the two 
candidates who won greater number of votes than all the remaining candidates. 
Article 118 
Responsibility for the supervision of the election of the President 
lies with the 
Guardian Council, as stipulated in Article 99. But before the establishment of the 
first 
Guardian Council, however, it lies with a supervisory body to be constituted by 
law. 
Article 119 
The election of a new President must take place no later than one month before 
the end of the term of the outgoing President. In the interim period before the election 
of the new President and the end of the term of the outgoing President, the outgoing 
President will perform the duties of the President. 
Article 120 
In case any of the candidates whose suitability is established in terms of the 
qualifications listed above should die within ten days before polling day, the elections 
will be postponed for two weeks. If one of the candidates securing greatest number of 
votes dies in the intervening period between the first and second rounds of voting, the 
period for holding (the second round of) the election will be extended for two weeks. 
Article 121 
The President must take the following oath and affix his signature to it at a 
session of the Islamic Consultative Assembly in the presence of the head of the 
judicial power and the members of the Guardian Council: 
In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful, I, as President, swear, 
in the presence of the Noble Qur'an and the people of Iran, by God, the Exalted and 
Almighty, that I will guard the official religion of the country, the order of the Islamic 
Republic and the Constitution of the country; that I will devote all my capacities and 
abilities to the fulfilment of the responsibilities that I have assumed; that I will 
dedicate myself to the service of the people, the honour of the country, the 
propagation of religion and morality, and the support of truth and justice, refraining 
from every kind of arbitrary behaviour; that I will protect the freedom and dignity of 
all citizens and the rights that the Constitution has accorded the people; that in 
guarding the frontiers and the political, economic, and cultural independence of the 
country I will not shirk any necessary measure; that, seeking help from God and 
following the Prophet of Islam and the infallible Imams (peace be upon them), I will 
guard, as a pious and selfless trustee, the authority vested in me by the people as a 
sacred trust, and transfer it to whomever the people may elect after me. 
Article 122 
The President, within the limits of his powers and duties, which he has by 
virtue of this Constitution or other laws, is responsible to the people, the Leader and 
the Islamic Consultative Assembly. 
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Article 123 
The President is obliged to sign legislation approved by the Assembly or the 
result of a referendum, after the (related) legal procedures have been completed and it 
has been communicated to him. After signing, he must forward it to the responsible 
authorities for implementation. 
Article 124 
The President may have deputies for the performance of his constitutional 
duties. 
With the approval of the President, the first deputy of the President shall be 
vested with the responsibilities of administering the affairs of the Council of Ministers 
and coordination of functions of other deputies. 
Article 125 
The President or his legal representative has the authority to sign treaties, 
protocols, contracts, and agreements concluded by the Iranian government with other 
governments, as well as agreements pertaining to international organizations, after 
obtaining the approval of the Islamic Consultative Assembly. 
Article 126 
The President is responsible for national planning and budget and state 
employment affairs and may entrust the administration of these to others. 
Article 127 
In special circumstances, subject to approval of the Council of Ministers, the 
President may appoint one or more special representatives with specific powers. In 
such cases, the decisions of his representative(s) will be considered as the same as 
those of the President and the Council of Ministers. 
Article 128 
The ambassadors shall be appointed upon the recommendation of the foreign 
minister and approval of the President. The President signs the credentials of 
ambassadors and receives the credentials presented by the ambassadors of the foreign 
countries. 
Article 129 
The award of state decorations is a prerogative of the President. 
Article 130 
The President shall submit his resignation to the Leader and shall continue 
performing his duties until his resignation is not accepted. 
Article 131 
In case of death, dismissal, resignation, absence, or illness lasting longer than two 
months of the President, or when his term in office has ended and a new president has 
not been elected due to some impediments, or similar other circumstances, his first 
deputy shall assume, with the approval of the Leader, the powers and functions of the 
President. The Council, consisting of the Speaker of the Islamic Consultative 
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Assembly, head of the judicial power, and the first deputy of the President, is obliged 
to arrange for a new President to be elected within a maximum period of fifty days. In 
case of death of the first deputy to the President, or other matters which prevent him to 
perform his duties, or when the President does not have a first deputy, the Leader shall 
appoint another person in his place. 
Article 132 
During the period when the powers and responsibilities of the President are 
assigned to his first deputy or the other person in accordance with Article 131, neither 
can the ministers be interpellated nor can a vote of no confidence be passed against 
them. Also, neither can any step be undertaken for a review of the Constitution, nor a 
national referendum be held. 
SECTION TWO: 
The President and Ministers 
Article 133 
Ministers will be appointed by the President and will be presented to the 
Assembly for a vote of confidence. With the change of Assembly, a new vote of 
confidence will not be necessary. The number of ministers and the jurisdiction of each 
will be determined by law. 
Article 134 
The President is the head of the Council of Ministers. He supervises the work 
of the ministers and takes all necessary measures to coordinate the decisions of the 
government. With the cooperation of the ministers, he determines the programme and 
policies of the government and implements the laws. 
In the case of discrepancies, or interference in the constitutional duties of the 
government agencies, the decision of the Council of Ministers at the request of the 
President shall be binding provided it does not call for an interpretation of or 
modification in the laws. 
The President is responsible to the Assembly for the actions of the Council of 
Ministers. 
Article 135 
The ministers shall continue in office unless they are dismissed, or given a 
vote of no confidence by the Assembly as a result of their interpellation, or a motion 
for a vote of no confidence against them. 
The resignation of the Council of Ministers, or that of each of them shall be 
submitted to the President, and the Council of Ministers shall continue to function 
until such time as the new government is appointed. 
The President can appoint a caretaker for a maximum period of three months 
for the ministries having no minister. 
Article 136 
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The President can dismiss the ministers and in such a case he must obtain a 
vote of confidence for the new minister(s) from the Assembly. In case half of the 
members of the Council of Ministers are changed after the government has received 
its vote of confidence from the Assembly, the government must seek a fresh vote of 
confidence from the Assembly. 
Article 137 
Each of the ministers is responsible for his duties to the President and the 
Assembly, but in matter approved by the Council of Ministers as a whole, he is also 
responsible for the actions of the others. 
Article 138 
In addition to instances in which the Council of Ministers or a single minister 
is authorised to frame procedures for the implementation laws, the Council of 
Ministers has the right to lay down rules, regulations, and procedures for performing 
its administrative duties, ensuring the implementation of laws, and setting up 
administrative bodies. Each of the ministers also has the right to frame regulations and 
issue circulars in matters within his jurisdiction and in conformity with the decisions 
of the Council of Ministers. However, the content of all such regulations must not 
violate the letter or the spirit of the law. 
The government can entrust any portion of its task to the commissions 
composed of some ministers. The decisions of such commissions within the rules will 
be binding after the endorsement of the President. 
The ratifications and the regulations of the government and the decisions of 
the commissions mentioned under this Article shall also be brought to the notice of 
the Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly while being communicated for 
implementation so that in the event he finds them contrary to law, he may send the 
same stating the reason for reconsideration by the Council of Ministers. 
Article 139 
The settlement of claims relating to public and state property or the referral 
thereof to arbitration is in every case dependent on the approval of the Council of 
Ministers, and the Assembly must be informed of these matters. In cases where one 
party to the dispute is a foreigner, as well as in important cases that are purely 
domestic, the approval of the Assembly must also be obtained. Law will specify the 
important cases intended here. 
Article 140 
Allegations of common crimes against the President, his deputies, and the 
ministers will be investigated in common courts of justice with the knowledge of the 
Islamic Consultative Assembly. 
Article 141 
The President, the deputies to the President, ministers, and government 
employees cannot hold more than one government position, and it is forbidden for 
them to hold any kind of additional post in institutions of which all or a part of the 
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capital belongs to the government or public institutions, to be a member of the Islamic 
Consultative Assembly, to practise the profession of attorney or legal adviser, or to 
hold the post of president, managing director, or membership of the board of directors 
of any kind of private company, with the exception of cooperative companies 
affiliated to the government departments and institutions. 
Teaching positions in universities and research institutions are exempted from 
this rule. 
Article 142 
The assets of the Leader, the President, the deputies to the President, and 
ministers, as well as those of their spouses and offspring, are to be examined bef ore 
and after their term of office by the head of the judicial power, in order to ensure they 
have not increased in a fashion contrary to law. 
SECTION THREE: 
The Army and the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps 
Article 143 
The Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran is responsible for guarding the 
independence and territorial integrity of the country, as well as the order of the Islamic 
Republic. 
Article 144 
The Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran must be an Islamic Army, i. e., 
committed to Islamic ideology and the people, and must recruit into its service 
individuals who have faith in the objectives of the Islamic Revolution and are devoted 
to the cause of realizing its goals. 
Article 145 
No foreigner will be accepted into the Army or security forces of the country. 
Article 146 
The establishment of any kind of foreign military base in Iran, even for 
peaceful purposes, is forbidden. 
Article 147 
In time of peace, the government must utilize the personnel and technical 
equipment of the Army in relief operations, and for educational and productive ends, 
and the Construction Jihad, while fully observing the criteria of Islamic justice and 
ensuring that such utilization does not harm the combat readiness of the Army. 
Article 148 
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All forms of personal use of military vehicles, equipment, and other means, as 
well as taking advantage of Army personnel as personal servants and chauffeurs or in 
similar capacities, are forbidden. 
Article 149 
Promotions in military rank and their withdrawal take place in accordance with 
the law. 
Article 150 
The Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, organized in the early days of the 
triumph of the Revolution, is to be maintained so that it may continue in its role of 
guarding the Revolution and its achievements. The scope of the duties of this Corps, 
and its areas of responsibility, in relation to the duties and areas of responsibility of 
the other armed forces, are to be determined by law, with emphasis on brotherly 
cooperation and harmony among them. 
Article 151 
In accordance with the noble Qur'anic verse: 
Prepare against them whatever force you are able to muster, and horses ready 
for battle, striking fear into God's enemy and your, enemy, and others beyond them 
unknown to you but known to God... (8: 60). 
the government is obliged to provide a programme of military training, with all 
requisite facilities, for all its citizens, in accordance with the Islamic criteria, in such a 
way that all citizens will always be able to engage in the armed defence of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. The possession of arms, however, requires the granting of 
permission by the competent authorities. 
CHAPTER X: 
Foreign Policy 
Article 152 
The foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is based upon the rejection 
of all forms of domination, both the exertion of it and submission to it, the 
preservation of the independence of the country in all respects and its territorial 
integrity, the defence of the rights of all Muslims, non alignment with respect to the 
hegemonist superpowers, and the maintenance of mutually peaceful relations with all 
non belligerent States. 
Article 153 
Any form of agreement resulting in foreign control over the natural resources, 
economy, army, or culture of the country, as well as other aspects of the national life, 
is forbidden. 
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Article 154 
The Islamic Republic of Iran has as its ideal human felicity throughout human 
society, and considers the attainment of independence, freedom, and rule of justice 
and truth to be the right of all people of the world. Accordingly, while scrupulously 
refraining from all forms of interference in the internal affairs of other nations, it 
supports the just struggles of the mustad'afun against the mustakbirun in every corner 
of the globe. 
Article 155 
The government of the Islamic Republic of Iran may grant political asylum to 
those who seek it unless they are regarded as traitors and saboteurs according to the 
laws of Iran. 
CHAPTER XI: 
The Judiciary 
Article 156 
The judiciary is an independent power, the protector of the rights of the 
individual and society, responsible for the implementation of justice, and entrusted 
with the following duties: 
1. investigating and passing judgement on grievances, violations of rights, and 
complaints; the resolving of litigation; the settling of disputes; and the taking of all 
necessary decisions and measures in probate matters as the law may determine; 
2. restoring public rights and promoting justice and legitimate freedoms; 
3. supervising the proper enforcement of laws; 
4. uncovering crimes; prosecuting, punishing, and chastising criminals; and 
enacting the penalties and provisions of the Islamic penal code; 
5. taking suitable measures to prevent the occurrence of crime and to reform 
criminals. 
Article 157 
In order to fulfil the responsibilities of the judiciary power in all the matters 
concerning judiciary, administrative and executive areas, the Leader shall appoint a 
just Mujtahid well versed in judiciary affairs and possessing prudence and 
administrative abilities as the head of the judiciary power for a period of five years 
who shall be the highest judicial authority. 
Article 158 
The head of the judiciary branch is responsible for the following: 
1. Establishment of the organizational structure necessary for the 
administration of justice commensurate with the responsibilities mentioned under 
Articie 156. 
2. Drafting judiciary bills appropriate for the Islamic Republic. 
3. Employment of just and worthy judges, their dismissal, appointment, 
transfer, assignment to particular duties, promotions, and carrying out similar 
administrative duties, in accordance with the law. 
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Article 159 
The courts of justice are the official bodies to which all grievances and 
complaints are to be referred. The formation of courts and their jurisdiction is to be 
determined by law. 
Article 160 
The Minister of Justice owes responsibility in all matters concerning the 
relationship between the judiciary, on the one hand, and the executive and legislative 
branches, on the other hand. He will be elected from among the individuals proposed 
to the President by the head of the judiciary branch. 
The head of the judiciary may delegate full authority to the Minister of Justice 
in financial and administrative areas and for employment of personnel other than 
judges in which case the Minister of Justice shall have the same authority and 
responsibility as those possessed by the other ministers in their capacity as the highest 
ranking government executives. 
Article 161 
The Supreme Court is to be formed for the purpose of supervising the correct 
implementation of the laws by the courts, ensuring uniformity of judicial procedure, 
and fulfilling any other responsibilities assigned to it by law, on the basis of 
regulations to be established by the head of the judicial branch. 
Article 162 
The chief of the Supreme Court and the Prosecutor-General must both be just 
mujtahids well versed in judicial matters. They will be nominated by the head of the 
judiciary branch for a period of five years, in consultation with the judges of the 
Supreme Court. 
Article 163 
The conditions and qualifications to be fulfilled by a judge will be determined 
by law, in accordance with the criteria of filth. 
Article 164 
A judge cannot be removed, whether temporarily or permanently, from the 
post he occupies except by trial and proof of his guilt, or in consequence of a violation 
entailing his dismissal. A judge cannot be transferred or redesignated without his 
consent, except in cases when the interest of society necessitates it, that too, with the 
decision of the head of the judiciary branch after consultation with the chief of the 
Supreme Court and the Prosecutor General. The periodic transfer and rotation of 
judges will be in accordance with general regulations to be laid down by law. 
Article 165 
Trials are to be held openly and members of the public may attend without any 
restriction; unless the court determines that an open trial would be detrimental to 
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public morality or discipline, or if in case of private disputes, both the parties request 
not to hold open hearing. 
Article 166 
The verdicts of courts must be well reasoned out and documented with 
reference to the articles and principles of the law in accordance with which they are 
delivered. 
Articl 167 
The Judge is bound to endeavour to judge each case on the basis of the codified law. 
In case of the absence of any such law, he has to deliver his judgement on the basis of 
'9 authoritative Islamic sources and authentic fatawa. 
He, on the pretext of the silence of or deficiency of law in the matter, or its 
brevity or contradictory nature, cannot refrain from admitting and examining cases 
and delivering his judgement. 
Article 168 
Political and press offences will be tried openly and in the presence of a jury, 
in courts of justice. The manner of the selection of the jury, its powers, and the 
definition of political offences, will be determined by law in accordance with the 
Islamic criteria. 
Article 169 
No act or omission may be regarded as a crime with retrospective effect on the 
basis of a law framed subsequently. 
Article 170 
Judges of courts are obliged to refrain from executing statutes and regulations 
of the government that are in conflict with the laws or the norms of Islam, or lie 
19Declaration of the unknown rule which is found by Mt jtahid. 
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outside the competence of the executive power. Everyone has the right to demand the 
annulment of any such regulation from the Court of Administrative Justice. 
Article 171 
Whenever an individual suffers moral material loss as the result of a default or 
error the judge with respect to the subject matter of a case or the verdict delivered, or 
the application of a rule in a particular case, the defaulting judge must stand surety for 
the reparation of that loss in accordance with the Islamic criteria, if it be a case of 
default. Otherwise, losses will be compensated for by the State. In all such cases, the 
repute and good standing of the accused will be restored. 
Article 172 
Military courts will be established by law to investigate crimes committed in 
connection with military or security duties by members of the Army, the Gendarmerie, 
the police, and the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps. They will be tried in public 
courts, however, for common crimes or crimes committed while serving the 
department of justice in executive capacity. The office of military prosecutor and the 
military courts form part of the judiciary and are subject to the same principles that 
regulate the judiciary. 
Article 173 
In order to investigate the complaints, grievances, and objections of the people 
with respect to government officials, organs, and statutes, a court will be established 
to be known as the Court of Administrative Justice under the supervision of the head 
of the judiciary branch. The jurisdiction, powers, and mode of operation of this court 
will be laid down by law. 
Article 174 
In accordance with the right of the judiciary to supervise the proper conducting 
of affairs and the correct implementation of laws by the administrative organs of the 
government, an organization will be constituted under the supervision of the head of 
the judiciary branch to be known as the National General Inspectorate. The powers 
and duties of this organization will be determined by law. 
CHAPTER XII: 
Radio and Television 
Article 175 
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The freedom of expression and dissemination of thoughts in the Radio and 
Television of the Islamic Republic or Iran must be guaranteed in keeping with the 
Islamic criteria and the best interests of the country. 
The appointment and dismissal of the head of the Radio and Television of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran rests with the Leader. A council consisting of two 
representatives each of the President, the head of the judiciary branch and the Islamic 
Consultative Assembly shall supervise the functioning of this organization. 
The policies and the manner of managing the organization and its supervision 
will be determined by law. 
CHAPTER XIII: 
Supreme Council for National 
Security 
Article 176 
In order to safeguarding the national interests and preserving the Islamic 
Revolution, the territorial integrity and national sovereignty, a Supreme Council for 
National Security presided over by the President shall be constituted to fulfil the 
following responsibilities: 
1. Determining the defence and national security policies within the 
framework of general policies determined by the Leader. 
2. Coordination of activities in the areas relating to politics, intelligence, 
social, cultural and economic fields in regard to general defence and security policies. 
3. Exploitation of materialistic and intellectual resources of the country for 
facing the internal and external threats. 
The Council shall consist of: heads of three branches of the government, chief 
of the Supreme Command Council of the Armed Forces, the officer in charge of the 
planning and budget affairs, two representatives nominated by the Leader, ministers of 
foreign affairs, interior, and information, a minister related with the subject, and the 
highest ranking officials from the Armed Forces and the Islamic Revolution's Guards 
Corps. 
Commensurate with its duties, the Supreme Council for National Security 
shall form sub councils such as Defence Sub council and National Security Sub 
council. Each Sub council will be presided over by the President or a member of the 
Supreme Council for National Security appointed by the President. 
The scope of authority and responsibility of the Sub councils will be 
determined by law and their organizational structure will be approved by the Supreme 
Council for National Defence. 
The decisions of the Supreme Council for National Security shall be effective 
after the confirmation by the Leader. 
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CHAPTER XIV: 
The Revision of the Constitution 
Article 177 
The revision of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, whenever 
needed by the circumstances, will be done in the following manner: 
The Leader issues an edict to the President after consultation with the Nation's 
Exigency Council stipulating the amendments or additions to be made by the Council 
for Revision of the Constitution which consists of: 
1. Members of the Guardian Council. 
2. Heads of the three branches of the government. 
3. Permanent members of the Nation's Exigency Council. 
4. Five members from among the Assembly of Experts. 
5. Ten representatives selected by the Leader. 
6. Three representatives from the Council of Ministers. 
7. Three representatives from the judiciary branch. 
8. Ten representatives from among the members of the Islamic Consultative 
Assembly. 
9. Three representatives from among the university professors. 
The method of working, manner of selection and the terms and conditions of 
the Council shall be determined by law. 
The decisions of the Council, after the confirmation and signatures of the 
Leader, shall be valid if approved by an absolute majority vote in a national 
referendum. 
The provisions of Article 59 of the Constitution shall not apply to the 
referendum for the "Revision of the Constitution. " 
The contents of the Articles of the Constitution related to the Islamic character 
of the political system; the basis of all the rules and regulations according to Islamic 
criteria; the religious footing; the objectives of the Islamic Republic of Iran; the 
democratic character of the government; the wilayal al'amr; the Imamate of Ummah; 
and the administration of the affairs of the country based on national referenda, 
official religion of Iran [Islam] and the school [Twelver Ja'fari ] are unalterable. 
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